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STUDIES IN HISTORY, ECONOMICS AND PUBLIC LAW 

EDITED BY THE FACULTY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE OF 
COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY 

Volume XXXIX] [Number 1 

Whole Number 102 



THE MAKING OF THE 
BALKAN STATES 



BY 



WILLIAM SMITH MURRAY, Ph.D. 





COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY 

LONGMANS, GREEN & CO., AGENTS 

London: P. S. King & Son 

I9IO 



"olograph 



Columbia Uttiuex-sitg 
FACULTY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE 



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i 

THE MAKING OF THE BALKAN STATES 



STUDIES IN HISTORY, ECONOMICS AND PUBLIC LAW 

EDITED BY THE FACULTY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE OF 
COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY 

II 

Volume XXXIX] [Number 1 

Whole Number 102 



THE MAKING OF THE 
BALKAN STATES 



BY 

WILLIAM SMITH MURRAY, Ph.D. 




Ntvo Jgork 
COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY 

LONGMANS, GREEN & CO., AGENTS 

London: P. S. King & Son 

I9IO 









Copyright, 1910, 

BY 

William Smith Murray 






PREFACE 

Within the past hundred years Turkey has lost some- 
what more than two-thirds of her European territory and 
population. Much the larger part of this loss has gone to 
make up the four constitutional monarchies that are com- 
monly called the Balkan States. 

This study aims to give a brief account of the peoples 
in these four groups so long under Ottoman rule, and to 
trace somewhat in detail the movements that have led to 
their independence. Parts of this field already covered by 
special treatises have been passed over here quite briefly. 
The works giving the fuller treatment have usually been 
cited. 

Only incidental references are made in this sketch to the 
other three groups (in Greece. Bessarabia and Bosnia- 
Herzegovina) that have also been completely separated, 
more or less in the same connection, from Turkey. The 
chief effort here has been to show the actual working of 
the forces that have finally added Roumania, Bulgaria, 
Servia and Montenegro to the family of European nations. 

I gratefully acknowledge my indebtedness to Professor 
William M. Sloane and Professor James T. Shotwell, who 
have aided me with most helpful advice and criticisms. 

W. S. M. 

New York City, April 18, 1910. 

5] 5 



CONTENTS 



CHAPTER I 



The Danubian Principalities, Servia and Montenegro — 
up to the Treaty of Paris— 1856 

PAGE 

Intervention as a factor in the formation of new states 11 

Discontent and disunion in the Ottoman empire 12 

The beginning of Russia's treaty rights in relation to Ottoman 

subjects 13 

Formation and early history of Moldavia and Wallachia 14* 

Turkey's European provinces in connection with the Napoleonic 

struggles 16 

The beginning of a Russian protectorate over the Servians .... 19 
The Servians as a free people, and as vassals under the dominion 

of Constantinople 20 

The beginning of Servia' s struggles against the Sultans 25: 

Kara George and the treaty of Bucharest 26 

Milosh Obrenovich renews the contest and secures added im- 
munities 28 

Turkish affairs in connection with European movements — 1814-26. 30 
The Sultan grants further concessions in the treaty of Ackerman 

and the treaty of Adrianople 40 

Additional liberties and a constitution for Servia . . 43 

Despotic rule and forced abdication of Prince Milosh 46 

Russia's exercise of an exclusive protectorate and the restoration 

of the Karageorgevich dynasty 47 

Changes in the government of the Danubian provinces 47 

The situation in Montenegro , 49 

The Crimean War and its outcome in relation to the Balkan 

provinces 50, 

7] 7. 



8 CONTENTS * [8 

PACK 

CHAPTER II 

The Balkan Provinces Under the Protection of the 
European Concert 
The new status of Russia and Turkey in relation to the Eastern 

Question 56 

Partial union of Moldavia and Wallachia under a native ruler — 

Alex. Couza 60 

Couza's downfall and the choice of a foreign prince 68 

Prince Charles of Hohenzollern becomes the prince of ' ' Roumania " . 69 

The new government and the persecution of the Jews 74 

The most favorable turn of affairs under Prince Charles' rule ... 76 
Recall of Milosh and later of Michael to the princely office in 

Servia 77 

Delay in Constantinople and the outbreak in Belgrade 78 

Servian fortresses turned over to the native authorities 81 

Outcome of further dynastic troubles. General conditions in Servia. 82 

Montenegro's request for European recognition 86 

Turkey permitted to force the Montenegrins into submission ... 89 

The beginning of a better state of affairs in Montenegro 91 

The Bulgarians, and their existence under the dominion of Con- 
stantinople 92 

The status of religious communities in Turkey 95 

The Bulgarian struggle for a national hierarchy 98 

CHAPTER III 

International Complications and the Outcome in the 
Balkans — 1870-1878 
Abrogation of the Black Sea stipulations in the treaty of Paris. . - 103 
Failure of the efforts of the treaty powers in connection with the 

Balkan uprising 105 

The Bulgarian " atrocities " in 

Russia wages war against Turkey 121 

The rejection of the treaty of San Stefano and the settlement in 
the Berlin congress 124 

CHAPTER IV 

Organization of Bulgaria and Eastern Roumelia and the 

Movements Leading up to Union and to Independence 

The Bulgarians in connection with the Russo-Turkish war .... 129 

The provisional governments in the two provinces 134 

Determined efforts of the Bulgarians to prevent the separation . . 134 



g] CONTENTS g 



PAGt 



Formulation of the Bulgarian constitution and election of Prince 

Alexander .... 138 

The ''Organic Statute" for Eastern Roumelia [41 

Russia dispels various disquieting apprehensions 144 

Aleko Pasha to govern in Eastern Roumelia, aided by the Inter- 
national Commission 146 

Party antagonism in Bulgaria and Prince Alexander's coup d'etat. 151 
The change in Russia's attitude and the restoration of the consti- 
tution 152 

The unionist movement virtually unites the two Bulgarian prov- 
inces 155 

Abduction of Prince Alexander. His return and abdication .... 162 

The regency and the choice of another ruler 168 

The treaty powers follow the lead of Russia and will not recognize 

Prince Ferdinand . 171 

The regime of the Russophobe ministries under Stambouloff ... 175 

Bulgaria in relation to the Macedonian agitation 176 

Bulgaria becomes an independent kingdom 178 

CHAPTER V 
Summary— Present Situation in the Balkan States 
The Young Turk movement changes the aspect of the Macedonian 

Question 186 

General view of foreign intervention in the Balkans 187 

The situation in Roumania 190 

The favorable outlook in Montenegrin affairs 190 

The unfortunate conditions in relation to Servia 191 

Unpromising outlook because of the situation in^connectionNvith 

Macedonia and Servia 194 

Map of the Balkan Peninsula opposite p. 11 



CHAPTER I 

Wallachia, Moldavia, Servia and Montenegro, Up 
to the Treaty of Paris — 1856 

The interference of nations in the internal affairs of 
other countries, although once a more common thing than 
it is to-day, has continued to play an important role 
in the creation of new states. This has happened de- 
spite the tendency of leading nations in recent times to take 
more and more account of the principle of non-intervention. 
Certain changes in ideas and conditions during the past 
century have, no doubt, had a most decided bearing in that 
connection. Keeping pace with increasingly rapid and suit- 
able means of communication, the widening range of trade 
and travel has so spread out the interests of civilized coun- 
tries that most nations have come to be scrupulously sensi- 
tive to the policies and practices of many others. Then too 
the aggressive and propagandist character of democracy 
and the efforts among those of the same race to achieve 
political unity have helped now and then to produce com- 
plications that have afforded more or less plausible ex- 
cuses for intervention. 

There has been, meanwhile, no lack of imperative calls 
for the readjustment of political relations established as a 
result of conquest. For various reasons, it would seem, 
these manifestations of discontent, especially in the Turkish 
empire, have been quite generally seized upon as pretexts 
for interference from without. It is in this connection that 
11] 11 



I2 THE MAKING OF THE BALKAN STATES [ I2 

the suspected national ambitions of some of the European 
governments and the lingering faith in the balance-of-power 
principle have quite frequently carried so-called friendly in- 
terpositions over into destructive wars. 

The anomalous conditions so long existing in Turkey 
have laid that country open in recent times to the applica- 
tion of what may be called exceptional principles of inter- 
vention. Nowhere else since the close of the French Revo- 
lution has intervention been so constant and in one sense 
so effective. Although the peace of Europe has often suf- 
fered by reason of the resulting complications, all this has 
been a most important factor in the creation of the four 
constitutional monarchies in the Balkans. 1 

The Ottoman empire was built up by a series of con- 
quests that made subjects of peoples who either could not 
or would not be one with the conquerors or with each other, 
hence patriotism there, in relation to the whole state, has 
been one-sided, to say the least. Religious differences and 
accompanying prejudices have ever been operative; while 
national and racial ambitions, together with the pressing 
need and the burning desire for a larger measure of liberty 
and security, have fostered there a spirit of jealousy, of 
discontent and of disunion. With these influences at work 
and with the increasing probability that a determined 
struggle would eventually receive the support of one or 
more of the great powers of Europe, the discontented na- 
tionalities under Turkish rule have succeeded for nearly 
a century in keeping up almost a constant strain on the 

1 Phillimore, Sir R., Commentaries upon International Law (London, 
1879), vol. i, pp. 553 et seq.; Holland, T. E., Studies in International 
Law (Oxford, 1898), chs. xi-xii; Moore, J. B., International Law 
Digest (Washington, 1906), vol. i, ch. xix. 



!3] UP TO THE TREATY OF PARIS— 1856 13 

forces that were calculated to hold the empire together. 1 
Yet this very clashing of interests, ambitions, and aspira- 
tions — to be seen as well in the consequent strivings of the 
interested powers — and the apprehension in Europe of 
grave and far reaching consequences likely to result from 
the impending conflict, have given a semblance of solidarity 
and a measure of perpetuity to what has come to be called 
the " Concert of Europe." 2 

THE WALLACHIANS AND THE MOLDAVIANS UP TO THE 

GREEK INSURRECTION (l82l) 

The beginning of a continuous control, under treaty 
rights, in the affairs of the Ottoman empire by one of the 
great powers of Europe, was in 1774. Six years previous, 
in connection with Russian interference in Poland, Turkey 
declared war against Russia. After several other nations 
became involved, this struggle resulted in the first partition 
of Poland, and in the acquirement by Russia of a protector- 
ate over a part of the Ottoman subjects. In the treaty of 
peace (Kutschouc-Kainardji, 1774) the Porte agreed that a 
permanent Russian embassy might be established at Con- 
stinople, and that Russia should have the right of free navi- 
gation in Turkish waters; and, most important of all, the 
Sultan promised " to protect constantly the Christian reli- 
gion and its churches," and " to keep religiously " to a list 
of conditions under which Russia restored Wallachia and 
Moldavia to Turkey. 3 Also, as the circumstances of these 

'Odysseus, Turkey in Europe (London, 1900), passim; Seignobos, 
Political History of Europe since 1814 (New York, 1900), trans, by 
Mac Vane, ch. xxi. 

2 De Worms, England's Policy in the East (London, 1877), passim; 
Dennis, Eastern Problems at the Close of the Eighteenth Century 
(Cambridge, Mass., 1901), ch. ii. 

3 Duggan, The Eastern Question (New York, 1902), ch. ii; Menzies, 
Turkey Old and New (London, 1883), pp. 293-308. 



!4 THE MAKING OF THE BALKAN STATES [14 

two principalities might require, the Russian ministers resi- 
dent at Constantinople were to be permitted to intercede in 
their favor. This treaty which expressed the agreement of 
the two empires " to annihilate and leave in an eternal ob- 
livion all the treaties and conventions " previously made 
between the two states (some reference to boundaries was 
excepted), marks the beginning of a Russian regime, so to 
speak, in Turkish affairs, which was only brought to an end 
when the armies and navies of England and France joined 
with those of Turkey against Russia, in 1 853-6. x 

Wallachia and Moldavia already had a history of nearly 
five hundred years, and the two principalities had now 
(1774) been tributary to the Porte for more than three cen- 
turies. 2 A few descendants of the Latin-speaking Roman 
colonists in that part of Europe are supposed to have sur- 
vived from the third century, A. D., and about the end of 
the thirteenth century these were joined by other Roumans 
(more or less Latinized peoples of eastern Europe) and 
thus were formed the two Rouman principalities. The 
southern — Wallachia — took its name from that by which its 
people were known to their neighbors, and the northern — 
Moldavia — was called by the name of its principal river. 3 
During the fifteenth century, these principalities were 
brought under the supremacy of the Ottoman government, 

^he treaty of Kainardji (1774) was written in Italian, and may be 
seen in that language and in French also in Martens, Recueilde Traites 
(Gottingen, 1817), vol. ii, pp. 286 et seq. Copies of principal treaties 
between the Porte and Russia (1 774-1850) may be seen in Parliamentary 
Papers (1854), vol. lxxii (French and English). 

2 De Testa, Recueil des Traites de la Porte Ottomane (Paris, 1882), 
vol. v. (Four treaties between Sultans and Moldavia and Wallachia — 
1392-1529.) 
J 3 Noyes, Routnania, The Border Land of the Christian and the Turk 
(New York, 1858), pp. 156-59; Walsh, From Constantinople to England 
(London, 1831), ch. xiii. 



I5 ] UP TO THE TREATY OF PARIS— 1856 15 

but by paying a yearly tribute they retained, for a long 
period, practical independence in internal affairs and were 
governed down to 1720 by native hospodars (governors) 
of their own choosing. 1 Unlike the social conditions in 
other Balkan provinces, however, the old nobility in Mol- 
davia and Wallachia managed to perpetuate itself, and all 
governmental affairs administered by the principalities 
were controlled for centuries by the aristocracy. 2 

Although the Treaty of Kainardji professed that there 
would be cultivated between the two sovereigns — the Em- 
press and the Sultan — , as well as between the two empires, 
a " sincere union and a perpetual and inviolable friendship," 
with a careful " accomplishment " and maintenance of the 
Articles, yet within ten years Russia annexed the Crimean 
peninsula and some nearby territory, and the Porte promptly 
responded by undertaking another war against the Czarina. 8 
This struggle was brought to an end in 1792 by the treaty 
of Jassy, which ceded to Russia some sections of Turkish 
territory, and reaffirmed all the former stipulations respect- 
ing Wallachia and Moldavia, beginning with the treaty of 
Kainardji. 4 

The principalities suffered for a century (1720- 1820) 
from their relations with the Phanariot Greek governors, 
who were sent to them by the Porte. As each appointment 
added somewhat to the income of the Sultan, it became cus- 
tomary to change these hospodars frequently. 5 But every 

' ' Wilkinson, Wallachia and Moldavia : (London, 1820), ch. i. 
' Noyes, op cit., passim. 

3 Holland, The Treaty Relations of Russia and Turkey, 1774-1853 
(London, 1877). 

* Martens, op. cit., vol. v, p. 291; Menzies, op. cit., pp. 315 et seq. 

5 Wilkinson, op. cit., ch. vi; Tennent, History of Modern Greece 
(London, 1845), vol. vii, pp. 41-54; cf. infra, pp. 22, 36. 



jC THE MAKING OF THE BALKAN STATES [16 

such change added greatly to the burdens of the principali- 
ties; and, mindful of her treaty rights, Russia induced the 
Sultan to issue a Hatti-cheriff, in 1802, fixing the terms of 
office for these officials at seven years, and making the 
consent of the Russian minister necessary to their removal. 1 
This promise was made while the Tsar was posing as the 
friend of Turkey, by helping to drive the French army out 
of Egypt. Only three years later, however, the great vic- 
tory at Austerlitz, and the treaty that followed, making 
France through her new possessions — the Illyrian provinces 
— a neighbor to the Ottoman empire, inclined the Sultan 
and his advisers to put themselves again under the guidance 
of the French. 2 

In his efforts to remain neutral in the European conflict 
just ended, the Sultan had taken the precaution to make 
some warlike preparations along the lower Danube; and 
that led the Tsar to increase his influence over Ottoman sub- 
jects in that territory. Urged on now by the representa- 
tions of the French minister, Sebastiani, and disregarding 
his agreement of four years previous, the Sultan permitted 
himself to be so deeply moved by the traitorous attitude of 
the governors of Wallachia and Moldavia in favoring Rus- 
sian intrigue, that he removed these officials without the 
consent of Russia. 3 The ambassadors of England and 
Russia then determined to force the Sultan to reinstate the 
governors, and he yielded, after a time; but, notwithstand- 
ing his submission, Russia moved her army into the prin- 
cipalities. 4 England's threatening attitude failed before the 
end of the year (1806) to prevent the Porte from declar- 
ing war against Russia. With a British fleet anchored a 

2 De Testa, op. cit., vol. v, p. 288. 

'Menzies, op. cit., p. 329. 3 Ibid., p. 331. 

4 Lane-Poole, Life of Stratford Canning (London, 1888), vol. i, p. 37. 



I j] UP TO THE TREATY OF PARIS— 1856 1 y- 

few miles from Constantinople (February, 1807), the Sul- 
tan's government seemed inclined to yield to the English 
ambassador's ultimatum, that Sebastiani be at once dis- 
missed from the city; that the Porte renew the treaty of 
alliance with England and Russia; that the Bosphorus and 
Dardanelles be open to Russian ships of war; and that the 
Turkish navy be held by the English until the return of 
peace. 1 Time was gained at Constantinople by delaying 
negotiations with England, and under the encouragement 
and direction of the French ambassador the defenses of the 
city were made ready to withstand an attack. Within two 
weeks the idea of an assault was abandoned by the British 
and their fleet sailed away; but they then made an unsuc- 
cessful attempt to invade Egypt, and as a result the Porte 
declared war against England (March) and formed an 
alliance with France. 

The Russian forces being mostly engaged with the Prus- 
sians at this time against the French, made the outlook quite 
promising for the Turks. But the deposition of Sultan 
Selim (May, 1807) and the prospect, after the French won 
the battle of Friedland (June), that Napoleon and the Tsar 
Alexander would settle their differences served to bring 
about an entire change in the situation. The disorders in 
Turkey, culminating in the Sultan being set aside on the 
charge of " combating the religious principles consecrated 
by the Koran," seemed to cause Napoleon to feel that the 
Osmanlis were hopelessly unstable, and that the fall of their 
empire was inevitable. He therefore all the more readily 
abandoned Turkey when he formed his alliance with the 
Tsar (July, 1807). 2 The treaty of Tilsit, setting forth 

1 Menzies, op. cit., p. 335. 

1 Sloane, W. M., Life of Napoleon Bonaparte (New York, 1896), 
vol. iii, ch. iv; Menzies, op. cit., p. 343. 



iS THE MAKING OF THE BALKAN STATES [ T 8 

the terms of this alliance, stipulated that Russia should 
evacuate the Danubian principalities, but that the Turks 
were not to be allowed to enter that territory until a treaty 
of peace should be made between Russia and the Porte. 
The Tsar and Napoleon secretly agreed, however, that the 
Porte must accept the mediation of France, and that a satis- 
factory result must be reached within three months after 
negotiations were commenced, else France and Russia would 
make common cause in leaving to the Porte simply Con- 
stantinople and the province of Roumelia. 1 This treaty 
led to an armistice between Russia and the Porte (August), 
which continued for two years. France and Russia joined 
in another alliance in October, 1808, to be kept secret for 
at least ten years, in which France promised to aid Russia 
in annexing Wallachia and Moldavia. 2 At the beginning 
of the next year, friendly relations were resumed between 
England and the Porte. 3 

Russia continued to occupy the principalities; and when 
Turkey tried to come to terms with the Tsar Alexander, 
his demands were such that the Porte renewed hostilities 
(April, 1809). Although the Tsar was soon obliged to be- 
gin preparations for an impending struggle in his own coun- 
try against the French, still the Russians continued, in gen- 
eral, to be successful against the Turkish forces. 

Influenced by England's ambassador, Stratford Canning, 
and, doubtless, by a general distrust of France, the Porte 
finally accepted the offer of Russia to give back all but about 
half of Moldavia, and the terms of peace were signed at 

1 De Clercq, Recueil des Traitis de la France (Paris, 1888), vol. ii, 
pp. 207-14. 

2 Ibid., p. 284. 

3 Martens, Nouveau Recueil de Traitis, vol. i (Gottingen, 1817), 
p. 160. 



I 9 ] UP TO THE TREATY OF PARIS— 1856 IOy 

Bucharest in May, 1812. 1 Menzies expresses the opinion 
that " Turkey had committed suicide in not having seconded 
Napoleon in his audacious invasion of Russia ;" and that in 
signing the treaty of Bucharest, the Porte " missed the most 
brilliant opportunity which ever presented itself to repair 
the losses of Turkey." 2 All of the former stipulations be- 
tween Russia and the Porte, back to 1774, in respect to 
Wallachia and Moldavia, were again reaffirmed; but most 
important of all, perhaps, was the article of this treaty re- 
lating to Servia. 

THE SERVIANS UP TO THE GREEK INSURRECTION 1 82 1 

The treaty of Bucharest marks the beginning of a Russian 
protectorate over another portion of the Ottoman popula- 
tion. In this treaty the Tsar and the Sultan came to " a 
solemn agreement " respecting the security of the Servians ; 
and though the terms were somewhat indefinite, still Russia 
could now demand and exact, under treaty right, that a 
fairly well-defined policy should be followed by the Porte 
in dealing with these people. The Sultan was to proclaim 
a general amnesty to the Servians; and he was to leave to 
them the administration of their internal affairs, and to ex- 
act only moderate taxes which were to be paid direct to the 
Porte. But the Turks were still allowed to garrison the Ser- 
vian fortresses; and that opened the way for troubles that 
soon followed. 3 

These stipulations gave a new anchorage to the hopes of 

1 For the text of the treaty of Bucharest, see Martens, op. cit., vol. iii, 
p. 397; and for a glance at the diplomatic policies of the time, see Mr. 
Canning's efforts to release Russia, and at the same time prevent an 
alliance between the Sultan and Napoleon, Lane-Pool, op. cit., vol. ii, 
ch. iv. 

'Menzies, op. cit., p. 350. 

*See Treaty of Bucharest, article viii. 



20 THE MAKING OF THE BALKAN STATES [ 2 o 

the Servians for reasonable security and increasing liberty 
in a portion of the territory which had been occupied by their 
race for centuries. Back in the ninth century, A. D., the 
Serbs had taken possession of that part of Europe at the 
close of the period of migrations and were already making 
a start toward forming political institutions. 1 They early 
embraced the Christian faith, and being within the Roman 
Empire of the East they acknowledged the emperor's su- 
premacy, on condition that their rulers should be native 
chiefs, of their own choosing. Thus their early patriarchal 
form of government was preserved. In the eleventh cen- 
tury, however, the Greeks made an armed attack in order 
to force the Servians to accept a Greek governor. The at- 
tempt failed and only served to establish on a firmer basis 
the princely power of the native rulers. 

The Servians were not long in discovering the advantages 
of being alongside of Western Christendom. By the pros- 
pect of support from the West — from the Pope as well as 
from the Western emperor — the Servians were from time 
to time encouraged in resisting the encroachments of the 
Eastern Empire. During a considerable part of the four- 
teenth century, Servia was the strongest power in south- 
eastern Europe; and her last and only great king, Stephen 
Dushan (1333-56), even besieged Constantinople, with the 
idea, it is said, of destroying the Empire of the East. 2 Under 
Dushan, the clergy elected their own patriarch, thus com- 
pleting the independence of the Servian empire, which then 
comprehended the larger part of the Balkan peninsula. 3 An 

^anke, History of Servia. Translation by Kerr. (London, 1847), 
ch. i. 

s Menzies, op. cit., p. 47. 

'Freeman, Historical Geography of Europe (London, 1881), vol. i, 
p. 424- 



2i ] UP TO THE TREATY OF PARIS— 1856 2 I 

Assembly composed of clergy and laity, under the presidency 
of the king and patriarch, exercised legislative and other 
functions, but the laws continued in keeping with the more 
or less primitive ideas of these people. 1 As the Servians 
most nearly represent the unmixed Slavic race, so their sys- 
tem of laws is, of all the Slavonic systems, the most na- 
tional. 2 

After the death of Dushan (1356), a half-century of in- 
ternal struggle left Servia once more a small kingdom. The 
Osmanlis were already overrunning that part of Europe, 
and the battle of Kosova (1389) brought Servia under 
tribute to the Sultan; then the great victory for the Turks 
at Varna (1444) made the Servians defenceless rayahs — 
non-Moslem subjects under Ottoman rule. A century of 
comparative quiet then followed in Servia. The Christian 
Servians were not allowed to hold office, or to carry arms; 
but, as time went on, some of their most illustrious families 
turned Mohammedans, and thus it was that now and then 
the people of this province were governed by officials united 
with them in race, but separated from them by religion. 3 

For more than four centuries the Servian Church re- 
mained independent; the native patriarchs paying the Porte, 
meanwhile, an annual tribute of something like sixty-three 
thousand asperes (about $650.00). Finally, when the 
struggle began which tore Hungary from the Turkish empire, 
the Servian patriarch joined the Austrian forces. By the 
end of the war (1699) thirty-seven thousand families from 
Servia had migrated with him to> Hungary. The Porte ap- 
pointed another Servian patriarch. But the people who re- 

^anke, op. cit., pp. 19-20. 

a Macieiowski, Sclavische Rechtsgeschichte , vol. i, part ii, section v. 
(Quoted by Ranke, op. cit., p. 20.) 
' Ranke, op. cit., p. 31. 



22 THE MAKING OF THE BALKAN STATES [22 

mained in Servia now saw a part of their race enjoying a 
good degree of freedom outside of Turkish territory. So 
when another opportunity came to aid Austria against the 
Porte, they joined with the enemies of the Sultan, and in 
the Peace of Passarowitz (1718) Turkey was forced to 
cede to Austria a large part of Servia. European politics, 
however, soon restored this territory to the Ottoman empire 
(1739); and then it was that the Servians lost the privi- 
lege and the inestimable advantage of having a native pa- 
triarch, and were given over, in relation to the many inter- 
ests then centered in the Church, to the domination of the 
Greek patriarch at Constantinople. Servia thus lost the last 
vestige of self-government, and became doubly dependent; 
for the people must now struggle against the Greeks as well 
as the Osmanlis. All through the eighteenth century the 
Greeks exercised a wide influence, especially in European 
Turkey; and now, with a Greek Metropolitan in Servia, the 
Phanariots could also extend their influence over that pro- 
vince. 1 Wherever the Greek patriarch exercised complete 
ecclesiastical authority over those who were not of the Greek 
race, his priests and teachers were sure to labor assiduously 
in transferring their own language and ideas to the people. 
It may be added, also, that the more educated Greeks hoped 
for the restoration of the Byzantine Empire, and that their 
views respecting the union of Church and State naturally 
made them feel certain that, in such an event, political power 
would go hand in hand with ecclesiastical authority, and 
that the Greeks would thus become the dominant race. 2 

^anke, op. cit., ch. ii. The buildings of the Greek Patriarchate 
have long been in the part of Constantinople called Phanar. As early 
as the seventeenth century that quarter of the Turkish capital was prin- 
cipally inhabited by Greeks. So many of these played such an active 
and influential part in Turkish and Greek affairs that they are now 
commonly referred to as Phanariots. Odysseus, op. cit., p. 306. 

2 Finlay, History of Greece (Oxford, 1877), vol. vi, p. 7. 



23] UP TO THE TREATY OF PARIS— 1856 23 

Later on, in the Servian crisis (1805-12), Russia sent a 
councillor and various supplies to them, promising to sup- 
port their cause if they would accept the Russian protec- 
torate with a Phanariot prince. But the Servians soon 
came to distrust their Greek Metropolitan, who* kept up 
familiar relations with the Russian councillor; and the fear 
of Greek influence had much weight, during that struggle, 
in keeping Servia from forming a closer alliance with Russia. 1 

When Austria joined with Russia back in 1788, prepara- 
tory to a decisive struggle against Turkey, the Servians 
again readily volunteered against the Porte, and many of 
them fought in a body, under Austrian commanders. 2 Jeal- 
ousy among the maritime powers and fear occasioned by the 
upheaval in France hurried the conclusion of peace (1791- 
92), however, and, in keeping with England's demands, 
the treaty was on the basis of the strict status quo ante hel- 
ium} Again, and quite contrary to expectations, Servia 
was left to form a part of the Ottoman territory, but under 
a general amnesty, nevertheless, for Servians who* had 
fought against Turkey, and with the agreement that those 
who had left the principality or had been driven from their 
homes might return to their estates. The intervention of 
the European powers had at least rendered their return to 
the dominion of the Porte a fait accompli. But many of 
them had received a training in the Austrian service, never- 
theless, that was soon to be turned to account. 4 

The next two Pashas of Belgrade endeavored to rule in 
a way that would naturally lead the Servians to favor the 
Turkish administration, and there was a beginning now 

1 Odysseus, op. cit., p. 308; Finlay, History of Greece , vol. v, pp. 2, 4; 
vol. vi, pp. 2, 6, 7. 
2 Holland, op. cit., p. 12; Menzies, op. cit., p. 319. 
'Ranke, op. cit., pp. 93-105. 4 Menzies, op. cit., p. 324. 



24 THE MAKING OF THE BALKAN STATES [24 

among these people of contentment and prosperity. This 
brief period of ten years followed the expulsion of the 
Janisaries from Servian territory because they would not 
give up their opposition to the Pasha, and their habits of 
plundering the rayahs. In the general weakness of the Otto- 
man empire at that time, groups of brigands began to over- 
run European Turkey, and it was not long before the ex- 
pelled Janisaries united with one of these bands and made 
an effort to force their way back into Servia (1804). The 
Turkish Pasha of Belgrade now took an unprecedented step 
in calling the Servian rayahs to arms, and they fought side 
by side with their Mohammedan neighbors, against the in- 
vaders. This united force continued to be victorious until 
the Sultan weakened, and ordered the Pasha to reinstate 
the Janisaries. 1 It was not long, however, before one of 
these who had returned shot a former Servian leader for 
refusing to comply with his unjust demand, and when the 
Pasha undertook to punish the murderer the Janisaries 
quickly united and the Pasha was slain. The supreme au- 
thority in Servia was then taken over by four chiefs of the 
Janisaries, and they sent others of their number into the 
provincial towns, where they were unmerciful in their ex- 
actions, and exercised the power of life and death. When 
the Sultan hinted that he would send an army against them 
if they did not modify their conduct, the Janisaries felt 
sure that it must be the purpose at Constantinople to arm 
the Servians against them. Accordingly, they at once fell 
to killing off all the possible leaders among the natives 
(1804). In sheer desperation, the Servian leaders quickly 
roused their people, and within a few weeks the Janisaries 
were driven out, and the native leaders and their followers 
were left in control. 

^anke, op. cit., ch. vi; Menzies, op. cit., p. 324. 



25] UP TO THE TREATY OF PARIS— 1856 25 

It was at this stage that the Servians determined to make 
an appeal to some Christian power to intervene in their be- 
half. 1 At different times, they had fought with and for 
Austria ; but Austria, they remembered, had always returned 
conquered territory and its inhabitants to the Porte. They 
were fully aw r are, also, of the effectual way in which the Tsar 
of Russia had cared for the interests of the Wallachians and 
the Moldavians. So they were not long in deciding to 
apply to Russia; and accordingly, in August, 1804, three 
Servian representatives were sent to St. Petersburg. These 
returned the next February, to say that Russia would help--' 
in Constantinople to secure compliance with their requests, 
so soon as these were laid before the Ottoman government. 
Deputies were then sent to Constantinople (1805), where 
they were soon imprisoned; and the Sultan sent a pasha, to 
assume control in Servia. 

But the Serbs already had a native leader, Kara George, 
a simple peasant; and they determined that they would 
not surrender their country to the Sultan's representative 
until they were given some reason to hope for some amelior- 
ation of their former condition. From that time the Ser- 
vians were fighting, not a party, but the Ottoman empire, 
and they looked to Russia for support. 2 However, they be- 
gan the struggle alone, and by the middle of the next year 
(1806), excepting the fortresses, their territory was free 
from Ottoman soldiers. An embassy was again sent to 
Constantinople. Realizing now the danger of a closer al- 
liance between the Servians and the Russians, the Porte 
agreed to concede all the requests of the Servians on condi- 
tion of being paid a fixed annual tax and having an official 

^anke, op. cit., ch. vi; Menzies, op. cit., pp. 144-5. 
2 Menzies, op. cit., pp. 330-351. 



2 6 THE MAKING OF THE BALKAN STATES [ 2 6 

in Belgrade with one hundred and fifty Turks. 1 These 
promised concessions would have made the country practi- 
cally independent; but late in the autumn the Porte refused 
to ratify the terms already agreed upon, and the Servians 
then fought their way into the fortresses. 2 

There was already a sort of representative central gov- 
ernment among the Servians, carried on by two groups of 
native councilors. Each of the twelve districts into which 
their territory was divided had a military chief, and these 
leaders held an assembly (Skupschtina, from skupti, to as- 
semble) each year, soon after New Year's Day, and made 
necessary plans for war and attended to matters relating to 
finance and judicature. The need of another council, how- 
ever, was soon apparent, and in 1805, a Senate (Sozviet) 
composed of one elected representative from each district, 
had begun its meetings. This body began at once to estab- 
lish schools and courts of justice, and undertook to care for 
the civil affairs of the whole country. 

The success of Kara George as a leader in the field, how- 
ever, soon laid the foundation for his real leadership in both 
civil and military matters. As the war went on, there were 
instances of merciless vengeance; and cruel jealousies 
among native leaders bore deadly fruit. The Tsar sent com- 
panies of soldiers, and gave aid to the Servians from time 
to time in various other ways ; so when Turkey made liberal 
proposals to Kara George (1811), with the idea of induc- 
ing him to renounce the protectorate of Russia, he com- 
municated with the Russian headquarters and then informed 
the Porte that he would accept such terms as might be 
agreed upon between the Sultan and the Tsar. 3 The treaty 
of peace that followed (Bucharest, 181 2) was undoubtedly 

^anke, op. cit., p. 172. 2 Ibid., p. 200. 

3 Ranke, op. cit., chs. xii, xiii; Menzies, op. cit., pp. 351-352. 



2 y~\ UP TO THE TREATY OF PARIS— 1856 27 

a disappointment to the Servians. 1 It stipulated, never- 
theless, that their peace must not be disturbed ; and Turkey 
agreed, " as a mark of her generosity," to come to an un- 
derstanding with them in the matter of regulations for 
carrying out this promise. 

Throughout the career of Napoleon, affairs in Turkey 
were a sort of barometer of many of his undertakings ; and 
at this time the Tsar's necessity for concentrating all his 
forces in Russia against the invading army of the French 
left the Servians without any material support. 2 In fact, 
the turn in the great conflict in the West in 181 3 might well 
have led them to despair of receiving any aid until that 
struggle should end. Because of the general indefiniteness 
of the terms of the treaty of Bucharest relating to Servia, 
and also owing to the prevailing conditions, it is not strange 
that the two parties differed in interpreting the promises that 
had been made. The Ottomans claimed that the treaty of 
Bucharest required the Servians to surrender the fortresses 
and their arms and ammunition, and to allow the banished 
Turks to return. The Servians were not willing to accept 
that interpretation; but after a Turkish army reached their 
frontier (May, 1813), Kara George offered his submission, 
on condition that the expelled Ottomans should not be al- 
lowed to return. 3 Their return, he held, would be sure to 
disturb the peace of the country. But the Porte would delay 
no longer, and the Turkish forces pressed on into Servia. 4 
French influence at Constantinople, and the expectation of 
receiving the assistance of France, are claimed to have in- 
fluenced the Turks in hurrying forward what proved to be 

l Cf. supra, p. 19. 

2 Dennis, Eastern Problems at the Close of the Eighteenth Century, 
ch. iii. 
3 Ranke, op. cit., p. 270. *Menzies, op. cit., p. 352. 



2 8 THE MAKING OF THE BAEKAX STATES [28 

a successful attempt to reconquer that territory. 1 On the 
third of October, Kara George, abandoning his countrymen, 
fled from Servia. His example was quickly followed by 
the senators and many of the other Servian leaders, and re- 
sistance to the Turks was soon abandoned. The Servians 
as a whole had made a good effort to defend their country ; 
but their warrior chiefs who had so often led them to victory 
during the eight years before the treaty of Bucharest 
(1812), for one cause and another, were now no longer in 
command. The changes incident to the acquirement of 
monarchial power by one chief — Kara George — had driven 
away a number of the former leaders and had lessened the 
spirit of self-reliance in the several districts. 2 Ranke has 
most carefully traced the history of Servia, and he tells us 
that in this struggle, " from some incomprehensible cause," 
Kara George did not appear upon the scene of battle. 

One of the native leaders, however, Milosh Obrenovitch, 
would not desert his countrymen, and he was soon recog- 
nized by the Ottoman authorities as a man who could aid 
the Porte in pacifying the country. Accordingly they prom- 
ised to make him governor of a district if he would help 
toward that end. Milosh accepted the proposal, and was at 
once appointed governor of three districts. For two years 
he kept his promise; but the increasing atrocities perpetrated 
by the Turks upon his people, the fear for his own life and 
very probably the utter defeat of the French, finally induced 
him to become the leader of his people (Palm Sunday, 
181 5) in still another attempt to throw off the severe burdens 
imposed upon them by the local Turkish misrule. 3 Within 
a year the Ottomans outside the fortresses were conquered, 
and the Porte then dispatched two large armies against the 

1 Ranke, p. 274. s Ibid., ch. xiii. 

s Ranke, op. cit., pp. 299-302. 



29] UP TO THE TREATY OF PARIS— 1856 29 

insurgents. But these forces were very cautiously halted 
at the Servian frontier. The Russian ambassador at Con- 
stantinople had already inquired of the Sultan : " What war 
is this now going on in Servia, contrary to the stipulations 
of the treaty? " and the members of the Hetaeria (a secret 
political society of Greeks) were spreading their doctrine 
of the possibility, through opposition to the Sultan and 
loyalty to the Tsar, of freeing the Greeks from Ottoman 
rule. 1 There was fear also among the Turkish leaders that 
the Holy Alliance threatened dire consequences to the Mo- 
hammedan government. 2 The commanding pasha led the 
Servians to hope for liberal concessions ; and representatives 
of both sides returned in about a month from Constantinople 
with the Sultan's firman of peace. In this imperial decree, 
the pasha was appointed to the pashalic of Belgrade and 
simply instructed " that as God had entrusted the Servians 
to the Sultan, so the Sultan recommended them to the pasha, 
and that by kind treatment towards these people he would 
best perform his duty." 3 This new Turkish governor then 
proceeded to Belgrade. After a little time Milosh and the 
other chiefs appeared before him, and to his thrice-repeated 
question, " Are ye Servians subject to the Grand Signor 
(the Sultan) ? " Milosh answered each time, " We are sub- 
ject to him;" and it was sixty years before the Servians took 
up arms again against the Constantinople government. 

The Servians were now allowed to retain their arms and 
w^ere themselves to collect the taxes and administer justice 
for their people in the provincial towns. A National As- 
sembly was formed, similar to the former senate, which ex- 
ercised the functions of a national chancery court. The 
Turkish authorities also granted a number of important 

x Ranke, op. tit., p. 323; Finlay, op. cit., vol. vi, p. 98. 
s Ranke, op. cit., p. 336. % lbid., p. 327. 



30 THE MAKING OF THE BALKAN STATES [30 

privileges to Milosh, personally; and in 181 7 the chiefs of 
the several districts agreed to recognize him as the supreme 
chief (knes) and to make his official position hereditary. 
Milosh thus possessed a double authority, and he went on 
taking more and more power unto himself from both sides, 
until his downfall in 1839. 

The government and the territory of the Ottomans were 
important factors in nearly all the movements connected 
with Napoleon's campaigns. Nevertheless, that empire and 
the appeals of some of its people — the Greeks and the Ser- 
vians, especially — were wholly ignored in the many confer- 
ences which undertook, in connection with the series of 
treaties of 1814-1815, to provide for the " peace ", the " re- 
pose ", and the " tranquillity ", of Europe. 1 That there was 
no discussion of Turkish affairs in these conferences is 
claimed to have been due to the influence of the Tsar, Alex- 
ander I. 2 Russia was thus left with greater freedom of 
action in that part of Europe. 

Through the activity of the Tsar, Russia certainly played 
a very important role in the overthrow of the Napoleonic 
regime, as well as in the attempt to solidify and perpetuate 
the territorial and governmental regulations established in 
the reorganization of Europe (1814-15). Among all his 
associates in these various efforts to provide for lasting peace 
in Europe, Alexander was for a time pre-eminent in the 
field of what his guide-to-be, Metternich, called " wrong 
ideas of liberalism and philanthropy — erroneous theories in 
themselves, and ridiculous in their application." 3 For 
nearly a decade after the Congress at Vienna, Europe was 

^ertslet, Map of Europe by Treaty (London, 1875), vol- »• 
'Metternich, Memoirs, translated by Napier (New York, 1880), 
vol. iv, p. 63; Wilkinson, op. cit., p. 195. 
3 Metternich, op. cit., vol. i, p. 317. 



31 ] UP TO THE TREATY OF PARIS— 1856 31 

largely under the control of these two personalities ; but the 
ultra-conservative Count Metternich, as Austria's prime 
minister, was so resourceful and relentless that his was the 
dominant influence. He tells us that the Tsar's judgment 
was always influenced by fanciful ideas, and that his 
strength of character was not sufficient to maintain the 
balance of his different inclinations. Metternich knew how 
and when to fill Alexander's mind with forebodings of the 
machinations of secret societies and the horrors of revolu- 
tions, and thus win the emperor's support in furthering his 
own reactionary policies. 1 

When the conference of Aix-la-Chapelle (18 18) withdrew 
the allied troops from French territory, that act_was con- 
sidered by the Quadruple Alliance as the -"completion of 
the political system destined to insure the solidity of the 
work of peace." 2 A new union, including France, was 
then formed, which Metternich called " the moral Pen- 
tarchy." 3 This union, the five contracting powers affirmed, 
" is the more real and durable inasmuch as it depends on 
no separate interest or temporary combination, and can 
only have for its object the maintenance of general peace; 
and this intimate union," they continued, " established 
among the monarchs, offers to Europe the most sacred 
pledge of its tranquillity." These allies were to hold meet- 
ings from time to time. Lord Castlereagh, England's For- 
eign Secretary, was willing to say that he thought the " re- 
unions to be a new discovery in the European government 
. . . , giving to the councils of the powers the efficiency and 
almost the simplicity of a single state." 4 It was not long, 

1 Metternich, op. tit., vol. i, p. 333; vol. iii, pp. 58, 665. 

l Hertslet, op. cit., vol. i, p. 573. 

'Comprising Austria, England, France, Prussia and Russia. 

4 Correspondence , Despatches, and Other Papers, of Viscount Castle- 



32 THE MAKING OF THE BALKAN STATES [32 

however, before the two constitutional monarchies found 
themselves unable to follow the absolutists of the East in 
going to Naples (1821) simply to "fight against and repel 
rebellion," on the plea of going " to the assistance of sub- 
dued peoples," and going " in support of their liberty." The 
declaration of the allied sovereigns of Austria, Prussia and 
Russia, May, 1821, clearly stated that those countries in- 
tended to preserve " the independence and the rights of each 
State," as then recognized in existing treaties. 1 

Such was the feeling of the allied monarchs of Europe 
toward all disturbers of the peace of nations, when an em- 
bassy of Servians arrived in Constantinople (1820) to de- 
mand of the Porte what they regarded as Servia's rights, 
granted in the Peace of Bucharest (1812). It was an inop- 
portune effort to influence the Sultan's government, and the 
embassy had no other immediate result but the imprisonment 
of the Servian representatives soon after they reached the 
Turkish capital. About this time an armed rebellion against 
Ottoman authority was started by Greeks who were in Wal- 
lachia and Moldavia. Milosh then at once relinquished all 
efforts with the Porte, and turned his attention to the exten- 
tion of his own authority throughout Servia. Fearing that 
the Servians might join with the leaders of the rebellion in 
the Danubian provinces, the Turkish governor in Belgrade 
offered little or no resistance to Milosh's aggressive policy. 
The chieftains in the several districts, however, and later on 
the peasants in general, forcibly resisted, for a short time, 

reagh (Third series, London, 1853), vol. xii, p. 55. Prince Metter- 
nich's confidence in concerted efforts is clearly discernible in such ex- 
pressions as the following: "The limits of states ars of late years firmly 
and inviolably fixed by diplomatic negotiations . . . —political repose 
rests on fraternization between monarchs, and on the principle of main- 
taining that which is." Metternich, op. cit. y vol. ii, p. 199. 
1 Hertslet, op. cit., vol. i, pp. 664, 667. 



33] UP TO THE TREATY OF PARIS— 1856 33 

the monarchial tendencies of their Grand Knes (Milosh). 
But the idea of their possible liberation from the Ottomans 
had already given life and abiding force to the spirit of na- 
tionality, and that bond of common aspiration and mutual 
sympathy triumphed for more than a decade over jealousies 
and disappointments. Under the authority of Milosh, there 
came to be a good degree of internal unity. 

WALLACHIA, MOLDAVIA, AND SERVIA, IN CONNECTION WITH 
THE GREEK INSURRECTION, 1 82 1 -29 

After the treaty of Bucharest was signed (18 12) the 
Porte soon established its authority in the Danubian princi- 
palities, but the Turkish army was not withdrawn. This 
continued occupation of Wallachia and Moldavia and the 
atrocities perpetrated upon the Greeks in Constantinople, 
called forth from time to time unavailing remonstrances 
from the Russian ambassador. He finally delivered a note 
to the Porte (July 18, 1821) allowing only eight days for an 
answer. In brief his demands were : that the Greek churches 
that had been destroyed and plundered should immediately 
be restored; that the Christian religion should be restored 
to its prerogatives by granting it the protection it formerly 
enjoyed and by guaranteeing its inviolability for the future, 
and that the Turkish government should enable Russia, by 
virtue of existing treaties, to contribute to the pacification 
of the principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia. 1 Two 
days before this note was handed to the Porte, Lord Castle- 
reagh wrote the Emperor Alexander a long and interesting 
letter, pointing out that the dreadful events then afflicting 
Turkey were but " a branch of that organized spirit of in- 
surrection which was systematically propagating itself 
throughout Europe," and expressing his " sanguine per- 

a Stapleton, The Political Life of George Canning (London, 1831), 
vol. i, ch. iv. 



34 THE MAKING OF TUB BALKAN STATES [34 

suasion " that the Tsar would determine to maintain " in- 
violably " the European System, as consolidated by the late 
treaty of peace. 1 The letter fully recognized the ample pro- 
vocation that the Emperor had for intervening but suggested 
several reasons why he should not do so, and it concluded 
by urging that Alexander " could afford to temporize and 
to suffer the tempest to exhaust itself." 2 The Porte did 
not answer Russia's ultimatum within the specified eight 
days, and the Russian ambassador, who already had his in- 
structions, left at once for Odessa, with the whole of his 
embassy. By this time the Greeks were already righting 
with some success in their own country against the Turks. 

A few days after the ambassador's departure, the Porte 
sent to St. Petersburg an unsatisfactory reply to the Russian 
demands. The Tsar's request for the " good offices of the 
other Christian embassies at Constantinople " followed, and 
called forth instructions from London and Vienna, direct- 
ing the British and Austrian ambassadors at the Porte to 
urge upon the Sultan the need of making concessions. 
Russia soon renewed her demands at Constantinople (Oc- 
tober, 1821), with some additions, and two months later 
the Porte made an unsatisfactory conditional promise to 
fulfil the Tsar's latest requirements. 3 . By this time, Eng- 
land and Austria had arrived at the conclusion that it was 
necessary that Russia should refrain from any hostile act 
against Turkey. 4 Metternich used all his powers to induce 
the Russian government to delay any act of war; and when 
the Tsar consented to make further pacific efforts to arrive 

1 Meaning the European treaty, at the close of the Napoleonic wars — 
1815. See Hertslet, op. cit., vol. i. 
i Correspondence and Despatches of Castlereagh, vol. xii, pp. 403-8. 
3 Stapleton, op. cit., vol. i, p. 191. 
* Metternich, op. cit., vol. iii, p. 558. 



35] UP TO THE TREATY OF PARIS— 1856 35 

at a good understanding with the Sultan, the proud minister 
of Austria considered that he had achieved " perhaps the 
greatest victory that one cabinet had ever gained over an- 
other " (May, 1822). Prince Metternich was far too san- 
guine, however, when he avowed his conviction that what 
he called the ''mistakes of the Russian minister and the rec- 
titude of the conceptions and conduct of the allied Cabinets " 
had destroyed the influence that the Russian cabinet had so 
long exercised over the Sultan's government, and " that a 
new era had opened for the Turkish empire. 1 

Although Russia had been checked in its policy of inter- 
vention the redoubled efforts of England and Austria soon 
began to have a more marked influence on the Sultan's 
policies, and it was not long before he issued orders for his 
armies to evacuate the Danubian principalities. He de- 
termined now, likewise, to free those provinces from Phan- 
ariot rule, and appointed a native hospodar to govern in 
each principality. 2 Moreover, in relation to the other Rus- 
sian demands, the Turkish ministers claimed that their gov- 
ernment was proceeding to rebuild churches, and " that 
every degree of indulgence and forgiveness would be 
granted to the Greek people." 3 Thus, when the congress 
of the Allies, at Verona (1822), held a conference on the 
relations between Russia and Turkey, it appeared that the 
only matters still at issue were the need that the Porte 
should renew the amnesty to the Greeks, restore to Russia 
former privileges of navigation in the Black Sea, and make 

1 Metternich, op. cit., pp. 609-50. 

2 A hundred years had passed since Moldavia and VVallachia were de- 
prived of the privilege — or rather the treaty right — of having native 
governors. All this time these provinces had been administered by 
men selected by the Sultan from among the official aristocratic class of 
Greeks in Constantinople. Cf. supra, pp. 15 et seq. 

3 Stapleton, op. cit., vol. i, p. 203. 



36 THE MAKING OF THE BALKAN STATES [36 

some conciliatory overtures to the St. Petersburg govern- 
ment with a view of re-establishing diplomatic relations 
between the two countries. In the Verona conference, in- 
terference in the struggle going on between Turks and 
Greeks was not even proposed ; but the allies agreed to 
urge the Porte to concede Russia's demands and thus restore 
diplomatic relations with the Tsar. 1 Alexander, however, 
expressed the conviction that public opinion would, in time, 
compel the British ministry to take the condition of Greece 
into consideration; and he suggested that the utmost extent 
of his wishes would be to see the Greeks placed on the same 
footing as the inhabitants of Servia or of Wallachia and 
Moldavia. 2 For some time yet the one object and aim of 
English diplomacy, and of Austrian also, was the preserva- 
tion of peace between the Turks and the Russians. France, 
however, was more anxious to aid the Greeks. 3 Canning's 
main object was to avert the danger that " Russia would 
swallow up Greece at one mouthful and Turkey at an- 
other." 4 

In the early part of the year 1823, the Ottoman govern- 
ment assumed a more defiant attitude; and the aid given to 
the Greek cause by British subjects somewhat weakened 
the influence of the English ambassador with the Sultan's 
government. Nevertheless, on the demand of the ambassa- 
dor, the Turkish ministers held a conference with him, with 
the result that the Ottoman government promised to concede 
the particular demands of Russia in respect to commerce. 5 
Throughout all these efforts to direct the action of both 
Russia and Turkey, England and Austria, in particular, 

1 Stapleton, op. tit., p. 208 et seq. 2 Ibid., p. 213. 

3 Debidour, Histoire Diplomatique de V Europe (Paris, 1891), vol. i„ 
pp. 212 et seq. 

* Stapleton, op. tit., vol. ii, p. 377. 5 Ibid., p. 388. 



37] UP TO THE TREATY OF PARIS— 1856 37 

were most anxious to separate the question of Russia's 
grievances against the Porte, in connection with treaty 
rights, from the matter of giving help to the Greeks. 

Russia obstinately refused to send an ambassador to Con- 
stantinople until the Turkish troops were all withdrawn 
from the Danubian principalities. The Porte learned, how- 
ever, through the public prints, that Russia intended to 
bring about the pacification of Greece also. This led Tur- 
key to determine, against the most urgent advice of Aus- 
tria, that she would not evacuate the principalities until 
some settlement should be made including all her subjects 
then in revolt. 1 

England was now invited by the Russian government to 
take part in a conference of the- Allies at St. Petersburg on 
the affairs of Greece; and in January, 1824, a general 
scheme for the pacification of that territory was suggested 
by Russia. The main proposition was that the Porte should 
retain its sovereignty there and receive a fixed tribute but 
should allow continental Greece to be divided into three 
principalities and should grant to each a large measure of 
independence. England recognized Russia's right by 
treaty, if on friendly terms with the Porte, to interfere in 
behalf of the Greeks and to consult her allies in reference 
to the exercise of that right. But Russia had no minister 
at the Porte at this time, and therefore the British cabinet 
could not consent to take part in discussing the above pro- 
positions without renouncing its former attitude (1821- 
22 ) , which was that the European Allies possessed no right 
of jurisdiction over the internal affairs of a sovereign state. 2 
The plan adopted by the St. Petersburg conference for the 

^tapleton, op. tit., pp. 397, 401. 

2 Wellington s Dispatches , Correspondence and Memoranda (London, 
1868), vol. iii, p. 157. 



38 THE MAKING OF THE BALKAN STATES [38 

pacification of Greece was prematurely published, and deeply 
offended both the Greeks and the Ottomans. 1 Under these 
circumstances, the Porte did not hurry forward the restora- 
tion of the status quo in the principalities of Wallachia and 
Moldavia, and Russia accordingly delayed sending a minis- 
ter with full powers to Constantinople. A little later on, 
after the Turkish forces were mostly withdrawn from Wal- 
lachia and Moldavia (1824), Russia put forth the claim that 
the civil status quo had been a part of the requirement, and 
still refused to re-establish full diplomatic relations with the 
Sultan's government. 2 

The Greeks now turned to Great Britain, and voted to 
place themselves under the protection of that country (Au- 
gust, 1825) ; but the English government would only pro- 
mise to contribute its good offices toward the termination 
of the contest. Alexander was exasperated by the failure 
of his allies to come to an agreement with him on an ef- 
fective plan for settling his difficulties with the Porte. This 
was the situation when the Tsar died, in December, 1825. 
The successor, Nicholas I, promptly announced his intention 
to carry into execution the " last wishes and intentions " of 
the late emperor. At the same time, also, some who had 
been connected with the government under Alexander de- 
clared that his latest resolve had been upon immediate war 
with Turkey. 3 Having been solicited by the provisional 
Greek government to mediate in behalf of the Greeks, Mr. 
George Canning, England's Foreign Secretary, now felt 
that his government had real grounds on which Greek af- 

^ebidour, op. cit., vol. i, p. 217. 

2 Wellington, op. cit., vol. ii, pp. 470-82, 531. 

3 Joyneville, Life and Times of Alexander I (London, 1875), vol. iii, 
P- 33^', Stapleton, op. cit., vol. ii, p. 468; Wellington, Dispatches, etc., op. 
cit., vol. iii, pp. 172 et seq. 



39 j UP TO THE TREATY OF PARIS— 1856 39 

fairs might be discussed with Russia. Accordingly, with 
the purpose of preventing Russia from going to war with 
Turkey, the Duke of Wellington was sent to St. Petersburg 
(February, 1826), and was instructed to offer the "single 
intervention " of Great Britain between the Tsar and the 
Sultan, and also between the latter and the Greeks. The 
Duke found that the Tsar Nicholas was not much concerned 
about the Greeks, but that he had already determined 
(March, 1826) to issue an ultimatum to the Porte, and to 
require an answer within a month. This was to be a per- 
emptory demand for the execution of treaties respecting the 
Danubian principalities, and for the release of the Servian 
deputies, still imprisoned (since 1820) in Constantinople. 1 
The ultimatum was to require, moreover, that Turkish pleni- 
potentiaries should be sent to the Russian frontier in order 
to settle the arrangements for executing the treaty of Bucha- 
rest. Wellington tried to delay the sending of this note. 
Failing in this he finally made efforts to have the time al- 
lowed for an answer extended, and to have the demand re- 
lating to the meeting of plenipotentiaries left out. 2 The ulti- 
matum was presented to the Porte (April, 1826), six weeks 
being now allowed to the Sultan in which to return an an- 
swer. At this juncture, France and Austria joined with 
England in urging the Sultan to concede the Tsar's de- 
mands ; and before the time expired, Turkey promised that 
the three requirements would be fulfilled. 3 

The plenipotentiaries of the Sultan and of the Tsar met 
(July-October, 1826) and concluded the treaty of Acker- 
man. 4 The treaty of Bucharest was thereby confirmed, 

1 Cf. supra, p. 32; Wellington, op. cit., vol. iii, pp. 179 et seq. 
'Wellington, op. cit., vol. iii, pp. 172, 181, 224-33. 
3 Stapleton, op. cit., vol. ii, pp. 479, 494. 
4 Menzies, op. cit., p. 365. 



4 THE MAKING OF THE BALKAN STATES [40 

and some important stipulations were added. According 
to the terms of the new treaty the hospodars of Wallachia 
and Moldavia were to be elected for seven years, and were 
to be selected in each province by the General Assembly of 
the nobles. The two governors thus chosen were to be re- 
quired to " take into consideration the representations of 
Russian ministers on the subject of taxes, together with the 
maintenance of the privileges of the country." The nobles 
who had left during disturbances were to be permitted to 
return to their estates, and all the inhabitants were to enjoy 
liberty of commerce. A separate act, relating to Servia, set 
forth the interpretation of Article VIII of the treaty of 
Bucharest, as held by the Servians in 1813; and the Porte 
now promised to settle the Servian demands in concert with 
Servian deputies and to communicate the details of the set- 
tlement to the court of Russia within eighteen months. 1 

The treaty of Ackerman temporarily separated the Greek 
question from other matters that had been in dispute be- 
tween Russia and Turkey since 1821. 2 But even before 
the Porte promised to satisfy Russia in reference to the 
principalities and Servia, in particular, the English gov- 
ernment had come to an agreement with the Tsar 
(April 4, 1826) regarding the pacification of Greece. 3 
The Greeks had asked England to interpose with the object 
of bringing about a settlement of their differences with 
Turkey, and hence Canning took the initiative, at this time, 
in coming to an understanding with Russia. These two 
powers agreed to try mediation; but whether the recon- 
ciliation should be brought about by intervention in concert, 
or separately, Greece was to be made a dependency of Tur- 

1 See supra, p. 27. 

2 For the treaty of Ackerman, see Hertslet, op. cit., vol. i, p. 474. 
z Ibid., p. 741. 



4 i.] UP TO THE TREATY OF PARIS— 1856 41 

key, with an independent internal government. Neither 
England nor Russia was to seek in the settlement any terri- 
tory or any exclusive influence. The Ottoman government 
continued, however, to reject every offer of mediation in 
relation to the Greeks. France then joined with England 
and Russia in the treaty of London (July, 1827). In the 
battle of Navarino, as is well known, the ships of these allies 
destroyed the Turkish and Egyptian fleets (October), but 
the Sultan now became even more defiant. Then Nicholas 
proposed more severe measures. 1 Wellington, now Eng- 
land's prime minister, was fearful of consequences and 
pleaded for delay of hostilities. But on the twenty-sixth of 
April, 1828, in a lengthy declaration of war, accompanied 
with a comprehensive manifesto accusing the Ottoman 
Porte of " trampling under foot the Convention of Acker- 
man, and therewith all preceding treaties," Russia reopened 
the entire Eastern question, and moved her armies into 
Turkish territory. 2 Moldavia and Wallachia were occupied 
(May, 1828) and administered by Russia; and when the 
Tsar's army reached Adrianople, the Porte asked for an 
armistice, and on September fourteenth, 1829, the treaty of 
Adrianople was signed. 3 

The terms of this treaty advanced the Danubian provinces 
and Servia a long way towards independence. Moldavia 
and Wallachia were left under the suzerainty of the Porte, 
but were granted independent national governments, and 
liberty of commerce. The hospodars of these provinces were 
to be elected as before, but with the term of office, hence- 

1 State Papers—British and Foreign — vol. xvii, p. 30. 

'Wellington, Dispatches, Correspondence and Memoranda, vol. iv, 
pp. 204-5, 273 et seq. The declaration and the manifesto may be found 
in Hertslet, op. cit., vol. ii, p. 777. 

s Hertslet, vol. ii, p. 813. 



4 2 THE MAKING OF THE BALKAN STATES [42 

forth, for life. Turkey was required to give up every forti- 
fied place on the left bank of the Danube. After eighteen 
months no Moslems were to be allowed to reside in these 
two provinces, and none except merchants with special per- 
mits were even to visit that territory. Turkey relinquished 
all right, moreover, to demand supplies of any kind from 
Wallachia and Moldavia; and payment of taxes was not to 
begin there until two years after the Russians should evacu- 
ate the territory. Under some other specified circum- 
stances, these two provinces were to pay definite sums to the 
Porte ; but it was stipulated that, with the exception of these 
dues, " there should never be exacted from Moldavia or 
Wallachia, nor from the hospodars, any other tribute, con- 
tribution, or gift, under any pretext whatever." Russia 
exacted from Turkey a war indemnity, and payment for the 
losses of merchants, amounting to about $28,000,000; and 
until full payment should be made — to be within ten years 
— Russia was to continue her occupation of Moldavia and 
Wallachia. 1 

It was admitted that circumstances had kept the Porte 
from carrying out the terms of the treaty of Ackerman 
(1826), in reference to Servia. But now (1829) it was 
stipulated that the six districts previously detached from 
Servia must immediately become a part of that province; 
and the Porte was to have but one month in which to formu- 
late the regulations and issue the necessary orders for carry- 
ing into execution in Servia the present stipulations con- 
firming the rights of that province, as given in the treaty 

J The British Foreign Office complained of the excessive exactions of 
the treaty of Adrianople, and held that more liberal terms for Turkey- 
might well have been expected. "The Treaty," wrote the Earl of 
Aberdeen (1829), "appears to vitally affect the interests, the strength, 
the dignity, the present safety, and the future independence of the 
Ottoman Empire." Parliamentary Papers (1854), vol. lxxii, p. 1. 



43 ] UP TO THE TREATY OF PARIS— 1856 43 

of Ackerman. Moreover, it was required that within that 
time such regulations and orders should be communicated 
to the Court of Russia. Within half the time allowed the 
Sublime Porte issued to Servia the necessary Hatti-Sheriff, 
in which the Turkish governor and the Cadi of Belgrade 
were commanded to turn over to the Servians the adminis- 
tration of the internal affairs of the country, with the six 
districts annexed. These officials were likewise instructed to 
grant substantially the privileges that had been claimed by the 
Servians in 18 13, under the treaty of Bucharest. 1 No Mus- 
sulmans, except those left to guard the fortresses, were to be 
permitted henceforth to reside in this province; and as mer- 
chants, with their own passports, Servians were now to 
pass, at pleasure, throughout Turkish territory. 

SERVIA FROM THE TREATY OF ADRIANOPLE TO THE TREATY 

OF PARIS 1829-1856 

Within a year following the making of the treaty of 
Adrianople, and after full consultation with Servian deputies 
at Constantinople, the Sultan issued a firman, which was 
ostensibly intended to insure to the Servian nation the 
" inviolability and stability " of all the privileges heretofore 
granted to that province. 2 In keeping with the request of 

J The Pasha, or governor of Belgrade, was the Sultan's representa- 
tive, charged with the duty of administering the province. After the 
Servian uprising in 1804, however, the jurisdiction of that official was 
cut down more and more, until, by the withdrawal of the last of the 
Turks in 1867, he was left without any place in Servia. The Cadi (or 
Kadi), in Turkey, is a town or village magistrate, who administers the 
religious law, under the Sheik-ul-Islam — the Sultan's representative for 
the realm in religious matters. Since the religious law of the Moham- 
medans (the Sheri) is extended so as to apply to nearly all the activities 
of Moslems, as well as to questions relating to real property in Turkey, 
the Sheik-ul-Islam and his subordinates exercise very important legal 
as well as ecclesiastical functions. For the text of this Imperial mandate 
(Hatti-Sheriff), see Hertslet, op cit., vol. ii, p. 832. 

2 Ibid., p. 842. A firman is an edict of the Turkish government, and 



44 THE MAKING OF THE BALKAN STATES [44 

the people, Milosh Obrenovitch was to continue to be the 
prince, that dignity now being made hereditary in the 
Obrenovitch family. Prince Milosh was instructed by the 
Sultan to rule in the name of the Sublime Porte, and to 
administer the internal affairs of the country, in concert 
with the Council and the Assembly of the chiefs and elders 
of the nation. The authorities of the Porte in Servia (the 
Governor and the Cadi) were now commanded by the Sultan 
not to interfere in the affairs of the country, and not to 
exact the smallest amount (even 1/10 of one cent) beyond 
the permanently fixed tribute. A number of other privileges 
were likewise granted to the Servians, such as the right to 
establish printing offices, post offices, hospitals, schools, etc. ; 
and the metropolitan and bishops that the Servians should 
appoint, were to be confirmed by the Patriarch of Constanti- 
nople, without their being obliged to go to the capital of 
the empire for confirmation. This privilege of electing 
metropolitans and bishops from their own nation, was 
looked upon by the Servians as a special blessing; and it was 
enacted that the bishops should now receive a fixed salary 
from the public treasury. 1 Turkish and Russian commis- 
sioners traveled over Servia at this time for the purpose 
of settling its boundaries. When their report was ready 
(1833), the Sultan issued another firman ordering the 
boundary to be fixed in accordance with the maps and in- 
formation furnished, and also allowing the Turks five years 
more in which to sell their estates and leave Servia. 2 (Mus- 

may be signed by a Minister of State; while a Hatti-Sheriff is in the 
nature of an irrevokable order or decree signed by the Sultan. 

1 Ranke, op. tit., ch. xx. 

2 Hertslet, op. tit., vol. ii, p. 929. Thirty years later this last part of 
the firman had not been carried out, and an armed struggle between the 
two races then led to all Mussulmans being withdrawn from Servia. Cf. 
infra, ch. ii, p. J7* 



45 ] UP TO THE TREATY OF PARIS— 1856 45 

sulmans in the fortresses and in the city of Belgrade were 
to be permitted to remain). 

The relations between the Servians and the Ottomans, 
as now adjusted left little cause for further agitation in 
Servia, at the moment, against the Turks. But some of 
Milosh's staff of officials were again displeased with his ex- 
treme monarchial tendencies. He failed to respect the 
private rights of his people, and he soon appeared to con- 
sider inferior officers as so many servants, with no other 
duty than to do his bidding. He spared the peasants many 
hardships, however, for he resolutely refused to distribute 
fiefs and thus to create a class of overbearing landlords. 
But early in 1835, the opposition to him became more ag- 
gressive, and was found to be so well organized that the 
prince promised to allow some limit to his personal rule. A 
charter was accordingly drawn up and duly accepted by 
Servians; but the Porte, and some of the other powers, 
would not permit the operation of anything like a constitu- 
tion granted under the pressure of a popular uprising. In 
accordance with the wish of the Sultan, Milosh now visited 
Constantinople, and soon after his return his official Gazette 
announced that the people were happy in having the Prince 
as their master. Meanwhile, his monopoly of trade grew 
more and more extensive; and those who had opposed him 
were now sorely persecuted. Russia warned him, and the 
Sultan required him to send a deputation to Constantinople 
(1837). These deputies and the Porte, with the Russian 
court in full accord, were not long in preparing for Milosh 
and his people a charter that was very similar to the con- 
stitutions of Western states. Strangely enough, the abso- 
lute monarchies favored this constitution, with its limita- 
tions on the authority of the prince, while France and Eng- 
land opposed the grant of so much liberty to a people not 
yet ready, it was argued, for self-government. 



4 6 THE MAKING OF THE BALKAN STATES [46 

Under this new constitution a senate of seventeen life 
members was created, together with courts and a central 
administration made up of four officers, who were to preside 
respectively over foreign affairs, home affairs, finance, and 
justice and education. All details were carefully worked 
out, and it may be said that the constitution of 1838 repre- 
sents an excellent system of checks and balances. 1 The 
senate of seventeen members could exercise so much au- 
thority, however, that Milosh, in his disappointment at the 
loss of supreme leadership, early convinced some of his 
people that they would now be obliged to satisfy seventeen 
masters. A half-hearted revolt in favor of the prince was 
soon suppressed ; and when Milosh would not consent to any 
division of authority, he was told by his rivals that he must 
leave. He resigned (June, 1839) in favor of his son and 
left his country. The eldest son, Milan, was already too 
ill to take the exiled father's place, and he died without 
knowing that he was really at the head of the government. 
Michael, a younger son, was then elected, and as he was but 
seventeen years of age, the Porte appointed two native chiefs 
to be his official counselors. With the support of his 
people, Michael rejected these counselors; but it was not. 
long before he too fell into disfavor with some of the native 
leaders, who accused him, among other things, of giving too 
many places in the government to Austrian-Servians. 2 

The leaders of the opposition among the Servians soon 
joined with the Turks, who were displeased because the 
prince and his party rejected the counsel of the Sultan's 
appointees, and Prince Michael also was obliged to abdicate 
and to leave his country (August, 1842). The Skupschtina 

1 Hertslet, op. cit., vol. i, p. 968. 

1 Ranke, op. cit., ch. xxiii. Several of the Servian leaders were very 
anxious for the restoration of Milosh. 



47] UP TO THE TREATY OF PARIS— 1856 47 

then promptly elected Alexander, son of Kara George, to 
fill the vacancy. Russia would not permit this change to 
be made, however, as a result of revolution, and demanded 
a new election, together with the deposition of the Pasha 
of Belgrade and the exile of the two counselors who had 
been leaders in the opposition to the late prince. Austria 
agreed with Russia that the concerns of Servia did not fall 
within the discussion of the five powers; so the Porte and 
Servia carried out the requirements of the Russian court, 
and Alexander was then regularly elected (June, 1843). 1 
The movement thus culminated in the restoration of the 
Karageorgevich dynasty. 

After these changes, Servia passed through a period of 
comparative quiet down to the Crimean War, and details 
may well be passed over. 2 

THE DANUBIAN PRINCIPALITIES FROM THE TREATY OF 

ADRIANOPLE TO THE CRIMEAN WAR 1829-1855 

The treaty of Adrianople left Wallachia and Moldavia 
temporarily, as will be remembered, in the possession of 
Russia. 3 The Tsar's government continued to occupy and 
administer these provinces for about six years, and during 
that time a constitution, commonly called the Reglement 
Organique, was framed for the government of the two prin- 
cipalities (1831). 4 Unlike the conditions in Servia, these 
provinces had two quite distinct classes, the peasants and 
the so-called nobles. The Reglement Organique placed the 
government in the keeping of the nobles and the hospodars 

1 Russia, Prussia, Austria, England and France — Metternich's "Moral 
Pentarchy," formed in 1818. Cf. supra, p. 31. 

2 Ranke, op. cit., pp. 383 et seq. Cf. Minchin, Growth of Freedom in 
the Balkan Peninsula (London, 1886), ch. iv. 

z Supra, p. 42. 

4 Filitti, Les Principalis roumaines sous l y occupation russe (Bucca- 
rest, 1904), pp. 81 et seq. 



4 8 THE MAKING OF THE BALKAN STATES [48 

for life whom they should elect. The common people 
shared in the affairs of their country simply by paying 
taxes. However, under Russian occupation, sanitation was 
greatly improved, and tribunals were created in order to 
secure a regime of justice between man and man. In the 
treaty of Adrianople, the Porte had agreed to confirm the 
administrative regulations which might be made in these 
principalities while they were occupied by Russian garri- 
sons. 1 Accordingly, when Russia evacuated the two pro- 
vinces (1834) the Reglement Organique was formally re- 
cognized by Turkey as the constitution of Wallachia and 
Moldavia. The boundaries and the amount of tribute to 
be paid to the Porte were also definitely specified. 2 A few 
months later the Sultan issued a Hatti-Sheriff guaranteeing 
the territory against incursions from the Turkish side, and 
giving the hospodars the right to regulate freely the in- 
ternal affairs of the two provinces. 

A national spirit was already manifest there in the move- 
ment for schools, and for the study of art and other branches. 
The hospodars and the nobles did not work together har- 
moniously, however, and the European revolutionary move- 
ment of 1848 found parties in these principalities, also, ready 
for revolt. Jealousies there among the nobles, together 
with the desire for freedom from Russian interference, and 
the wish for full political equality, were the underlying 
causes of the outbreak. Both Russia and Turkey promptly 
sent armies into these provinces and quickly restored order. 
In the treaty that followed (Balta-Liman, May, 1849), 
Russia and the Porte set aside some portions of the organic 
statute of 183 1, and now appointed hospodars, not for life, 
but for a term of seven years. The two countries likewise 

1 Hertslet, op. cit., vol. ii, p. 827. 
^Ibid., p. 936. 



49 ] UP TO THE TREATY OF PARIS— 1856 49 

continued the suspension of the regular Assemblies, and 
sent a special commissioner from each Court to watch over 
the progress of affairs there, and to choose a commission of 
the most reputable nobles to revise the constitution. 1 This 
agreement between Russia and Turkey was for a term of 
seven years, and in the meantime each country was to keep 
in the province, or near by, a sufficient number of troops 
to maintain order and security in that territory. But before 
the seven years elapsed, however, the Crimean War began, 
and the whole situation was changed. 2 

MONTENEGRO UP TO THE CRIMEAN WAR 1853 

The latter half of the nineteenth century began with a 
series of events in southeastern Europe, which opened the 
way for still another group of the Sultan's people to steer 
toward statehood. Either because of the independent at- 
titude of the Montenegrins, or because of their predatory 
practices, in 1852 the Porte sent an army against them. 
On the plea of avoiding the danger of consequent uprisings 
in her own neighboring territory, and supported by Russia, 
Austria promptly demanded and procured the withdrawal 
of the Turkish forces from Montenegro. 3 

The resolute resistance of the Montenegrins, together 
with the inaccessible nature of their country and the sup- 
port of the Russians, coupled with the general confusion in 
Ottoman affairs, had enabled that little group of mountain- 
eers to withstand, for centuries, the many attempted in- 
vasions of the sultans, and to maintain throughout their his- 
tory a large degree of liberty. 4 When the Turks overran a 

^ertslet, op. tit., p. 390. 2 Menzies, op. cit., pp. 389-90. 

3 Denton, Montenegro — Its People and Their History (London, 1877), 
pp. 278-81. 

4 Frilley & Wlahovitj, Le Montenigro Contemporain (Paris, 1876). 
Introduction. 



c;o THE MAKING OF THE BALKAN STATES [50 

part of the Balkan peninsula in the fifteenth century, some 
of the Servians found a safe retreat on the western slope 
of the Black Mountain (called by Venetians, Montenegro). 1 
The extent of their territory was only something like sixty 
by thirty miles — sometimes more and sometimes less. 
From 1 5 16 to 185 1 they lived as a democracy of warriors, 
under the leadership of Vladikas, or prince-bishops. 2 It 
is said that down to 1800, these people had withstood 
attacks by Turkish armies in more than forty systematic 
campaigns. 3 In 171 1 they declared themselves subjects of 
Peter the Great, and from that time on, Russia assumed 
toward them the attitude of a protector, often aiding them, 
especially with money and counsel. 4 

THE CRIMEAN WAR AND SOME OF ITS IMMEDIATE CONSE- 
QUENCES 1853-1856 

The Roman Catholics at Jerusalem complained that the 
ecclesiastics of the Orthodox Greek church there had 
usurped some of the Holy Places which a century earlier 
had belonged to the Latins. The exclusive guardianship, 
it was claimed, of certain chapels which enshrined the 
monuments of some of the crusaders had, in course of time, 
passed from the Latins to the Greeks; and it was charged 
by the Latins that these chapels and monuments had been 
allowed to fall into a lamentable state of decay. The 
Latins expressed their anxiety to make the 'needed repairs, 
and, among other things, they asked for the vindication 
of their right to the possession of these chapels. The claims 

freeman, Historical Geography of Europe, p. 428. 

2 Odysseus, Turkey in Europe, p. 276. 

3 Edinburgh Review, vol. 109, p. 461. 

4 Wilkinson, op. cit., pp. 429, 482; Ranke, op. cit., p. 215; DeTesta, 
op. cit., vol. x, p. 373. 



5 i] UP TO THE TREATY OF PARIS— 1856 51 

of the Roman Catholics were based on some stipulations in 
a treaty between France and Turkey (1740), and hence 
France took the lead (1850) in supporting the demands 
of the Latins. The Tsar of Russia very promptly made 
his influence felt at the Porte, also, in behalf of his co- 
religionists — the Greeks — and he soon demanded the main- 
tenance of the status quo in respect to the Holy Places. 

So it came about that while Austria was forcing the 
Sultan to abandon the attempt to punish the Montenegrins 
(1852-3), Russia was insisting that he should pronounce 
a verdict favoring a continuance of all the privileges here- 
tofore possessed, at Jerusalem, by the Greek Church. Both 
France and Russia persistently pressed the Constantinople 
government for a settlement; and the Sultan found him- 
self face to face with the unpleasant necessity of reconcil- 
ing the rival claims of the two Churches, as well as the con- 
flicting demands of the two great powers. Finally, in 1852, 
the Sultan issued a firman providing for a settlement in the 
form of a compromise. But the concessions thereby made 
to the Greeks and the Latins were soon found to overlap. 
Nevertheless, both France and Russia threatened demon- 
strations against Turkey unless the conflicting grants were 
carried into effect without delay. 1 Unremitting diplomatic 
efforts were kept up, however, especially on the part of 
England, and by the end of April, 1853, the Sultan issued 
another firman whereby the contradictory concessions were 
satisfactorily adjusted. 2 

But Russia had already (March 16 and April 19) re- 
quested from the Sultan a written Act that would afford the 
government of the Tsar " solid and inviolable pledges," 
that, in the future, the Porte would protect the privileges 
and the immunities of the Orthodox Eastern church and its 

1 Parliamentary Papers, 1854, vol. lxxv, pp. 1 et seq. * Ibid., p. 183. 



5 2 THE MAKING OF THE BALKAN STATES [52 

clergy. 1 The Sultan's government hesitated about the 
matter of pledges for the future. So within a few days 
after the privileges of the Greeks and Latins at Jerusalem 
had been harmonized, the Tsar's envoy to the Porte, Prince 
Menchikoff, demanded that within five days an answer 
should be given to Russia's request for guarantees. 2 Great 
Britain held that such a guarantee as was demanded would 
" extend the religious influence, and by that means the 
political power, of Russia, in Turkey," and determined that 
the Tsar should not receive from the Sultan any such 
pledges for the future. 3 

Russia contended, now, that she was not demanding a 
recognition of her right to protect the Christian subjects of 
the Ottoman empire, but that the requirement was merely 
a pledge for the future maintenance, by the Sultan, of the 
religious status quo of the Greek Church in Turkey. The 
Tsar professed to feel bound in honor to require, as a final 
demand, a " simple note," as " reparation for the past and a 
guarantee for the future." When, after much urging, it was 
seen that the " simple note " was not forthcoming, the Rus- 
sian embassy was recalled from Constantinople, and Russian 
troops were sent to> occupy and hold Moldavia and Walla- 
chia, as a pledge for the desired guarantee (July, 1853 ). 4 
The hospodars departed, leaving the two provinces in the 
hands of the Russian generals. The Turkish declaration 
of war (October) was followed by that of Russia (Novem- 
ber), and several battles ensued in these principalities. The 
next March (1854), England and France called on Russia 
to evacuate the two provinces ; and when the Tsar refused 
to answer their communication, the two states, as the allies of 

1 Parliamentary Papers , 1854, vol. lxxv, pp. 160, 174. 2 Ibid., p. 182. 

% Ibid., p. 179; Hertslet, op. tit., vol. ii, p. 87. 

* Parliamentary Papers , (1854), vol. lxxi, pp. 209, 233, 243. 



53] UP TO THE TREATY OF PARIS— 1856 53 

Turkey, began active operations against the Russians. Austria 
and Prussia were trying to avoid participation in the war, 
but becoming alarmed by the continued nearness of Russian 
troops in Moldavia and Wallachia, these two states formed 
an offensive and defensive alliance (April, 1854), and also 
summoned the Tsar to evacuate the two provinces (June 
3). 1 Austria then entered into an agreement with the Porte 
(June 14), providing for Austrian occupation of Walla- 
chia and Moldavia, until peace should be declared. During 
the period of such occupation, however, the local authorities 
in the principalities were to be free to govern in accordance 
with rights and privileges previously granted by Turkey. 

The Servians had watched the warlike preparations in 
Austria, and becoming suspicious that there might be de- 
signs of invading their territory, they addressed a strong 
protest to the Porte, and promised to answer for the main- 
tenance of tranquillity and public order in their country 
(April). 2 In December (1854), Austria, France and Eng- 
land entered into an alliance for concerted action in refer- 
ence to possible terms of peace with Russia, and the occu- 
pation of Moldavia and Wallachia by Austrian troops. The 
sovereigns of these three states promised to each other, in 
the same connection, that they would join in an offensive and 
defensive alliance in case hostilities should break out, during 
the war, between Austria and Russia. The treaty was ac- 
ceded to by Sardinia, in March, 1855. 3 

The death of Nicholas I (March 2, 1854) and the acces- 
sion of Alexander II, together with the extended efforts of 
the warring powers to agree on terms of peace, did not 
have much bearing on the struggle that followed. It was 
not until after the inexpressible suffering and the bloody 

1 Hertslet, op. cit., vol. ii, p. 1201. 

1 1bid., p. 1196. z Ibid. t p. 1221. 



54 THE MAKING OF THE BALKAN STATES [54 

campaigns in the Crimea, that the Tsar bowed to the in- 
evitable, and in the treaty of Paris (March, 1856) joined 
in the total annihilation of all the exclusive rights which his 
predecessors, in the struggles of three-quarters of a century, 
had wrung from the sultans. 

Not long after the beginning of this contest, England, 
Austria and France declared (December, 1854) that the 
erroneous interpretation of the treaty of Koutchouk-Kain- 
ardji (1774) had been the principal cause of the war; and, 
at the same time, these powers determined that Russia must 
" renounce the pretention to take under an official protec- 
torate " the Sultan's Christian subjects (Orthodox Greeks), 
and must also " renounce the revival of any of the articles 
of her former treaties " with Turkey, relating to Moldavia, 
Wallachia, or Servia. 1 The treaty of Paris (1856) satisfied 
these demands. Thus it was that the exclusive Russian pro- 
tectorate over the Sultan's Christian provinces and the 
Greek Church in Turkey, was outlawed. 

Whatever ambitions may have been cherished by Russia's 
rulers — from Peter the Great on — for more than half a cen- 
tury, by encouraging and in a large measure supporting and 
directing the efforts of groups of co-religionists in Turkey, 
that nation had helped these peoples to secure the privileges 
and the right of internal self-government. 2 Happily, the 
interdiction now of Russian interference in the Ottoman 
empire could not bring about the obliteration of what Rus- 
sian diplomacy and Russian armies had helped to establish 
in the Danubian principalities, in Servia, and in Montenegro. 
Hopes and aspirations had been awakened in these provinces, 
looking toward a still more distinctively national life there. 
Nevertheless, the powers were content to do little more than 

1 Hertslet, op. cit., vol. ii, p. 1225. 

3 Parliamentary Papers (1854), vol. lxxi, p. 845. 



55] UP TO THE TREATY OF PARIS— 1856 55 

to stipulate in the treaty of 1856 that Wallachia, Moldavia, 
and Servia were to continue to enjoy such " rights and im- 
munities " as they already possessed. Pledges were also 
given for the preservation in these provinces of independent 
and national administrations, as well as full liberty of wor- 
ship, of legislation, of commerce, and of navigation; and 
there was to be no intervention without the previous agree- 
ment of the contracting powers. 1 A part of Bessarabia 
was taken from Russia and annexed to Moldavia, and pro- 
vision was made for a commission charged with the duty 
of investigating the state of the Danubian principalities and 
of revising their laws and statutes. All the rights and privi- 
leges of the three provinces- — Wallachia, Moldavia and 
Servia — were placed, by the treaty, under the guarantee, 
henceforward, of the contracting powers. 2 

While Montenegro was not mentioned in this treaty, it 
is significant that in the protocol of one of the conferences 
resulting in its formulation (March 25), the Sultan's pleni- 
potentiary reiterated Turkey's claim to that province as an 
integral part of the Ottoman empire, and declared that the 
Porte had no intention of changing the status quo there. 
At the same time, also, Russia gave assurances that she did 
not claim any exclusively political relations with the Mon- 
tenegrins. 3 

v 

1 England, Russia, Austria, France, Prussia, Sardinia and Turkey. 

2 For the general treaty of peace (Paris, March 30, 1856), see Hertslet, 
vol. ii, p. 1250. The Bessarabian territory taken from Russia was taken 
away from Roumania (united Moldavia and Wallachia) by the Euro- 
pean powers in 1878 and restored to Russia. 

3 State Papers, op. cit., vol. xlvi, pp. 102, 104. 



CHAPTER II 

The Balkan Provinces under the Protection of the 
European Concert — 1856- 1870 

Well might the treaty of Paris (1856) have seemed to 
inaugurate a new regime in relation to the affairs of the 
Ottoman empire. For the first time in its history that em- 
pire was now recognized as forming a component part of 
the great European system, and the Sublime Porte was 
formally " admitted to participate in the advantages of the 
Public Law and System (Concert) of Europe." * 

In the famous Hatti-Humayoun (famous though futile) 
of February 18, 1856, the Sultan confirmed all the privi- 
leges and immunities heretofore granted to his non-Mussul- 
man communities, and promised equal rights to all subjects, 
irrespective of race, religion or language. 2 Provision was 
also made in this imperial decree for needed reforms along 
various other lines; and we may discern in the firman the 
expression, at least, of a feeling that the empire had now 
been raised to a higher dignity, and had entered upon a new 
era. 

The formulation and the promulgation of this definite and 
comprehensive Imperial edict was largely due to the untiring 
efforts of Stratford Canning (Viscount Stratford de Rad- 
cliffe). For sixteen years (1842-58), as England's am- 
bassador at Constantinople, he kept up " active and friendly 

1 Peace of Paris (1856), Art. vii; Hertslet, op. cit., vol. ii, p. 1254. 
5 Ibid., vol. ii, p. 1243. 

56 [56 



57] UNDER PROTECTION OF EUROPEAN CONCERT 57 

intervention " with the Porte, in order to bring about from 
within the reform of the Ottoman empire. 1 

Mr. Canning felt very keenly, however, that unless some 
" force from without " should " keep up a steady animating 
pressure " on the Turkish authorities, this great Charter 
of Reforms would be merely " a lifeless paper, valuable only 
as a record of sound principles." 2 He tried to induce the 
London government to protest against placing in the treaty 
any promises or guarantees that would lead to the conclusion 
among Ottoman authorities that the Sultan was thereby 
rendered unquestionably secure in the possession of his 
dominions and in the exercise of absolute sovereignty. All 
his efforts in that direction, however, were unavailing. The 
powers that had conquered Russia were already committed 
to that policy; and such promises and guarantees were em- 
bodied in the treaty of Paris as would naturally ins£ire, at 
the Porte, an implicit confidence that the integrity and the 
independence of the empire had now become inviolable. 3 

Although the treaty of Paris lacks any specific guarantee 
that the signatories would defend the independence and ter- 
ritorial integrity of the Turkish empire, still there is in it 
engagements and guarantees that might well have seemed 
to free the Porte from all danger in this connection, because 
of coercion from without. 4 Each of the contracting parties 
guaranteed the strict observance of its engagement to 1 re- 
spect the independence and territorial integrity of the Otto- 
man empire, and any violation of the engagement was to 
be considered a " question of general interest." Moreover, 

1 Lane-Pool, Life of Stratford Canning ; vol. ii, ch. xxii. 
'Lane-Pool, op. cit., vol. ii, p. 437. 
3 Annual Register (London, 1858), p. 183. 

* Moore, International Law Digest (Washington, 1896), vol. i, p. 20; 
Hertslet, op. cit., vol. ii, p. 1281. 



58 THE MAKING OF THE BALKAN STATES [58 

it was agreed that no one or more of the signatories should 
use force against the Porte without first giving the others 
an opportunity for mediation. Also, in recognizing the high 
value of the Sultan's communication to the powers (the 
Hatti-Humayoun of February 18, 1856), decreeing radical 
reforms, and " recording the Sultan's generous intentions 
toward the Christian population of his empire," it was ex- 
pressly agreed that in no case could the communication of 
this edict give to the powers the " right to interfere, either 
collectively or separately, in the relations of the Sultan with 
his subjects, or in the internal administration of his em- 
pire." * Moreover, among other precautionary measures, 
the treaty neutralized the Black Sea, closed the Dardanelles 
and the Bosphorus to foreign ships of w r ar while the Porte 
was at peace, and provided for the free navigation of the 
Danube, under an international commission for improving 
and regulating the navigation of that river. 2 Then, also, 
before the ratifications of the treaty of Paris were ex- 
changed (April 27, 1856), Great Britain, France and Aus- 
tria signed a treaty of alliance (April 15, 1856), guaran- 
teeing, jointly and severally, the independence and integrity 
of the Ottoman Empire recorded in the treaty of Paris, and 
agreeing to consider any infraction of the latter treaty as a 
casus belli. 5 

The treaty of Paris was a somewhat carefully devised 
system of checks and balances, with the primary purpose, it 
would appear, of providing for the peace and the perpetuity 
of the Ottoman empire. 4 In general, the privileges of four 

treaty of Paris (1856), arts, vi, ix. 

'Hertslet, op. cit., vol. ii, p. 1251; Holland, The European Concert 
in the Eastern Question (Oxford, 1885), p. 249. 

3 Hertslet, vol. ii, p. 1280. 

A I6td., vol. ii, p. 1251. See especially the preamble and article i of 
the treaty of Paris. 



59] UNDER PROTECTION OF EUROPEAN CONCERT 59 

parties are noted in the treaty: the Ottoman empire (politi- 
cally and territorially) ; the contracting powers; the autono- 
mous provinces; and all non-Moslem (but in particular the 
Christians) subjects of the empire. Of these four parties, 
the provinces seem to have been the least limited by either 
legal or circumstantial restrictions. It is true that the sig- 
natories guaranteed to these provinces only such privileges 
and immunities as they already possessed; but at the same 
time the Porte engaged to preserve in each (not including 
Montenegro) " an independent and national government." 

One of the three " requisite levers " suggested by Mr. 
Stratford Canning for improvement within the Turkish em- 
pire was action prompted by " the right spirit " on the part 
of the provincial authorities. 1 But in undertaking to pro- 
tect Turkey's semi-independent European provinces, the 
powers denied themselves everything except the right of 
collective intervention; and as disagreement respecting the 
necessity or the manner of coercion was probable, no really 
effective means remained for making the action of the pro- 
vincial authorities conform to the chief aim of the treaty — ■ 
the independence and integrity of the Turkish empire. 2 

Subsequent events indicate that the European powers were 
more inclined, all along, to induce the Porte to pacify the 
Balkan provinces by granting increasingly liberal conces- 
sions, than they were to hold in check the ambitions and as- 
pirations of these groups of the Sultan's subjects. So one 
concession followed another, until racial sympathies were 
to lead Servia and Montenegro to join Bosnia and Herze- 
govina in a war against the Porte (1876), which in its turn 
was to lead on to other complications, thereby drawing the 
affairs of the Balkan territory into one general current of 

1 Lane-Pool, op. cit., vol. ii, p. 439. 

s See the preamble of the treaty of Paris. 



60 THE MAKING OF THE BALKAN STATES [60 

events that carried Roumania, Servia and Montenegro on 
to independence. This same struggle also virtually separ- 
ated Bosnia and Herzegovina from Turkey, and created a 
semi-independent New Bulgaria and the partly autonomous 
province of Eastern Roumelia (1878). 1 In tracing some- 
what in detail these political movements in Servia, Monte- 
negro, and the principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia 
(Roumania, after 1866), between the treaty of Paris and the 
treaty of Berlin (1856-78), it seems advisable to continue 
the method adopted in the first chapter and follow separately, 
for the most part, the course of events in each province. As 
in the previous chapter, the affairs of Wallachia and Mol- 
davia (Roumania) first claim our attention. 

THE FORMATION OF ROUMANIA 

Provisions were made in the treaty of Paris for blocking 
Russia's supposed roadway to Constantinople. By requir- 
ing the Tsar to cede a part of Bessarabia to Turkey, the 
Russian frontier was pushed away from the Danube; and 
it was particularly stipulated that no exclusive protection by 
any one of the guaranteeing powers should be exercised 
over Wallachia and Moldavia. 2 

France, England and Russia were ready to proceed at 
once to organize these two principalities under one central 
government, but Turkey and Austria objected to such a pro- 
cedure, and Prussia and Sardinia were more or less uncon- 
cerned. 3 The result was that the treaty merely provided that 
the laws and statutes of these principalities should be re- 
vised; and that a special commission should proceed to 
Bucharest charged with the duty of investigating the con- 

1 British and Foreign State Papers, vol. lxvii, p. 1238. 
3 Hertslet, op. cit., vol. ii, p. 1260. 

s State Papers , op. cit., vol. xlvi, p. 80; Parliamentary Papers (1859), 
vol. lxi, p. 66. 



6i] UNDER PROTECTION OF EUROPEAN CONCERT 6 1 

ditions in the two provinces. This commission was ex- 
pected, moreover, to ascertain the wishes of the peopje, as 
expressed in representative assemblies (divans ad hoc) ; to 
suggest bases for the future organization of the principali- 
ties; and to transmit a report, without delay, to Paris. 1 But 
there was delay and difficulty in getting at the wishes of the 
people through these constituent assemblies. After about a 
year (September, 1857) these bodies expressed a practi- 
cally unanimous wish for a union of Moldavia and Walla- 
chia under a foreign prince. 2 The next year, from May to 
August, the powders held conferences in Paris and finally 
agreed on a series of ordinances that were to constitute the 
definitive organization of these principalities. These " Ar- 
ticles " represented a very comprehensive scheme, according 
to which the people in the provinces were to carry on their 
own affairs under the suzerainty of the Porte. 3 

The peculiar features of this European plan for the gov- 
ernment of these provinces resulted from the attempt to con- 
form, as nearly as might be, to the wishes of all parties con- 
cerned. Turkey and Austria still continued to oppose the 
formation of one government for the two provinces, so the 
treaty powers worked out a sort of combination of union 
and separation. 4 The name adopted was The United Prin- 
cipalities of Moldavia and Wallachia, and a central commis- 
sion was ordered. This commission w T as made up of eight 
members from each principality — four selected by the hos- 
podar from among men who had served the people in high 
offices, and four by each Assembly from its own body. This 

1 Hertslet, op. cit., vol. ii, Treaty of Paris, arts. 23-25; Annuaire 
Historique, 1856 (Paris, 1861), pp. 57-60. 

1 Ibid., p. 397. 3 Hertslet, op. cit., vol. ii, p. 1329. 

4 See Martens, N. R. G. de traitis, tome xvi, p. 15; also pp. 16-50, 
for the Protocols of the conferences (19) at Paris, May 22-August 19, 
1858. 



62 THE MAKING OF THE BALKAN STATES [62 

so-called Central Commission was intended to be permanent 
during the life of the two provincial Assemblies (seven 
years). It was made the special duty of this central govern- 
ing body to protect and revise the " Articles ", together with 
the laws, so as to bring all except matters of purely local 
interest under the care and administration of this Central 
Commission. 1 Each principality was to have an Assembly, 
elected for seven years by voters twenty-five years old or 
more and having a fixed property qualification. Each As- 
sembly was directed to proceed to the election of a hospodar 
for a life term. The hospodars were to keep agents at the 
suzerain court, and in case the Porte should not attend to 
the complaints of these agents respecting any violation of 
immunities, the hospodars were empowered to communicate 
their grievances directly to the representatives of the guar- 
anteeing powers at Constantinople. It was distinctly stated 
also that before the Porte could interfere in the affairs of 
these principalities for the purpose of re-establishing order 
there, an understanding must be had with the treaty powers. 
At the same time it was stipulated that the regular militia 
required to be maintained in each of the two provinces 
should be given an " identic " organization, in order that 
they might readily co-operate as two corps of one and the 
same army. The new scheme provided for the equality, in 
the eyes of the law, of all Moldavians and Wallachians, and 
ordered that all privileges, exemptions, or monopolies en- 
joyed by certain classes, be abolished. This constitution, 
which was formulated in Paris by the concert of the powers, 
is a lengthy document (seventy-three articles), and it bears 
witness to the efforts of the contracting powers to give to 

1 It will be seen that this somewhat ingenious compromise was as arti- 
ficial as it was complex. Cf. McCarthy, A History of Our Own Times 
(New York), vol. i, p. 502. 



63] UNDER PROTECTION OF EUROPEAN CONCERT 63 

these people very comprehensive and explicit laws and di- 
rections for governing their provinces. 

It has already been noted that the Moldavians and Walla- 
chians requested the Paris conference to grant them a cen- 
tral government, under a foreign prince. 1 The powers, how- 
ever, took no notice of their expressed desire for a foreign 
ruler; but finally, on the question of union, the compromise 
was effected which provided, as we have seen, for two gov- 
ernments, and also for the Central Commission, as the com- 
mittee of sixteen was called, to attend to matters of common 
concern. 

However, this detailed scheme of government which 
neither united nor separated the two peoples worked out 
very well from the standpoint of the local authorities. The 
next spring (1859) being the time for choosing new hos- 
podars, Moldavia elected a Moldavian, Colonel Alexander 
Couza, and about two weeks later the Wallachian Assembly 
elected the same man. 2 While it is clear that the new con- 
stitution was drafted on the basis of there being two hos- 
podars, it is equally clear that the document does not contain 
any statement that seems intended to prohibit the election 
of the same person to the hospodariat of both provinces. 3 
But the suzerain court contended that the double election 
was illegal, and called for a conference of the guaranteeing 
powers to deal with the matter. Accordingly, the plenipo- 
tentiaries in Paris, from these courts, held two meetings. 
April 7th and 13th, 1859. At the second sitting, and after 
listening to the protests of Turkey and Austria against the 
double election of Colonel Couza, the representatives of 
England, Russia, Prussia, France and Sardinia agreed to a 
resolution requesting the Porte to make an exception jn the 

1 See supra, p. 61. 

2 Hertslet, op. cit., vol. ii, p. 1335. i Ibid., p. 1329. 



64 THE MAKING OF THE BALKAN STATES [64 

case of the election already held, and recognize Prince Couza 
as the governor of both Moldavia and Wallachia. The 
Porte, on the other hand, urged military intervention for the 
purpose of enforcing strict conformity to the principles of 
the new constitution; but the five powers insisted that the 
suzerain court must take their resolution under careful con- 
sideration. The Central Commission met in June, and with 
the expression of an earnest desire for union, pledged its 
support to Prince Couza. Couza had already taken the 
name of Alexander John I, and he and the Commission now 
made free use of the terms " Roumania " and " Rouman- 
ians." 1 

After the lapse of six months, another meeting of the 
powers was held, and the Porte then promised (September 
6) to recognize Colonel Couza as being exceptionally called 
for that occasion to the government of both provinces, with 
the condition that he must maintain in each of the princi- 
palities separate and distinct administrations. 2 It was also 
understood among the guaranteeing powers that no further 
infraction of the administrative and legislative organization 
already given to the principalities would be permitted. 3 The 
Sultan then sent to Colonel Couza two identical firmans of 
investiture in the two hospodarships (September 24). 

The following year the prince urged the attention of the 
legislators to the need of reforms, especially in relation to 
the peasantry. 4 He soon found great difficulty, however, 
in bringing his ministers and the members of the two Assem- 
blies to his way of thinking. Consequently, at the beginning 
of 1 861, he addressed a long letter to the Porte, explaining 

} De Testa, Recueil des Traitis de la Porte Ottomane, vol. v, p. 407; 
Annuaire Historique, 1859, p. 369. 

2 State Papers , op. cit., vol. 49, pp. 454 et seq. 

'Hertslet, vol. ii, p. 1377. 4 De Testa, op. cit., vol. v, p. 407. 



65] UNDER PROTECTION OF EUROPEAN CONCERT 65 

fully the need of changes in the constitution. He requested 
at the same time that the electoral law be amended, and that 
there be but one ministry and one Assembly for both pro- 
vinces. 1 Before the end of the year, and with the full con- 
sent of the powers, the Sultan granted Prince Couza's re- 
quest, and issued a firman uniting the two ministries and 
also the two Assemblies, and suspending the jurisdiction of 
the Central Commission. This imperial decree likewise or- 
dered that a Council be convoked regularly in each princi- 
pality. The right of being consulted on all laws and regu- 
lations of local interest was given to these councils, and each 
was charged with the duty of controling the administra- 
tion of the funds of its own province. 2 The Sultan under- 
took to make it very clear, however, that other limits which 
had formerly divided the two principalities must be left in 
tact, and that as soon as Prince Couza should cease to ad- 
minister the two, the constitution of 1858 must again be- 
come the law of the provinces. Austria was in full accord 
with this view of future procedure ; but the other five powers 
offered the suggestion that favorable results might make it 
seem advisable to continue the union, and reserved the right, 
when a vacancy in the hospodariat should re-open the ques- 
tion, of considering with the Porte the course to be fol- 
lowed. 3 

As soon as the Sultan's firman was communicated to 
Prince Couza, he issued a proclamation (December 20, 
1 861) beginning with, "Roumanians! the union is accom- 
plished ! the Roumanian nationality is formed ! " and ending 
with, " Vive la Roumanie '' '.* 

In opening the first session of the new Roumanian As- 
sembly (February 5, 1862), the prince set before that body 

*De Testa, op. cit., vol. v, pp. 408 et seq. 

'Hertslet, vol. ii, p. 15. z Ibid., vol. ii, p. 1499. 

*De Testa, op. cit., vol. v, p. 445. 



66 THE MAKING OF THE BALKAN STATES [66 

the most urgent needs of the country, and expressed his be- 
lief that " neither the Porte nor the guaranteeing powers 
would ever destroy the union." * But the new government 
failed to work harmoniously, and the following February 
(1863), the consuls in Bucharest, representing the powers 
in the European concert, were instructed to act collectively 
for the purpose of preventing all acts contrary to the consti- 
tution. They were instructed also to make an effort to re- 
store harmony and to induce the Assembly to give first im- 
portance to questions of national interest. 2 A month later 
the Assembly addressed a lengthy communication to the 
prince, accusing him of unbounded caprice and with insin- 
cerity in relation to the intended constitutional regime. 

The deadlock between the government and the legislative 
body led the prince, on May 14, 1864, to dissolve the As- 
sembly. At the same time he called on the army to preserve 
order and proposed to the nation a series of ordinances, 
giving to the prince the sole initiative in proposing laws, and 
providing for universal suffrage, a senate and an elective 
assembly. 3 The Porte reminded him that he had exceeded 
his authority ; and he then went to Constantinople and came 
to an agreement with the Turkish government on an " addi- 
tional act" to the constitution of 1858. The consent of the 
guaranteeing powers to these alterations was freely given. 
By these authorized changes all public and legislative power 
was vested in the prince, a senate and an elective assembly. 
The prince now acquired the right, also, to name each year 
the president of the Assembly, and to him was given, as well, 
the power to originate laws. It was required, nevertheless, 
that before any measure could become a law it must receive 
the sanction of prince, Assembly and Senate. Moreover, it 

1 De Testa, op. cit., vol. v, p. 451. 

1 Ibid., p. 450. 3 Ibid., vol. v, pp. 465 et seq. 



67] UNDER PROTECTION OF EUROPEAN CONCERT 67 

was made obligatory for every public functionary on enter- 
ing office to swear submission to the constitution and the laws 
of the country, as well as fidelity to the prince. A council 
of state, to be formed by the prince, was also provided for. 
The duties of this council were to study and frame drafts 
of such proposed laws as might be referred to it by the 
head of the provinces. In addition to these duties, the mem- 
bers were empowered to represent the prince in the two 
chambers, where they would have the right to explain and 
defend such measures as they had proposed. The ministers 
were to have the right likewise of speaking in the senate as 
often as they might wish ; and the suffrage was now made 
practically universal. 

But the most important concession of all in this connec- 
tion, perhaps, was the right now given to the Roumanians 
to change the laws governing their internal administration 
without any intervention from without. This they were em- 
powered to do so long as the proposed changes should not 
affect the ties binding the principalities to Turkey, or violate 
the treaties between the Forte and other powers. 1 

In proclaiming to his people (July, 1864) the success of 
his mission to the suzerain court, Prince Couza called special 
attention to the fulfilment of the desire of the Roumanians 
for internal autonomy. 2 A month later, he issued a procla- 
mation liberating the peasantry from' all feudal obligations, 
and providing a way whereby they might buy at low prices 
much of the land formerly held by the boyards (nobles). 3 

The Senate and the Assembly met in January, 1865, and 
there seems to have been a better feeling than formerly 

1 Parliamentary Papers (1867), vol. lxxiv, pp. 639 et seq.; De Testa, 
vol. v, p. 472. 

J De Testa, vol. v, pp. 482-98. 

3 For the settlement of the land question, see Parliamentary Papers 
1870, vol. 64. 



68 THE MAKING OE THE BALKAN STATES [68 

between the prince and the legislators. 1 But the boyards 
were not pleased with the rural laws which took from these 
former large landowners so many of their fields and de- 
prived them at the same time of the labor of the peasantry. 
Accordingly, Prince Couza was severely criticised, and he 
was charged with being as despotic as he had been demo- 
cratic. 2 The tobacco monopoly and the confiscation of the 
property of the monasteries helped also to render him ex- 
tremely unpopular. 

The feeling against the prince finally became so strong 
that a number of conspirators entered the palace, February 
23, 1866, and forced him to abdicate. 3 The same day a 
provisional government issued a proclamation referring to 
the " anarchy and corruption " that had existed during the 
seven years of Prince Couza's reign. This proclamation 
reminded the Roumanians, moreover, that the election of a 
foreign prince would be the consummation of their wishes, as 
expressed to the powers in 1857. 4 The same day the two 
Assemblies elected Philip of Flanders, a brother of the king 
of Belgium, as prince of Roumania. 

In view of the situation, the Porte communicated at once 
with the guaranteeing powers, and asked for a conference. 
Accordingly, from March 10 to June 14, 1866, ten confer- 
ences were held in Paris, but without any very positive re- 
sults. 5 The first sitting (March 10) merely resulted in a 
communication being sent through the foreign agents at 
Bucharest to the provincial government of the provinces, 
announcing that a conference of the powers — parties to the 
treaty of 1856 — had been held, and recommending the pro- 

*De Testa, vol. v, pp. 484-98. 2 Ibid., vol. v, p. 499. 

J 3 De Testa, vol. v, p. 514. Couza went to Paris, and died at Heidel- 
berg in 1873. 

*Ibid., pp. 5I4-I5- 

6 Parliamentary Papers, 1867, vol. 74, pp. 547-619. 



69] UNDER PROTECTION OF EUROPEAN CONCERT 69 

visional government to maintain order and the administra- 
tion, and " to abstain from any act that would prejudice the 
decision of the Conference." 

But while the representatives of the powers at Paris con- 
tinued to deliberate, the government and the people in 
Roumania proceeded to act. At the second conference 
(March 19) the representatives from Turkey explained that 
the Porte could not admit a foreign prince to be at the head 
of the principalities, because that would be " tantamount to 
declaring the independence of the two provinces." Eng- 
land's representative agreed that the government of a for- 
eign prince there would be " incompatible with the integrity 
of the Ottoman Empire." The representative of France, 
however, was in favor of allowing the Roumanians to choose 
their own leader, and he did not hesitate tc recommend that 
as the best way out of the difficulty. Italy's representative 
was of the same mind. But the Russian ambassador stoutly 
opposed the idea of a foreign prince, and he denied altogether 
that the population of the principalities, at that time, even 
desired union under a native governor. 1 It was finally 
agreed that the question of allowing a foreign prince should 
be reserved until the conference should determine whether 
or not the union of the principalities ought to be continued. 
Several times during the meetings the idea was advanced 
that there were two very important principles to be con- 
ciliated — the integrity of the Ottoman empire, and the " ac- 
complishment of the wishes " of the people in the principali- 
ties. 2 

The Count of Flanders having declined the nomination 
tendered him on February 23, 1866, the Roumanians now 
proceeded by a plebiscite (April) to the election of Prince 
Charles Louis of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen. 3 As a result 

1 Parliamentary Papers, 1867, vol. 74, p. 560. 

5 Ibid., pp. 559, 583, 617. 3 De Testa, op. cit., vol. v. p. 628. 



jO THE MAKING OF THE BALKAN STATES [yo 

of this universal male suffrage vote, it was claimed that 
Charles Louis was elected by 685,969 affirmative votes 
against 224 negatives. The man who was thus called to 
undertake the difficult task of guiding the destinies of the 
principalities was related to the royal family of Prussia, 
and at that time was an officer in the Prussian army. 1 On 
hearing of his election, the conference at Paris merely di- 
rected the attention of the provisional government at Bucha- 
rest to the constitution of 1858, which required that the 
prince, who must be a native, should be elected by the 
Assembly. 2 

Prince Charles sent in his resignation as an officer in the 
Prussian army, and reached Bucharest May 22nd. 3 The 
Sultan was inclined to resort to military intervention but 
was informed that he could not do that without the consent 
of the signatories of the treaty of Paris (1856). 4 In this 
connection, the plenipotentiary of Great Britain called the 
attention of the conference to the fact that there were in 
reality, neither disturbances nor troubles in the principali- 
ties. Meanwhile, however, the agents of the powers at 
Bucharest were instructed to refrain from doing anything 
that would imply the recognition of Prince Charles as hav- 
ing any authority in The United Principalities. 

The last meeting of the conference (June 4) was called 
at the request of the Russian ambassador, and it was evi- 
dent that Russia and Turkey were becoming more and 
more impatient. These two powers were now prepared to 
urge immediate diplomatic intervention, as provided for in 

1 De Testa, op. cit., vol. v, pp. 604, 608. ''■Ibid., vol. v, p. 609. 

3 Prince Bismarck is said to have advised Prince Charles to accept the 
election and go to Roumania. Miller, The Balkans, p. 108; Dame, 
Histoire de la Roumanie (Paris, 1900), p. 162. 

^Parliamentary Papers, 1867, vol. lxxiv, p. 608. 



yi] UXDER PROTECTION OF EUROPEAX COXCERT yi 

the. protocol of September, 1859. 1 They desired that the 
suzerain court should send to the principalities a commis- 
sioner, accompanied by representatives of the powers, for 
the purpose of informing the provisional government that 
unless the request of the guaranteeing powers should be 
complied with, measures of coercion would be considered. 
The right to intervene was unanimously conceded, but none 
of the powers except Turkey and Russia were convinced 
of its " desirableness." 

When it was intimated in the conference that there was 
reason to believe that Prince Charles of Hohenzollern in- 
tended to free himself from the suzerain court, the repre- 
sentative of France explained that the Prince had already 
informed the Roumanian agent at Constantinople that the 
rights of the Porte would be maintained. 2 There was a 
general agreement among the five powers now striving to- 
ward off intervention, that the state of affairs in Europe, 
and the danger of insurrection among the Christian popula- 
tions in Turkey, rendered it hazardous to undertake coercive 
measures, and made it seem to be the wisest course to per- 
mit Prince Charles of Hohenzollern to become the Prince 
of Roumania. 5 These five governments went so far, at the_ 

1 Hertslet, op. cit., vol. ii, p. 1378. 

2 Parliamentary Papers , 1867, vol. lxxiv, p. 617; De Testa, op. cit. t 
vol. v, p. 641. 

3 While the Paris conferences were being held (March-June) to 
determine what course to pursue with the Roumanians, relations be- 
came very much strained between Prussia and Austria; and Italy like- 
wise engaged in preparations for a struggle against Austria. Meanwhile, 
Russia, England and France were endeavoring by peaceful means to 
bring about a settlement of these differences. Hertslet, vol. iii, pp. 
1655-85. Staatsarchive, vol. ii, (1866), p. 45. 

For a further expression of the extreme disappointment felt in the St. 
Petersburg cabinet because Russia and Turkey were not supported in 
their desire to carry out the stipulations of the Treaty of Paris and the 
subsequent agreement of the guaranteeing powers in 1858, see De Testa, 
vol. v, p. 660. 



72 THE MAKING OF THE BALKAN STATES [72 

same time, as to intimate that it might be well to recognize 
him as the head of the government of these provinces, so 
long as he should maintain order and respect the rights of 
the suzerain court and the integrity of the Ottoman empire. 

Russia's plenipotentiary at Paris declined to refer to his 
government the question of the " desirableness " of coercive 
measures in Roumania, and hinted at the probability that 
he would be instructed to retire from the conference. The 
sitting of June 4th proved to be the last meeting, however, 
and so the question was left by the European concert with- 
out any definite settlement. 1 Fortunately, at this juncture 
the Porte opened negotiations with the Roumanians, and 
within ten days after the last meeting of the Paris con- 
ference, there were trustworthy rumors that the Sultan 
was disposed to come to an agreement with Prince Charles. 2 

The Paris, London and Berlin cabinets exerted their in- 
fluence in order to secure the best attainable settlement for 
the Roumanians. 3 A little later, (July 11) the Turkish 
government expressed a willingness to sanction, under cer- 
tain conditions, the choice of the ruler that had been made 
in the United Principalities; and after three months of 
further negotiations a complete agreement was reached. 
Prince Charles now engaged on his own part, and in the 
name of his successors, to respect the Sultan's suzerain rights 
over the two provinces as an integral part of the Ottoman 
empire, and to accept as binding on these provinces Turkey's 
treaties with other powers. 

Having given these promises, with some others of minor 

1 Parliamentary Papers , 1867, vol. lxxiv, pp. 615-18; Martens, Nou- 
veau Recueil Giniral de Traitis (Gottingue, 1826-), vol. xviii, pp. 166- 
220. 

2 Parliamentary Papers, 1867, vol. lxxiv, p. 619. 

3 De Testa, op. cit., vol. v, pp. 680 et seq. 



73] UNDER PROTECTION OF EUROPEAN CONCERT 73 

importance, the foreign prince — now a naturalized Rou- 
manian — whom the people had selected to be their ruler, 
set out for Constantinople. There he was at once received 
by the Sultan, who put an end to the long and troublesome 
controversy and advanced the Roumanian population far 
on the way toward statehood, by conferring on Prince 
Charles of Hohenzollern the hereditary title of Prince of 
the United Principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia. 1 
Shortly afterwards all the guaranteeing powers concurred 
in this settlement. 

From that time (October, 1866) the people of the3e 
provinces always referred to their country as " Roumania;" 
but it was more than a decade before the name received 
diplomatic recognition. 2 

During the time that the question of recognizing the 
foreign prince was pending, a new constitution of one hun- 
dred thirty-two articles, signed by Charles, had been pro- 
mulgated at Bucharest (June 30). The first article very 
significantly declared the united principalities to constitute 
" one inseparable State," under the name of " Roumania." 
The country was divided into districts, which were organ- 
ized on the French system. This constitution provided for 
a liberal form of government similar to that in most con- 
stitutional monarchies, with a responsible ministry, to be 
selected by the prince, and a parliament of two houses. The 
Orthodox religion of the Orient (Greek) was mentioned as 
the dominant religion of the state; and the Roumanian 
Orthodox Church, remaining with the "ecumenical Church" 
of the Orient in matters of dogma, was declared indepen- 
dent of all outside control. Taken all in all, it is clearly 

1 Parliamentary Papers, 1867, vol. lxxiv, pp. 621-28. 
1 Cf. Holland, The European Concert in the Eastern Question, (Ox- 
ford, 1885). p. 235. 



74 THE MAKING OF THE BALKAN STATES [74 

evident that those who formulated this body of laws thought 
of Roumania as the land of only such as in blood, traditions 
and sympathies, should prove to be real Roumanians. 1 

With a view of establishing public credit and of encour- 
aging agriculture and foreign commerce, the new govern- 
ment set about the task of reorganizing the financial sys- 
tem. 2 During a part of the year 1867 Prince Charles was 
obliged, however, to listen to repeated and somewhat earn- 
est protests from several of the great powers against the 
persecution of the Jews in his territory. The higher offi- 
cials in the principality claimed that the hardships suffered 
by that part of the population were due to the lack of judg- 
ment on the part of subordinate employees in carrying out 
instructions respecting hygienic measures and the sending 
away of foreign vagabonds. It appears that the leaders 
in the persecution were not numerous, and that the prin- 
cipal agitators against the Israelites as a people, were, ac- 
cording to statements by some of the persecuted, " ignor- 
ant professors, briefless barristers, and small tradesmen.' ' 
For a year or more the situation presented a menacing as- 
pect, principally because of the disposition of Roumanian 
officials to minimize the acts of violence against the Jews 
and to emphasize the social bearing of the question to the 
exclusion of its racial and religious aspects. 3 In his ad- 
dress to the Chambers, in January, 1868, Prince Charles 
made it very clear that the laws of the country furnished 
him sufficient means to learn the truth in relation to the 
whole matter, and to put an end to all the abuses in con- 
nection with the Jewish population. At the same time he 

*De Testa, op. cit., vol. v, pp. 664 et seq. 
1 Ibid., vol. v, pp. 700 et seq. 

3 Ibid., vol. x, pp. 419, 432, 436; Parliamentary Papers, 1867, vol. 
lxxiv, pp. 509 et seq. 



75] UNDER PROTECTION OF EUROPEAN CONCERT 75 

called the attention of the legislators to the fact that be- 
cause of the economic as well as the political situation, the 
time had come to reorganize the army. 1 With much pres- 
sure from without, especially from England and Austria, 
the Jewish question gradually quieted down and gave place 
to others. 

During the years 1868 and 1869 the Turkish govern- 
ment frequently complained that, because Roumania failed 
to guard her Danubian frontier, bands of Bulgarians and 
others were being organized in Roumanian territory for 
the purpose of carrying on a revolutionary propaganda in 
the Sultan's nearby provinces. It was urged, moreover, 
from Constantinople, that the attitude of the Roumanian 
government already contributed towards a state of affairs 
that must soon threaten Turkish interests throughout the 
Balkan territory. 2 In reply, Roumania expressed her de- 
termination to continue the traditional hospitality of her 
territory ; but at the same time, the government at Bucharest 
instructed the Roumanian prefects all along the Danube to 
maintain order there, and to prevent any acts in that re- 
gion hostile to the Ottoman government. 3 

Notwithstanding the determination of Prince Charles, 
expressed in opening the Chambers in the fall of 1870, to 
hold his government to the maintenance of internal order 
as well as amicable relations with the Porte and the guar- 
anteeing powers, there soon began to be very threatening 
manifestations of party spirit. 4 The great land owners — 
the White or Conservative party — were open to Russian 
influence, and did not favor either the foreign prince or so- 

*De Testa, op cit., vol. v, pp. 704, 706. 

2 De Testa, vol. x, pp. 438 et seq. 

% Ibid., p. 471. 

"British and Foreign State Papers, vol. lxi (1870), p. 1277. 



76 THE MAKING OF THE BALKAN STATES [76 

cial reforms. Opposed to these were the Liberals (Red 
party) who looked to Germany and Austria for support, 
and demanded for the middle and lower classes a larger 
share in the government. The situation was still further 
complicated, meanwhile, by the aggressive attitude of some 
others, who boldly championed the cause of the French in 
their struggle against the Germans (1870-71). 

In general, both of the leading parties openly manifested 
their disloyalty to Prince Charles. Indeed, their, hostility 
became so pronounced that he even expressed his inclina- 
tion to abdicate, and leave the country. A new loyal con- 
servative ministry was formed, however, (under Catarji) 
and the influence of Germany and Austria, together with 
a timely reaction among his own people, dissuaded him. 1 

After this change of attitude toward the prince, the Rou- 
manians turned their attention more than ever to the im- 
provement of internal conditions. As time went by, the 
Porte, although with the ostensible aid of the guaranteeing 
powers, failed to put down the Herzegovinian insurrec- 
tion. 2 The Roumanian government issued a circular to its 
agents abroad (April, 1876) stating that the Roumanian 
policy was summed up in the one word " neutrality." Pre- 
parations there, however, for any eventuality were not 
neglected. The neutral attitude (if neutral at any time) 
was maintained for only a year, and then Roumania turned 
against the suzerain court and helped in the struggle that 
resulted in so many important changes in the relation be- 
tween all the Balkan provinces and the Ottoman gov- 
ernment. 3 

1 Annual Register ; 1871, p. 28; Seignobos, op. cit., p. 645. 

l Cf. infra, p. x. 

3 Parliamentary Papers, 1876, vol. lxxxiv, p. 365. 



77] UNDER PROTECTION OF EUROPEAN CONCERT 77 
CHANGES IN SERVIA 

When Servia was taken under the protection of the Euro- 
pean Concert (Treaty of Paris, 1856) that principality was 
already, as we have seen, fairly well organized under a 
native prince, Alexander, of the Karageorgevich dynasty. 
Some of the Servians complained that Prince Alexander 
was too submissive to Austrian influence and he soon be- 
came unpopular with the leaders in his government. He 
undertook to punish those who were accused of plotting 
against him, and was forced to abdicate (December, 1858). 1 
By recalling now the aged Milosh, who, twenty years be- 
fore had been driven to abdicate and to leave the country, 
the representatives of the people restored the Obrenovich 
dynasty. 2 

During the two years of Milosh's reign (1858-60), a con- 
siderable effort was made to obtain further concessions 
from the Sultan. In May, i860, a deputation was sent to 
Constantinople with a memorandum requesting the Porte to 
make the princely dignity in Servia hereditary in the 
Obrenovitch family, to restrict the privileges of Mussulmans 
still living in that province, and to give to the Servians the 
right to change and elaborate the laws for regulating the 
internal administration of their country. 3 Failing to re- 
ceive a satisfactory reply, and contending that what was 
asked for had already been promised, the Servians then 
declared that they would regard the concessions called for 
in the memorandum as already acquired, and as being 
inviolable. 4 

Prince Milosh died in the fall of i860, and was succeeded 

1 De Testa, op. cit., vol. vii, p. 15. 

2 Supra, ch. i, p. 44. 3 De Testa, vol. vii, p. 19. 

K Ibid., vol. vii, p. 31. As far back as 1830, and again in 1833, the 
Sultan had promised to Servia all and much more than was asked for 
in this memorandum. Cf. Hertslet, op. cit., vol. ii, pp. 842, 929. 



yS THE MAKING OF THE BALKAN STATES [78 

by his son, Michael, who, as we have seen, had been forced 
to abdicate in 1842, to make way for the restoration of 
the Karageorgevich dynasty. The new administration now 
began an earnest effort with the Porte to bring about the 
removal from Servia of all Turks living outside the for- 
tresses. 1 Firmans issued by the Sultan thirty years back 
had provided for such removal, but the instructions had 
never been carried out. The correspondence dragged on for 
more than a year, and finally it was agreed that .a mixed 
commission (Turks and Servians) should arrange for in- 
demnifying the Turks who would be dispossessed by the 
execution of these old firmans. Quite naturally the Servians 
became more and more exasperated when the Porte delayed 
the sending out of a commissioner; and in 1862, there were 
serious conflicts in Belgrade between the two races. 2 These 
disturbances were thought by some of the foreign consuls 
in Servia to have been the result not of accident but of 
" design and combination." 3 The English consul was dis- 
posed to place a large share of the blame on the recently in- 
creased Servian police force. After the first few hours of 
confusion and some firing, on the evening of June 15th, the 
consuls of the guaranteeing powers resident in Belgrade, 
were instrumental in bringing about an agreement between 
the Servian and the Turkish authorities in the city. 4 The 
Ottoman police retired to the citadel, and such other Turks 
as wished to do so were also allowed to take refuge there. 
Those of the Turks, however, who chose to remain outside 
were promised security of person and property. It appears 

1 De Testa, vol. vii, pp. 22 et seq.; Hertslet, vol. ii, pp. 842 et seq. 

2 There was an uprising, meanwhile, among people of the same races 
and religions in Herzegovina and Bosnia. 

3 State Papers, vol. lvi, p. 438. 

K Ibid., pp. 409 et seq.; De Testa, op. tit., vol. vii, pp. 81, 112. 



79] UNDER PROTECTION OF EUROPEAN CONCERT 79 

that the following day some of the Servians began to plun- 
der the houses of those who had gone to the citadel, and 
that, as a consequence, there was some firing on both sides. 
Then followed, without just provocation, as was generally 
held, the bombardment of the town. The Turkish garrison 
continued to fire on the city at intervals for four hours and 
then ceased on the earnest advice of the Austrian consul. 

These events in the Servian capital were followed by con- 
ferences at Constantinople (July 23rd-September 4, 1862) 
at which all the contracting powers in the treaty of Paris 
(1856) were represented. 1 The result of these confer- 
ences was an agreement that the Porte should maintain four 
fortresses in Servia for the defense of the country, garri- 
soned with " only the number of men necessary for their de- 
fense," but that all other Turks must leave the principality. 
A mixed commission of Ottomans and Servians was pro- 
vided for who were to decide questions of expropriation 
and indemnity, and this commission was allowed only 
four months in which to conclude its labors. 2 It was now 
expressly stated, moreover, that the officials of the citadels 
and the Servian authorities were not to interfere with each 
other in any way. Prince Michael was reminded by the 
guaranteeing powers that the new military organization of 
Servia had already created some apprehensions at Con- 
stantinople; and the international agreement added that he 
would find it easy to come to an understanding with the 
Porte as to the usual number of his effective force. The 
''Arrangement " also specified that the Porte would listen to 
demands made by Servia in a "just and friendly spirit," 
and that an answer to Servian requests or complaints would 
be returned by the Porte within the shortest possible time. 

1 Hertslet, op. cit., vol. ii, p. 1515. 

2 De Testa, op. cit., vol. vii, p. 126. (Aug., 1864. — Work of the com- 
mission not yet finished.) 



8 THE MAKING OF THE BALKAN STATES [80 

Under the constitution which had been forced upon Servia 
by Turkey and Russia in 1838, the senators (17) could not 
be legally removed without the consent of the sultan, and 
hence they were often able to set the prince at defiance. 1 
Soon after Michael's reign began (i860), however, the 
Servian government sent a representative to consult with 
the leading courts of Europe, and then enacted several laws 
that very materially modified that early constitution. 2 The 
senators were allowed to retain all their legislative functions, 
but they were now made amenable to the law courts, which 
were empowered to remove them for misconduct. 3 At this 
time also a distinctively Servian coinage was begun. 

The Turks failed to evacuate two positions on the Servian 
side of the frontier, and in the fall of 1866 Servia sent a 
" proper and conciliatory " note to the Porte requesting 
that the Turks be withdrawn from these places. The 
Sultan's government soon admitted that the right of the 
Turks to occupy these positions was not entirely clear; but 
the question became seriously complicated when the prince 
followed (October 29, 1866) the first request by soliciting 
the Porte either to make over to the Servians or demolish 
all the remaining fortresses in their territory. There were 
still four of these, and all were garrisoned by Turks. 4 
Prince Michael urged that a peaceful and contented Servia 
would be a far more effectual defense of the frontiers of the 
empire than the existing fortresses; and the Servian agent 
at the Porte, M. Ristich, declared that " if this one request 
were granted Servia would be content and would ask the 
Porte for nothing more." In the same communication, it 

*See supra, ch. i, p. 46; Hertslet, op. cit., vol. ii, p. 938. 

2 Macmillari s Magazine (London, 1863), vol. vii, "Servia in 1863." 

5 Minchin, Growth of Freedom in the Balkan Peninsula, p. 73. 

* Parliamentary Papers, 1867, vol. lxxv, p. 6. 



8i] UNDER PROTECTION OF EUROPEAN CONCERT gj 

was pointed out to the Turkish authorities, likewise, that 
though four years had elapsed since the bombardment of 
Belgrade, fear and the feeling of insecurity in the Servian 
capital, had not subsided. The Servians contended, more- 
over, that their material interests, and their legitimate feel- 
ings of national pride, were at stake. 

The protecting powers merely came to a sort of general 
agreement that the interests of all concerned required that a 
right feeling should be established between the Constanti- 
nople government and the Servians, and the Sultan was so 
advised. It was well understood that the feeling of ani- 
mosity in the nearby Christian provinces against the Turk- 
ish rule there, made it highly advisable that the Servians 
should not have any good reason for concerting with their 
neighbors against the Porte. For some time, however, the 
Ottomans felt that they ought not to yield to the extent of 
giving up the fortress of Belgrade. The policy of the 
powers throughout was to refrain from making any col- 
lective or formal representations, thus leaving to the Sultan 
the possibility of winning the good will of the Servians by 
spontaneously satisfying the wishes, for the time being, most 
dear to their hearts. 

It was not until five months after the prince's letter was 
received at Constantinople, that the Grand Vizier was ready 
to reply. But the answer was most welcome, for it an- 
nounced the willingness of the Sultan to confide the custody 
of all the Servian fortresses to the prince, and to have 
Servian soldiers replace the Mussulman garrisons. This 
very important concession was granted with the one con- 
dition, that the fortress should continue to fly the Ottoman 
flag together with that of Servia. 1 The Sultan's firman of 
April 10, 1867, confirming these concessions, added the con- 

1 De Testa, op. cit., vol. vii, pp. 138 et seq. 



77: OF THE \V STATES g 2 

dition. however, that the opinion and consent of the P 
must be obtained before any changes should be made in the 
fortresses now given over to the Servia. 

As early as 1861. the Servian government restricted the 
rights of the Jews in a way that was calculated to force 
them ultimately out of the interior of the country ; a:, 
to the end of Michael's reign (1868), an unavailing effort 
was kept up by the Jews in different parts of Europe to in- 
duce the powers to force Servia to modify :hese restrict: 
This persecution was claimed by the Servians to be on the 
sole ground of commercial rivalry. - 

Ever si::ce Kara George fled from the country in 18 
Servian people have been unfortunate, it would see::. 
having had two dynasties — the Karageorgevich and the 
Obrenovich. The members of these two families have kept 
up almost a constant struggle for the highest office in the 
country. Prince Michael failed in his efforts to conciliate 
the partisans of the Karageorgevich family, conseque: 
only a year after his government had been so triumphant in 
having the last Mussulman garrison withdrawn from his 
country, he was assassinated (i868). s But the plans of 
the plotters were foiled, and the National Assembly that 
was promptly summoned decreed that no member of the 
family of Kara George should ever again be eligible for 
the Servian throne. The Assembly then proceeded without 
Lelay zo the election of the late prince's nephew. Milan, as 
hereditary Prince, under the title :: Milan Obrenovich IV. 4 

The young prince was then but fourteen years :i:. ; 

1 Hertslet. op. n't., vol. iii. ?. 1S00: Farliamt -v>\>. 1867. vol. 

Ixxv. pp. 3 c. seq. 

x Parliamentary Papers, 1867, vol. Ixxv. 

* De Tes:a. op. :::.. vol. vii, pp. 172. 191: The Nation (New York, 
[86£ ral. vii, p. 10S. 

% Fortnightly Rei en London, : x ~: . vol. xiii: :\~; . vol. x.x. 



83] UNDER PROTECTION OF EUROPEAN CONCERT 83 

quently a Regency was formed. Ristich, the able leader 
of the Liberal party, was one of its three members. In full 
accord with the protecting powers the Sultan confirmed the 
election of Prince Milan, and also the regency as established 
(July 16, 1868) ; and a little later (August 4th), the Porte 
also confirmed the hereditary rights of the Obrenovich 
family. 

In his opening address to the Skouptschtina (June, 18^9) 
Ristich called attention to the suggestions made by the Na- 
tional Assembly the previous year, and to the work of the 
constitutional committee. He pointed out, moreover, that the 
time had come for the complete constitutional transforma- 
tion of Servia. 1 These suggestions were promptly acted 
upon, and before the end of the year a constitution of one 
hundred and thirty-three articles had been framed and 
adopted. This new constitution represented an attempt to 
organize the Servian government on the plan of the Euro- 
pean constitutional monarchies. The Skoupschtina now 
became a representative assembly, elected every three years, 
and holding sessions yearly. The voters elected the mem- 
bers of this Assembly on the general basis of one to every 
3,000 population, and the prince was empowered to appoint 
one for every three thus elected. Each one of these deputies, 
however, was charged with the duty of acting as a judge of 
the needs of the whole country, in accordance with his own 
convictions and conscience. All legislative power was vested 
in the prince and this assembly, but every official act signed 
by the prince required the signature also of the competent 
minister. The Senate that originated in 1859 was now 
transformed into a Council of State composed of from 
twelve to fifteen members, appointed by the prince. Among 
other duties, this Council was expected to elaborate projects 

1 De Testa, op. n't., vol. vii, pp. 18, 188, 202. 



g 4 THE MAKING OF THE BALK AX STATES [84 

of laws, to settle conflicts involving administrative law, and to 
have general supervision over public expenditures. All ques- 
tions looking toward important changes in the laws of the 
country were required, however, to be brought before a 
Grand National Assembly, made up of four times as many 
deputies as were regularly elected to the Skoupschtina. 1 

Under this constitution Servia began to have a more 
clearly defined political life. Parties with European names 
now ranged themselves, in general, on the side of one -or the 
other of the two main lines of national policy. The young 
prince had been a student in Paris, and it was but natural 
that he should gather about him men who favored the intro- 
duction of Western ways and the speedy development of the 
industrial interests of the principality. But there was a far 
more numerous party of those who cared little for internal 
improvements, and who strenuously opposed any consider- 
able increase in taxation, unless the money were to be used 
for national defense or in the interest of territorial expan- 
sion. 2 

Back at the beginning of " New Servia ", in 1804, tne 
Serb population of that province was but a body of unlet- 
tered peasants. Very few if any of these could even read or 
write. It seems probable that neither of the two native 
chiefs whose names have been given to the two so-called 
dynasties of Servia. could read or knew how to write his 
own name. Nevertheless, both Kara George and Milosh 
Obrenovich knew how to organize and carry forward cam- 
paigns for the liberation of their people. 

Down to 1840 there were not yet three thousand children 
in all the schools of the principality. The men who gave 

x For the text of the Servian constitution of 1869, see De Testa, op. 
cit., vol. vii, pp. 204 et seq. 

1 Cf. Seignobos, op. cit., p. 660; Miiller, Political History of Recent 
Times, p. 517. 



85] UNDER PROTECTION OF EUROPEAN CONCERT 85 

their time to the affairs of the government came to be 
called notables, but at the time of the new constitution 
(1869) Servia still contained an essentially peasant popula- 
tion. Cultivation of the soil, however, received slight atten- 
tion, for the people still found it profitable to supply pigs, 
oxen and sheep to the foreign markets. 1 The principality 
had now come to have an area of about sixteen thousand 
square miles, with a population of nearly one and a half 
million, almost all of whom were Serbs in race, and mem- 
bers of their autocephalous national Church. 2 There were 
then about three hundred and sixty church edifices, and a 
few more schools with upwards of twelve thousand pupils. 

The condition of the people had surely changed in many 
respects. But as yet they cared but little for material im- 
provements; and they had been very slow about giving up 
their former ways of living. They regarded themselves as 
" being politically tributary to, but not dependent on the 
Ottoman Porte ". Unfortunately, it must be admitted that 
the spirit of faction had been all too prevalent in their 
efforts at self-government, and had sadly marred their 
political life. Many of them cherished a lively hope of a 
" Greater Servia ", and as they constituted a branch of the 
Orthodox Eastern Church, it was but natural perhaps that 
they should continue to look to Slavic and Orthodox Russia 
as their all sufficient source of future aid and protection. 

Prince Milan reached his majority in 1872, and his peo- 
ple seem ever since to have treasured in their hearts this 
statement in his first speech from the throne : " It would 
be a great responsibility to lose the least of the acquisitions 
of our fathers, and little to our credit to add nothing to 
them." ? ' 

l Macmillan's Magazine, 1863, " Servia in 1863." 
'Identical in creed with the Orthodox Greek Church. 
3 Hertslet, op. cit., vol. iv, p. 2404. 






86 THE MAKING OF THE BALKAN STATES [86 

As we turn now to trace the affairs of the Montenegrins 
through this period we leave the Servians under the 
domination of the party of the people — the Radical Na- 
tionalists — and ready to join with their kinsmen in Bosnia, 
Herzegovina and Montenegro, in a determined struggle to 
secure further concessions from the Ottoman government. 

THE SITUATION IN MONTENEGRO 1856 TO 187O * 

When the Sultan's representative declared to the pleni- 
potentiaries of the powers in the Paris conference (March 
26, 1856) that the Porte regarded Montenegro as an inte- 
gral part of the Ottoman empire, the Montenegrin ruler ex- 
hibited solicitous surprise and mild indignation. 2 Prince 
Danilo at once protested to the powers, that the claim set 
forth by the Sultan's government was indefensible, and that 
Montenegro had a better claim to half of Albania and all of 
Herzegovina than Turkey had to Montenegro. 3 At the 
same time he addressed a note to the European powers call- 
ing attention to the successful struggles of the Montenegrin 
people during four hundred and sixty-six years to hold their 
territory and maintain their liberty. He also asked for the 
diplomatic recognition of the independence of Montenegro, 
the extension of the frontiers toward Albania and Herze- 
govina, the definite settlement of the boundary towards 
Turkey and the annexation to the principality of the port 
of Antivari. 4 Early the next year Prince Danilo visited 
Paris and presented his case to Emperor Napoleon III ; but 
on his return to Montenegro he received a proposition from 

1 The Nineteenth Century (London, 1877) contains an excellent sketch 
of Montenegro by W. E. Gladstone. 

2 Supra, ch. i, p. 55; Martens, N. G. R., op. cit., vol. xv, p. 738; 
State Papers, op. cit., vol. xlvi, pp. 97, 104. 

3 De Testa, op, cit., vol. x, p. 374; Edinburgh Review, vol. cix, p. 484. 

*De Testa, vol. vi, p. 4; Hertslet, vol. ii, p. 1438. 



Sj\ UNDER PROTECTION OF EUROPEAN CONCERT 87 

the ambassadors of the great powers at Constantinople that 
as an offset for access to the sea, and some other unimport- 
ant concessions from the Sultan, Montenegro should recog- 
nize the supremacy of the Porte. 1 The prince was ready 
to follow the advice of the powers, but the Montenegrins 
refused to acknowledge the suzerainty of the Sultan. 2 Mean- 
while a Turkish force, which was sent ostensibly to restore 
order on the frontier of Herzegovina, undertook to occupy 
the valley of Grahovo (" the Marathon of Montenegro"), 
which was then in the possession of the Montenegrins. The 
Turks were at once attacked and those of their number who 
escaped from the valley left behind them fourteen guns, their 
war supplies, and several thousand dead. 3 

The presence of Turkish troops in territory held by Mont- 
enegro at the time of the Congress of Paris (1856) placed 
the Porte in a very unfavorable position, considering the 
virtual promise by the Turkish government at that time to 
maintain the status quo in that province. 4 With a view of 
preventing future conflicts such as that in the valley of 
Grahovo, France invited the powers to join in a conference 
for the purpose of considering the whole situation in rela- 
tion to Montenegro. 5 The result was that the ambassadors 
at Constantinople of Austria, France, Great Britain, Prussia 
and Russia held a meeting with the Turkish authorities 
(November, 1858), and it was agreed to send, in the follow- 
ing spring, a boundary commission of engineers to assist 
in placing posts that should fix the territorial limits of Al- 
bania, Herzegovina and Montenegro. The boundaries were 

1 Frilley and Wlahovitj, Le Montinigro Contemporain , p. 72; Edin- 
burgh Review, vol. cix, p. 47. 
1 De Testa, op. cit., vol. vi, p. 10. 
'Frilley and Wlahovitj, op. cit., p. 76. 
4 Supra, ch. i, p. 55; De Testa, op. cit., vol. vi, p. 4. 
% Ibid., p. 12. 



88 THE MAKING OF THE BALKAN STATES [88 

to be fixed in strict accordance with the lines on a map 
previously prepared by the representatives of these powers. 1 
Despite the protests of Turkey, a Montenegrin was made 
a member of this international Boundary Commission soon 
after its work had begun. 2 

This commission reported the outcome of its labors in 
March, i860, and the Constantinople ambassadors, who 
originated this international body, then held another con- 
ference at the Turkish capital and agreed that if any further 
controversies likely to trouble the peace of the Montenegrin 
frontier should arise, the questions at issue must be referred 
to the consuls of these powers, at Scutari (Albania). It 
was also agreed that the Montenegrin prince was authorized 
to send a representative, in case the consuls at Scutari should 
have occasion to consider such questions. 3 

During the summer of i860 Prince Danilo went down to 
the hamlet of Persano for the baths, and while walking on 
the promenade at Cattaro with Princess Darinka, he was 
shot by an exiled Montenegrin. Without delay, and in con- 
formity with a decree of the Assembly passed in 1855, 
Princess Darinka proclaimed Nicholas Petrovic, a nephew 
of Danilo, the prince of Montenegro (Nicholas I). 4 

This change to a young prince, then but nineteen years of 
age. made very little difference for some time, however, 
in the policies of the principality. One who knew the young 
ruler intimately tells us that Nicholas I " set out with two 
fixed ideas — the first to prosecute the civilizing work among 
his people; the second, to liberate the sister Servian lands, 
.still in servitude ". 5 

x Hertslet, op. tit., vol. ii, p. 1353. 
2 Nineteenth Century (1877), vol. i, p. 372. 
3 Hertslet, vol. ii, p. 1439. 

4 Denton, Montenegro — Its People and Their History (London, 1877), 
p. 287. 

5 Frilley and Wlahovitj, op. cit., p. 202. 



89 ] UNDER PROTECTION OF EUROPEAN CONCERT 89 

The next year (1861), an insurrection in the sister Ser- 
vian province of Herzegovina called to the neighborhood 
of Montenegro a large Turkish force under Omer Pasha. 
The success of the insurgents during the fall of 1861 so 
awakened the enthusiasm and quickened the sympathies of 
the Montenegrins, that the Turkish general professed to 
be alarmed, and proclaimed the blockade of their country. 
In keeping with the urgent request of the powers, Prince 
Nicholas assumed a neutral attitude, and even allowed the 
Ottomans to pass through his province with provisions for 
a needy Turkish garrison in Herzegovina. 

During the winter re-enforcements were sent to Omer 
Pasha. When spring opened, Turkey (March, 1862) in- 
formed the other parties to the treaty of Paris (1856) that 
Montenegro was in a state of revolt, and then sent to the 
Montenegrin capital a declaration of war. 1 The Monte- 
negrins made a valiant resistance against the invading Otto- 
mans, but this time they were no match for the Turkish force 
sent against them. 2 Realizing after a time that their capital 
was in danger, they bowed to the inevitable and promised 
to comply with the demands of the Turkish ultimatum, 
which was issued from Scutari (August 31, 1862). 3 The 
internal administration of Montenegro was left as it had 
been before the invasion. But the prince was obliged to 
agree that his warrior father — Mirko* — should be exiled, 
and that the road from Herzegovina to Scutari passing 
through the interior of his country, should be kept open to 
commerce by Turkish troops, to be quartered in guard- 

*De Testa, op. cit., vol. vi, p. 12. 

2 In the words of William E. Gladstone: " It was then found that an 
empire of 30,000,000 could gain the advantage of a tribe under 200,000." 
Nineteenth Century (1877), vol. i, p. 373. 

3 Hertslet, op. cit., vol. ii, p. 1512; Archive Diplomatique (1863) , vol. 
iii, p. 269. 



9 o THE MAKING OF THE BALKAN STATES [90 

houses along the way. All senators, chiefs of natives, and 
other dignitaries in Montenegro, it was likewise agreed, 
would enter into a written agreement that the people of the 
conquered province would not make hostile excursions be- 
yond their frontiers, and that in case of an uprising in neigh- 
boring districts, they would not afford either moral or ma- 
terial assistance. Furthermore, without a Turkish passport, 
no family was to be allowed to enter Montenegro; but the 
right of leasing land outside the province for agricultural 
purposes was accorded to the Montenegrins. Moreover, 
while the importation of war supplies was strictly prohibited, 
the port of Antivari was opened to them for the export and 
import of merchandise, free of duty. 

Russia earnestly advised intervention in order to prevent 
the above conditions being imposed upon Montenegro. Eng- 
land, however, contended that the guaranteeing powers 
could not show any possible justification for intervening. 1 
Turkey had been admitted, it was contended, as an inde- 
pendent state to participate in the advantages and duties of 
the European System (Concert), 2 and Lord Russell argued 
that therefore the Sultan had the right to impose upon the 
prince of Montenegro such conditions of peace as would be 
likely to deter that people from future aggressions. 3 There 
was no formal intervention in this connection by the treaty 
powers. Nevertheless, the most offensive stipulations in 
the terms of peace were never enforced against Montenegro. 

1 Archive Diplomatique (1863), vol. iii, p. 271. 

2 By the Treaty of Paris (1856), art. vii. 

3 For Russia's objections to Lord Russell's views, see Archive Diplo- 
matique (1863), vol. iii, p. 273. Russia maintained that the Montene- 
grins had never recognized the suzerainty of the Sultan, and that there- 
fore the terms of peace that Turkey was being permitted to impose upon 
Montenegro effected a radical change in the status quo there, and really 
resulted in subjecting a Christian State to Turkish dominion. 



gi] UNDER PROTECTIOX OF EUROPEAN CONCERT 91 

The Porte soon withdrew the demand for the exile of Mirko 
and eventually abandoned the idea of establishing guard- 
houses along the route through the interior of the province. 1 

During their fourteen years of peace, following the war 
of 1862, the Montenegrins entered upon a new life in the 
matter of schools and military organization. Up to this 
time, almost no attention had been given there to educa- 
tion, and the soldier's preparation had consisted in un- 
bounded patriotism and the art of shooting, supplemented 
now and then by experience on the field of battle. 2 In con- 
nection with Prince Nicholas' visit to Paris, St. Petersburg, 
Berlin and Vienna (1868-9), a new start was made in 
Montenegro in establishing schools for elementary instruc- 
tion, and in providing the male population between the ages 
of seventeen and sixty with modern guns and with some 
military training. 

In 1868 Prince Nicholas promulgated a new constitution, 
which, at least, made it convenient for him when he so 
desired, to leave w T ith the senate the care of a considerable 
part of the internal affairs. Three years later, under the 
direction of a Professor from Odessa, there was a laudable 
effort also to bring the laws of the principality more into 
harmony with other European systems. Meanwhile, the 
Montenegrins rejoiced in the birth of a hereditary prince; 
and by naming this infant son Alexander (Danilo- 
Alexander) the parents afforded the Tsar of Russia, Alex- 
ander II. one more reason for interesting himself in behalf 
of this little mountain principality. 

Thus did the Montenegrins make ready, in a measure, 

1 Frilley et Wlahovitj, Le 3Iontinigro Contemporain , op. cit., p. 311; 
Nineteenth Century (1877), vol. i. pp. 707-752. (Article by Lord Strat- 
ford de RadclifTe) . 

1 A Montenegrin adage says: " Take my gun or take my brother, it's 
all one." Frilley et Wlahovitj, Le Montinigro Contemporain, p. 433. 



9 2 THE MAKING OF THE BALKAN STATES [92 

for the Balkan struggle against the Porte; and they need 
not claim our further attention until we find them joined 
with their " sister Servian peoples " in forcing forward the 
contest (1876-78), which dealt so many death-blows to 
the Sultan's suzerainty. 1 

THE BULGARIANS AND THEIR RE-AWAKENING 

Until the treaty of Paris (1856) was superseded, for the 
most part, by the treaty of Berlin (1878), as the public law 
of Europe in relation to the Ottoman empire, the Bulgarians 
had not secured any of the political rights and privileges 
that had been accorded from time to time, as we have seen, 
to the Roumanians, Servians and Montenegrins. While 
the territory inhabited by the latter peoples was contiguous 
to other European states, the Bulgarians dwelt in the in- 
terior of European Turkey, and were almost entirely shut 
off from contact with foreigners. 2 Being nearer, moreover, 
to the seat of the sultan's government, their subjection to 
Ottoman rule was, from the first, more unreservedly de- 
manded and more uniformly enforced. 3 

The original Bulgarians ("dwellers by the Volga") 
were mainly, it appears, members of an Ugrian tribe of 
Finnish stock. About 680 A. D. they left their homes in 
the Volga region and found a new abiding-place along the 

1 Frilley et Wlahovitj, op. cit., chs. xii, xiii; Miller, The Balkans (New 
York, 1896), ch. vii. See the Nineteenth Century (1877), vol. i, for 
"Montenegro," a sonnet, by Tennyson, in which the poet-laureate sings: 

" O smallest among peoples ! rough rock-throne 

Of Freedom! 

never since thine own 

Black ridges drew the cloud and brake the storm 
Has breathed a race of mightier mountaineers." 

2 Ranke, History of Servia, p. 7. 

3 Ibid., p. 33, and ch. vi; Odysseus, Turkey in Europe, op. cit., p. 75; 
Freeman, Historical Geography of Europe, p. 431. 



93] UNDER PROTECTION OF EUROPEAN CONCERT 93 

south side of the lower Danube. This territory they found 
already in the possession of Slavic tribes, nominally under 
the rule of Constantinople. As time went on, the Bul- 
garians seem to have established a good degree of political 
unity among both populations. 1 About two hundred years 
after the migration of the dwellers by the Volga to the 
Danubian territory, the Slavic (Servian) apostles, Cyril 
and Methodius, taught the Christian religion throughout 
that region. By the middle of the thirteenth century the 
two peoples there had become practically amalgamated into 
one nation, retaining the language and the traditions of 
the Slavs, but calling themselves Vulgars or Bulgars. 2 

Under the leadership of the first great king (Simeon, 
892-927) of these Slavo-Bulgarian peoples, they forced Con- 
stantinople to accept humiliating terms of peace, and Bul- 
garia came to include a large part of the Balkan peninsula. 3 
But a hundred years later the Greeks were the victors, and 
they continued for one hundred and fifty years afterwards 
to hold the Bulgarians in subjection. As time went on and 
no relief was granted from burdensome taxation for the 
support of the Constantinople Court, the Bulgarians re- 
belled. The strife between Eastern and Western Chris- 
tians (so called) soon afforded the Bulgarian king an oppor- 
tunity to strengthen his position, for a time, by seeming to 
espouse the cause of the Western Church. 4 So when Assen 
II (12 18-1240) came to the throne of Bulgaria, he found 
his kingdom free from Greek rule. However, he soon 
fell out with the Latin authorities in possession of Constanti- 

1 Bernard, The Shade of the Balkans (London, 1904), pp, 263, 292, 
312-326; Journal of the Anthropological Institute, vol. viii, "Bulgar- 
ians": vol. xxxvi, p. 189. 

'Bernard, Shade of the Balkans, p. 260; Finlay, op. cit., vol. iii, p. 
337; vol. iv, p. 28. 

'Odysseus, Turkey in Europe, p. 32. *Ibid., pp. 35-36. 



94 THE MAKING OF THE BALKAN STATES [94 

nople and allied himself with the Greeks, receiving in re- 
turn for this new alliance the creation of the Patriarchate 
of Bulgaria. 1 The autocephalous Bulgarian Church thus 
established was not wholly overthrown until 1767. During 
the reign of Assen II, ancient Bulgaria reached the zenith 
of her power and splendor, and after his death (1241) the 
empire rapidly declined. 

Then came the Servian ascendency in the Balkan country, 
which resulted in the Bulgarians being held for some de- 
cades under Servian domination. 2 At different times Bul- 
garians, and also a party among the Greeks, joined with 
the Turks against the Servians. And only, when it was 
too late, did the Balkan peoples unite against the Osmanlis, 
to suffer the fatal defeat of 1389, at Kossovo. 

With this general defeat of the Christians in 1389, and 
the burning of the Bulgarian capital (Tirnovo) four years 
later, the Bulgarians entered on their five centuries of 
existence as the Sultan's submissive subjects. 3 Most for- 
tunately for them, however, they were long permitted to 
retain their native hierarchy. That was an important fac- 
tor in keeping alive their language, their traditions, and 
their sense of nationality. It was not until 1766-7 that the 
Phanariots, seeing the opportunity for extending hellenizing 
influences, and of replenishing the treasury of the Con- 
stantinople Patriarchate, successfully used their patronage 
at the Porte to bring about the overthrow of the Bulgarian 
Patriarchate, as well as that of Servia. 4 

After the Ottoman victory at Kossovo (1389) the term 
Bulgaria, as occasionally used, could not have had any very 

1 Finlay, History of Greece, vol. iii, p. 308; cf. supra, ch. i, p. 22. 

'Odysseus, op. cit., p. 37. 

'Odysseus, Turkey in Europe, p. 75. 

i Idid., pp. 274-5! Ranke, History of Servia, p. 37. 



9 -] UNDER PROTECTION OF EUROPEAN CONCERT 95 

fixed and definite signification until Russia announced 
(1878) her specifications for a greater Bulgaria, which were 
promptly modified, as will be seen later, by the European 
creation of a diminutive Bulgaria. 1 

Following their incorporation with the Ottoman empire 
(1389), the Bulgarians seem gradually to have become 
more or less reconciled to living simple peasant lives, which 
appear to have been, for the most part, uneventful. Con- 
sequently we may take a long leap, so to speak, and direct 
our attention next to the re-awakening of the Bulgarian 
people, during the half-century preceding their political 
liberation (1878). 2 That re-awakening among these peo- 
ple first manifested itself almost wholly, for a period of 
nearly fifty years, in a strenuous effort to obtain again for 
themselves ecclesiastical autonomy. Native control over 
their own churches, and all that it signified, came to mean 
to them the all-important means for national development. 

The important bearing of the determined efforts of the 
, Bulgarians to regain the management of their own ecclesias- 
tical affairs, and consequently of their educational institu- 
tions, was largely due to the outcome of the unique method 
adopted by the sultans for the control and oversight of their 
non-Moslem subjects. Mohammet II — " The Conqueror " 
— had not been in possession of Constantinople many days 
(1453) before he proclaimed himself the protector of the 

1 Selected Writings of Viscount Strangford, vol. i (London, 1869), p. 
222; Freeman, Historical Geography of Europe, vol. i, pp. 423 et seq. 
Old Bulgaria had comprehended little or much territory, according to 
the fortunes of war. Later, that part of Turkey bounded, roughly 
speaking, by the Danube, the Black Sea, the Balkan Mountains and 
Servia was often conventionally called Bulgaria. 

2 After the formation of Eastern Roumelia and the principality of Bul- 
garia in 1878, however, there were many Bulgarians in European Tur- 
key who were left as much as ever under the domination of the Moslems. 



96 THE MAKING OF THE BA TATES [96 

Orthodox Eastern Church (Greek). 1 He confirmed the 
::on of the Greek patriarch, to whom he granted im- 
portant immunities, empowering him, at the same time, to 
ie among his co-religionists, according to Greek cus- 
toms, questions of both civil and ecclesiastical law. 2 From 
that time on, sultans have continued to recognize the di 
ion oi their non-Moslem subjects into separate religious 
lmunities, or millets. The ecclesiastical head of each 
one of these millets 1 Orthodox Greek. Roman Catholic, 
Armenian, etc. — now eight) has ordinarily been held re- 
sponsible, both by the members of his millet and by the 
sultan, as the official representative of his Community. 3 
These highest church officials in the various religious or- 
ganizations, have often been able to exert a considerable 
influence over the projects of the Pone: and until w T ithin 
the last half-century some of them could exercise almost 
absolute power over those under their jurisdiction. 4 The 
Mussulman Code, being at :::ce both civil and religious 
its nature, is not easily applicable to those of other religions . 
and. generally speaking, the Turks have been quite willing 
that the Christians and the Tews inhabiting the Ottoman 
dominions should settle many of the::- 3wn affairs among 
themselves. As a consequence, especially in times when 
the European countries were not intimately concerned in 
Ottoman affairs, so long as the head of any of these re- 

1 Odysseus, Turkey in Europe, p. 2:7; Menzies. Turkey Old and Xrj. . 
pp. 86^87. 

s Von Hammer. Geschichte e'es Or -Pest. i828\ 

vol. ii, pp. 2-3; Finlay. History of Greece, vol. iii. p. ;22. 

3 It has been suggested that for more than four centuries Turkey came 
near being a ' ' federation of theocracies under the sceptre of the Sultan. " ' 
Cf. Selected Writings of Viscount Strangford. vol. i. p. 224. 

*CY. Odysseus, op. cit.. ch. vi; Seignobos. op. c:i.. p. 618. 



gy] UNDER PROTECTION OF EUROPEAN CONCERT 97 

ligious communities kept on good terms with the Mohamme- 
dan government, he could usually carry out his own policies 
in relation to his millet. 1 

For centuries nearly all of the Bulgarians remained true 
to the Orthodox Eastern Church (Greek), and since 1767 
they had been ecclesiastically under the Greek patriarch of 
Constantinople. 2 Consequently their few schools and prac- 
tically all of their churches were in charge of Greeks, who, 
as a rule, either could not or would not make any use of the 
Bulgarian language. Moreover, as neither the Turks nor 
the Greeks were inclined to distinguish between Greek Or- 
thodoxy and Greek nationality, the Bulgarians came to be 
generally referred to as Greeks. 3 It is easy to see how 
their relation to the Greek Patriarchate became more and 
more strained. During the first half of the past century, 
there was a gradual growth of feeling and agitation among 
them, against the exactions and even the presence of Greek 
ecclesiastics and teachers. 4 

Soon after 1835 the Bulgarians in the Balkan territory 
began to open schools and to make their complaints and 
wishes known at Constantinople. 5 This growing desire for 
national schools was concurrent with their increasing deter- 
mination to have a national hierarchy. Earlier in the cen- 
tury, the realization of a free Greece and an autonomous 
Servia, had no doubt started the revival of a national spirit 
among the Bulgarians. They very soon discovered, how- 
ever, that even an effort to bring about the general use and 

^reacy, History of the Ottoman Turks (New York, 1877), p. 207; 
Finlay, History of Greece, vol. v, pp. 209-210. 

' Cf. supra, p. 22. 3 Finlay, vol. vi, pp. 1-12. 

* The People of Turkey, ed. by S. L.-Pool, London, 1878, vol. ii,p p. 
208 et seq. 

*Cf. Miller, The Balkans, ch. v; Odysseus, Turkey in Europe , passim. 



gg THE MAKING OF THE BALKAN STATES [98 

the development of their own language would be almost 
hopeless while they remained under the domination of a 
foreign hierarchy. But down to 1870, at least, there does 
seem to have been among the Bulgarians, any very general 
feeling of disloyalty toward the sultan. 1 

Shortly before the outbreak of the Crimean War, how- 
ever, the Tsar of Russia tried to make it appear that the 
Bulgarians were even then ready for revolt. In his con- 
fidential talk at that time with the British ambassador at 
St. Petersburg (April, 1853), tne Tsar Nicholas I is re- 
ported to have affirmed that only his efforts to check the 
manifestation of feelings of discontent among the Bul- 
garians had kept them from insurrection. 2 Nevertheless, 
their grievances against the Turks were generally attributed 
to the maladministration of the laws; and doubtless few 
among that essentially peasant people, even down into the 
seventies, were antagonistic towards the supreme Ottoman 
authority. 3 But they did determine to rid themselves of the 
domination and the burdens of what they felt more and 
more keenly to be a wholly foreign and unsympathetic 
hierarchy. 4 There were, in the meantime, quite active ef- 
forts by the Bulgarians along educational lines. In this 
work they were greatly aided by the services of some of 
their youths who were now beginning to be trained, especi- 
ally in the schools of France and Germany, as well as in 
the near-by American institutions. 5 

x The People of Turkey, pp. 208-214; Finlay, History of Greece, vol. 
vii, p. 126; Good Words (1865), pp. 197-205. 

i Parliamentary Papers, 1854, vol. lxxi, p. 846. 

* Ibid., 1 861, vol. lxvii, pp. 560, 597; 1867, vol. lxxv, p. 647; Contem- 
porary Review, vol. xxxv, "The New Bulgaria," loc. cit. 

4 Selected Writings of Viscount Strang ford, vol. i, p. 223. 

''The People of Turkey, p. 219; St. Clair and Brophy, The Eastern 
Question in Bulgaria (London, 1877), p. 290. A considerable number 
attended schools in Russia also. 



99] UNDER PROTECTION OF EUROPEAN CONCERT 99 

The sultan's decree in 1856 (noted in the treaty of Paris) 
of sweeping reforms and of an equal status for his subjects 
of whatever religion, had provided that the various ecclesi- 
astical taxes should be replaced by regular salaries to all 
church officials. 1 The following year several Bulgarian 
towns petitioned the Ottoman government for the privilege 
of availing themselves of this part of the promised reforms ; 
and they asked also for the appointment of a Bulgarian 
bishop. The Greek Patriarch, however, refused to sanction 
any such innovations. With a view of settling the con- 
troversy, an assembly, intended to be representative of the 
Orthodox community (Greek), was then called by the Porte. 
Of the twenty-eight representatives who assembled, how- 
ever, only four were Bulgarians. Under these conditions, 
the Patriarch's party could not fail to win. So the assem- 
bly closed in i860, after having particularly affirmed that in 
the appointment of bishops the Church could not take any 
account of the matter of race or nationality. 2 

Throughout the next decade, nevertheless, the Bulgarians 
kept up the struggle for ecclesiastical autonomy. 3 By 1867 
there was a wide breach between the Greek clergy and the 
Bulgarian population. Many places were then without 
bishops because the Bulgarians would no longer recognize 
the Greek ecclesiastics who were sent among them. It was 
not in any sense a question of doctrine or denomination, for 
the Bulgarians were merely seeking to free themselves from 
the tutelage of the Greeks, and to have a national synod with 
a representative at Constantinople. 4 

Meanwhile, apparently with a view of giving the non- 

1 Hertslet, op. cit., vol. ii, p. 1243. 

* Odysseus, Turkey in Europe, p. 283. 

3 Selected Writings of Viscount Strangford, vol. i, pp. 218 et seq. 

* Parliamentary Papers, 1867, vol. lxvii, p. 597, and passim. 



IO o THE MAKING OF THE BALKAN STATES [ioo 

Mussulman element in the empire some share in judicial pro- 
ceedings, the Porte made preparations for important changes 
in provincial administration. The reorganized pashaliks, 
or districts, were now (1864) called vilayets. By this new 
arrangement the large " vilayet of the Danube " was, in 
respect to population, a sort of Bulgarian province. Despite 
all obstacles, this part of the Balkan territory reaped some 
benefit from the new regulations relating to provincial ad- 
ministration. Under its first governor, the eminent Turkish 
reformer and statesman, Midhat Pasha, 1 a good start was 
made in that vilayet along several lines of reform. But, un- 
fortunately for the Bulgarians, before his reform measures 
could be established there on a firm basis, he was called to 
Constantinople to preside over the Council of State. 2 

The continued opposition of the Greek hierarchy to the 
Bulgarian demands for ecclesiastical liberty, inclined some 
of the Bulgarians to favor a union with the Western Church 
(Catholic). The prospect of such a movement at that time 
very naturally roused the apprehensions of Orthodox Russia. 
Finally, after the failure of a number of compromise meas- 
ures, and with the full accord of England and France, and 
the active support of Russia, the Sultan issued a firman 
(February, 1870) establishing the Bulgarian Exarchate, 
thus creating an autonomous Bulgarian Church. 3 Two 
years passed, however, before the first exarch was elected; 
and then the Patriarchate declared the new Church schis- 
matic and pronounced the sentence of excommunication 
against all who should desert the Orthodox Greek Commu- 
nity and place themselves under the ecclesiastical authority 
of the new Bulgarian Exarchate. Nevertheless, nearly all 

1 Ali Midhat, Life of Midhat Pasha (London, 1903), pp. 37 et seq. 

2 St. Clair and Brophy, op. cit., chs. xii, xiii. 

3 Odysseus, Turkey in Europe, pp. 283-85. For the English text of 
this firman, see Baker, Turkey (New York, 1879), pp. 435 et seq. 



IO i] UNDER PROTECTION OF EUROPEAN CONCERT IO i 

of the Bulgarians determined to brave the possible conse- 
quences of excommunication, and resolutely supported their 
native church organization. 

The Bulgarians had now won what they at once regarded 
as ecclesiastical freedom, and in so doing they had gained 
the means and the inspiration for more general and effective 
efforts towards securing some degree of political liberty. 1 
In creating the Bulgarian Exarchate, the Sultan had formed 
within his empire another religious community, or millet; 
and it was but natural, perhaps, that such a move should be 
regarded in the Balkans as a formal recognition of the Bul- 
garian nationality. When we remember the extent to 
which the affairs of each one of these religious communities 
were administered by its ecclesiastical head, we get some 
notion of what this victory meant to the Bulgarians. It is 
so common in the Orient for political and ecclesiastical au- 
thority to go hand in hand, that the right to manage their 
own Church, together with the accompanying civil jurisdic- 
tion, could not have failed to arouse and to sustain ardent 
desires among the Bulgarians, and to give to them anxious 
hopes for a still wider field of self-government. There are 
most conflicting accounts of the general feeling of the Bul- 
garians toward the Sultan's government, previous to the 
time when the approach of the Russian army became a cer- 
tainty (1877). Nevertheless, there seems to be but little 
reason to doubt, that without the work of agitators, operat- 
ing in Bulgaria from their headquarters in Servia, Roumania 
and Russia, the Bulgarian population would not, for some 
time at least, have risen in insurrection. The attempted 
revolt of some of the Bulgarians in 1876 was but a part of 
the general insurrectionary movement in the Balkans. That 

1 Minchin, Growth of Freedom in the Balkan Peninsula, p. 365; Fin- 
lay, History of Greece , vol. ii, p. 126. 



102 THE MAKING OF THE BALKAN STATES [i 02 

being the case, all that need be said in reference to what has 
come to be known as the " Bulgarian atrocities" (1876) 
very naturally has a place in the more general account of the 
Balkan uprising ( 1875-78). * 

1 C"Y. Beaman, Statnbuloff (London, 1985), ch. i. 



CHAPTER III 

International Complications, and the Outcome in 
the Balkans — 1870-1878 

The quarter of a century following the signing of the 
treaty of Paris (1856) brought to Europe political trans- 
formations of far-reaching significance. Much of that 
eventful period, it will be remembered, was taken up with 
the final conflicts which cleared the field for the unification of 
both Italy and Germany. 

Austria had but lately been defeated and humiliated, and 
the attention of Europe was absorbed by the Franco-German 
struggle, when in 1870, Tsar Alexander announced to the 
other signatory powers of the treaty of 1856, that he could 
no longer consent to be bound by such clauses of that treaty 
as were inimical to the interests of his empire. At the same 
time the Tsar pointed out that the powers had allowed parts 
of the agreement of 1856 to be disregarded, to the detriment 
of Russia. He contended that because the treaty had not 
stood the test of time, its neutralization of the Black Sea 
should not, and could not, by him, be accepted as any longer 
constituting a pledge of security to Russia's interests along 
her Black Sea frontier. 1 In short, the Tsar announced his 
intention to exercise Russia's sovereign rights in that sea, 
and to allow the Sultan to resume there whatever rights may 
have belonged, before 1856, to the Ottoman empire. 

Without discussing the merits of Russia's reasons for 
being unwilling to stand by the stipulations in question, the 
British government, seconded by Austria, vigorously pro- 

1 Hertslet, op. cit., vol. iii, p. 1892. 
103! 103 



IQ 4 THE MAKING OF THE BALKAN STATES [104 

tested against the Tsar's assumption that one of the signa- 
tory powers could alone release herself and others from 
treaty obligations. The upshot of the controversy was 
that conferences of the treaty powers were held in London 
(January-March, 1871), and that all the restrictions in the 
treaty of Paris bearing on the military arrangements of 
Russia and Turkey in the Black Sea, were abrogated. 1 At 
the same time, however, all of the signatory powers recorded 
their recognition of the proposition that " it is an essential 
principle of the law of nations, that no power can liberate 
itself from the engagement of a treaty, nor modify the stipu- 
lations thereof, unless with the consent of the contracting 
powers." 2 Moreover, by renewing and confirming all the 
stipulations of the treaty of Paris not annulled by their new 
agreement — the treaty of London — it will be seen that the 
contracting powers attempted in 1871 to give a new lease 
of life to all that was left of the treaty of 1856. 3 

At a meeting in Berlin of the emperors of Austria-Hun- 
gary, Germany, and Russia, a year after the treaty of Lon- 
don settled the Black-Sea incident, most intimate relations 
were once again established between these three eastern gov- 
ernments. Although there was no formal alliance, as it 
appears, between these monarchs, there was, nevertheless, 
an understanding that the three courts would act in common 
in the settlement of questions subsequently arising in the 
East. 4 Only three years passed before this agreement was 
to be put to the test. The Balkan insurrection that proved 

^he protocols of these six conferences may be seen in Martens, 
Nouveau Recueil Gin&ral, vol. xviii; also in Parliamentary Papers, 
1871, vol. lxxii. The correspondence relating to the Black Sea incident 
is also in this volume of Parliamentary Papers. 

2 Hertslet, vol. iii, p. 1901. s Ibid., p. 1922. 

4 Bismarck' 's Autobiography , trans, by Butler (New York and Lon- 
don, 1899), vol. ii, p. 251. 



105] INTERNATIONAL COMPLICATIONS 105 

so fatal to the territorial integrity of the Ottoman empire 
broke out in 1875, and for more than a year these three 
powers took the initiative, collectively, in three successive 
plans, ostensibly intended to put an end to the disturbances. 

In connection with reform projects looking towards the 
execution of the Hatti-Humayoun of 1856, Turkey had taken 
some steps, notably in 1862 and in 1867, to better her system 
of assessing and collecting taxes in the European provinces 
still wholly under Ottoman rule. 1 The plan of farming 
the tithes, however, had been allowed to go on in those 
districts without any satisfactory modifications. It was 
in connection with the working of that system, that a 
few peasants in Herzegovina commenced an armed resist- 
ance, in 1875, to what they represented to be the unjust ex- 
actions of local Ottoman officials. The beginnings of that 
very eventful contest of 1875-78 thus have reference to 
Turkish provinces not under consideration in this paper; 
but the European Concert soon became involved in the con- 
flict; and, from its very beginning, Servia and Montenegro 
played important parts. 

Under the lead of the signatory powers of the treaty of 
Paris, successive efforts were made to bring about an ad- 
justment satisfactory to the insurgents, as well as to the 
Porte. Most generous promises and detailed projects of 
reforms, were announced from time to time by the Sultan's 
government; but there was suicidal delay in their execution. 
Month by month the number of insurgents increased, and 
Slavic sympathy became more and more demonstrative. 
Servian and Montenegrin armies battled with the Ottoman 
forces that had been waiting near the boundaries of these 
two principalities. And all this time the insurgents in Her- 
zegovina and Bosnia steadfastly refused to lay down their 

1 State Papers, op. cit., vol. lxiii, p. 1251. 



io 6 THE MAKING OF THE BALKAN STATES [ io 6 

arms until they should receive some satisfactory guarantee 
for the execution of promised reforms. Within two years 
after the insurrection started in Herzegovina, it had in- 
volved all the Balkan provinces ; and inside of another year, 
the Russian armies terminated the contest, as is well known, 
and Turkey practically lost all of that territory. 

About a month after the beginning of the insurrection in 
Herzegovina (1875), Austria-Hungary, Russia and Ger- 
many, presented to the Porte a modus operandi. The plan 
was to have these three courts send representatives into the 
disturbed districts for the purpose of informing the insur- 
gents that no help would be given to them by either of these 
countries, or by Servia or Montenegro. A Turkish " High 
Commissioner " was to go along at the same time, and the 
foreign delegates were to advise the insurgents to make all 
their grievances known to this special representative of the 
Sultan. The duty of the Turkish commissioner would con- 
sist in hearing complaints and in correcting abuses; and 
thus he would be expected to carry forward the work of 
pacification. This project which originated with the three 
eastern courts was carried out (August), except that France, 
Italy and England also sent representatives, and the insur- 
gents were accordingly told that they must not expect help 
or countenance from any source whatever. 1 

This undertaking by the European powers, however, was 
doomed to failure. The insurgents absolutely refused to 
put any trust in Turkish promises, and required, before lay- 
ing down their arms, either the execution of the most urgent 
reforms, or a guarantee for their execution from the foreign 
powers. 

lr The correspondence in connection with the various movements at 
this time may be found in Parliamentary Papers , 1876, vol. lxxxiv, pp. 
143 et seq. 



IO y] INTERNATIONAL COMPLICATIONS 107 

The desired guarantee was hopelessly out of the question; 
and the Turkish commissioner demanded, as a preliminary 
to any step towards the redress of grievances, that the in- 
surgents should lay down their arms and return to their 
homes. Hence a deadlock ensued. Meanwhile, sym- 
pathy with the uprising grew apace in the surrounding ter- 
ritory. The situation became more and more threatening, 
and the Sultan issued decrees (October and December) or- 
dering judicial and financial reforms, and granting certain 
immunities and favors to all Ottoman subjects. 1 But the 
officials in the disturbed districts either could not or would 
not go very far in carrying out the policies enunciated in 
these Imperial decrees. 

The Turkish government was making so little progress in 
Herzegovina, either in reforming the administration or in 
subduing the insurgents, that Austria-Hungary, Russia and 
Germany again led the way in proposing a plan for helping 
forward, ostensibly, the work of pacification. By this time 
these three cabinets understood full well that it would be of 
no avail simply to enjoin Servia and Montenegro, or any 
of the Sultan's Christian subjects in that vicinity, to refrain 
from hostilities. Therefore, the purpose of this second pro- 
ject was to have the Porte " pledge itself to Europe " to 
execute in Bosnia and Herzegovina certain specified re- 
forms. 2 Count Andrassy, the Austn>Hungarian minister, 
drew up the proposals, and they received a ready assent at 
Paris and Rome, but there was delay in London. .The 
British government had protested at first against the earlier 
plans for sending representatives to Herzegovina, and had 
finally maintained the unity of the European Concert after 

1 Hertslet, op. cit., vol. iv, pp. 2407, 2409. 

'The text of the Andrassy Note, as this communication was afterward 
called, may be found in Parliamentary Papers, 1876, vol. lxxxiv, p. 216; 
and in Hertslet, vol. iv, p. 2418. 



108 ™ E MAKING OF THE BALKAN STATES [ I0 8 

being strongly urged by Turkey to do so. 1 The Porte im- 
portuned the London government to give its support like- 
wise to the Andrassy Note. It was the policy of England 
all along to grant more time to the Ottomans in which to 
suppress the insurrection, and to thus avoid the possible 
dangers connected with the outside interference. Neverthe- 
less, after a month's delay, the British ambassador at Con- 
stantinople, Sir Henry Elliot, was instructed (January, 
1876) to give a general support to the proposals. 

The note was then communicated to the Porte by the am- 
bassadors from the three courts that originated the plan, 
and the ambassadors from France, England and Italy gave 
verbal assurances that their governments were in accord. 2 
The Andrassy Note, as the communication has come to be 
called, demanded that the Porte establish religious liberty and 
abolish tax-farming in Bosnia and Herzegovina, employ in 
these provinces the taxes collected there, ameliorate the con- 
dition of the rural populations and provide for the election, 
by the inhabitants there, of an equal number of Christians 
and Mussulmans, to watch over the execution of all reforms 
thus far promised. 

The primary object of these identic representations to 
the Porte had been to obtain from the Turkish government 
a written promise to the guaranteeing powers, that these spe- 
cific reforms would be promptly executed. Such a formal 
agreement as that, some of the powers asserted, would en- 
able the European Concert to induce the insurgents and their 

1 Parliamentary Papers, 1876, vol. lxxxiv, p. 239. 

2 Sir Henry Elliott reported to his home government that none but 
the Austro-Hungarian ambassador read the communication to the Turk- 
ish foreign minister. On the other hand the Turkish minister reported 
that it was read to him by the ambassadors of Austria-Hungary, Ger- 
many and Russia. Parliamentary Papers, 1876, vol. lxxxiv, pp. 248, 
251-3. 



I0 9] INTERNATIONAL COMPLICATIONS 109 

sympathizers to open the way for reforms by completely 
abandoning hostilities. The English government, however, 
did not agree with the other five cabinets in regarding the 
Andrassy Note as being in the nature of a demand, but 
chose to refer to the communication that had been made to 
the Porte, by the use of such terms as " suggestions ", " ad- 
vice ", and the like. In view of this attitude in London, it 
is not strange, perhaps, that Turkey adopted the same view 
of the Note, and framed a reply accordingly. 1 All the repre- 
sentations that were made to the Sultan's government in 
connection with the presentation of the Andrassy Note were 
received by the Porte without the least show of impatience 
or disapproval. And the brief response, communicated to 
the powers a little later, clearly indicated that the Note was 
regarded at Constantinople as a bit of friendly counsel. 2 
The reply merely informed the powers that an irade 3 had 
just been issued for the immediate execution of four out of 
the five proposed reforms. At the same time it was pointed 
out that the proposition for the local use of the revenues 
collected in the insurgent provinces could not well be adopted, 
but that a certain sum would be added to what had usually 
been allotted to these two districts. 

This second plan (Jan., 1876) for putting an end to the 
insurrection proved to be the last concerted effort in this 
connection that received even a provisional acceptance by 
all parties concerned. The communication of this note to 
the Porte was followed by no lack of orders and instructions 
from Constantinople to Ottoman authorities in the insurgent 
territory. But the officials there were changed so often, 
and there were so many obstacles, that scarcely a beginning 

1 Parliamentary Papers, 1876, vol. Ixxxiv, p. 239. 

*Ibid., 1876, vol. Ixxxiv, p. 251. 

3 A document expressing the Sultan's will and orders. 



IIO THE MAKING OF THE BALKAN STATES [ II0 

was made in these provinces towards the execution of any 
of the Imperial edicts. The time had gone by, however, 
when liberal promises or reform projects, as such, could 
have any favorable bearing on the situation. So the 
Andrassy note, of January, 1876, was followed, as spring 
came on, by a much more general hostile attitude towards 
Turkish authority throughout all of the Slavic provinces. 1 

At the very commencement of this insurrection, the 
Turkish government had been impressed with its seriousness, 
and had looked upon it as but the beginning of a carefully 
worked out design. 2 The British government counseled 
Turkey, at that time, to regard the disturbance as a local 
affair, and to deal with it promptly and effectively, without 
any appeal for the support of the guaranteeing powers. At 
that time the central government at Constantinople already 
was weakened, it is true, by the approaching crisis that re- 
sulted in the dethronement of Sultan Aziz, in May, 1,876. 
Nevertheless, Turkey's appeals to the guaranteeing powers 
when the insurrection was confined to a very limited area, 
may be taken to mean that the Porte was disposed to throw 
the responsibility of a settlement on the powers that had 
declared in such strong terms, that the sovereignty of the 
Sultan and the integrity of his empire must be maintained. 
Indeed, in the light of subsequent events, also, it becomes 
quite apparent that, all through this contest, the treaty of 
Paris and the declarations relating to certain parts of it, 
were stumbling-blocks to the Turks. The Ottomans had 
been led by these representations of the powers, it would 
appear, to feel far too sanguine respecting the ultimate se- 
curity of their empire. 3 

1 Parliamentary Papers, 1876, vol. lxxxiv, pp. 284, 290-305, 361. 
2 Parliamentary Papers , 1876, vol. lxxxiv, p. 147. 
5 Musurus Pasha, the Turkish ambassador at London during this crisis, 
had held the post for about thirty years. " His great mistake," wrote 



Iir ] INTERNATIONAL COMPLICATIONS m 

As the spring of 1876 advanced, Servia and Montenegro 
assumed a more hostile attitude toward the Ottoman govern- 
ment, and there were also threatening signs of an insur- 
rection among the Bulgarians in the Adrianople district. 1 
In April, the insurgent chiefs in Herzegovina made known 
their requests. No change in the political status of their 
people was even suggested; but they asked that a third of 
the land in that province be given to the Christians, that 
Turkey should rebuild their houses and churches that had 
been burned, and supply them with agricultural implements 
and food for at least a year. And they demanded, more- 
over, that a European commission should receive all money 
and supplies, and should have full charge in making use of 
the same, for these purposes. 2 

The cabinets of Russia, Austria-Hungary and Germany 
were engaged in preparing a third series of propositions to 
the Porte (the Berlin memorandum), when two startling 
events happened (May, 1876), which lessened Turkey's 
chances for favorable consideration at the European courts. 
A Mussulman mob at Salonica assassinated the French and 
German consuls (the latter an Englishman), and an insigni- 
ficant insurrection among the Bulgarians was suppressed 
by irregular Turkish troops (Bashi-Bazouks), with fright- 
ful and indiscriminate slaughter. Nearly fifteen thousand 
Bulgarians were killed, and upwards of sixty villages were 
burned. 3 Two months after this atrocious affair, Disraeli, 

the Austro-Hungarian ambassador at London, "was that he still looked 
upon England as the England of the Crimean War, twenty years after 
that event." Memoirs of Count Beust (London, 1887), vol. ii, p. 309. 

1 Parliamentary Papers, 1876, vol. lxxxiv, p. 417. 

8 Parliamentary Papers, 1876, vol. lxxxiv, p. 361. 

'For reports based on investigations made by Turkish, English and 
American representatives, see Parliamentary Papers, 1877, vol. xc, pp. 
143 et seq. 



II2 THE MAKING OF THE BALKAN STATES [i I2 

England's prime minister, was still not ready to give to the 
House the information that he had received concerning the 
uprising. His replies to inquiries, moreover, were lacking 
in seriousness ; and he suggested that what had happened to 
the Bulgarians might be found to be " merely the usual 
accompaniment of a war of insurrection." * Yet, even before 
Mr. Gladstone's impassioned utterances in pamphlets and 
speeches against Disraeli's policy in supporting the Ottoman 
government, the British ambassador at Constantinople had 
been informed for his guidance, that the late events m Bul- 
garia had completely destroyed all sympathy in England 
with Turkey. In fact, the London Foreign Office went so 
far at that time (August, 1876) as to admit that if Russia 
were to declare war against Turkey, the British govern- 
ment would find it practically impossible to interfere in de- 
fense of the Ottoman empire. 2 In fact, back in May, when 
England refused to give her sanction to the Berlin memor- 
andum, the British government had suggested to Turkey 
that the feeling in England had changed since the Crimean 
War, and that the Sultan's government could not " count 
upon more than the moral support " of the London govern- 
ment. 3 In September of the same year, however, Ambassa- 
dor Elliot wrote from Constantinople urging his Home gov- 
ernment against allowing whatever number of Bulgarians 
had perished in connection with the insurrection to affect 
the policy of England in upholding her own interests, by 
firmly standing for the status quo in Turkey. 4 

1 Hansard' s Debates (1876), vol. ccxxx, p. 1181. 

* Morley, Life of Gladstone (New York, 1903), vol. ii, ch. iv; Parli- 
amentary Papers, 1877, v °k xc, p. 243; vol. xci, p. 405. 

* Parliamentary Papers, 1876, vol. lxxxiv, p. 464; 1877, vol. xci, p. 
393- 

* Ibid., 1877, vol- xc > P- !Q7- 



H3] INTERNATIONAL COMPLICATIONS 113 

The proposal (commonly called the Berlin Memorandum), 
which the governments of the three powers mentioned 
above had already agreed upon, was communicated to the 
English, French and Italian ambassadors at Berlin, on May 
13, 1876. The desire of the three courts that had taken the 
initiative was that the guaranteeing powers should make 
this a collective communication to the Porte. The first 
demand was to be for an armistice of two months. Then 
Turkey was to be asked to aid the returning refugees, and 
to provide for the election of the mixed commission, men- 
tioned in the Andrassy note, so soon as hostilities were sus- 
pended. It was now required also that the president of 
this commission should be a Herzegovinian Christian. The 
particularly new departures, in this document, were the pro- 
visions for surveillance by the consuls or delegates of the 
powers over the application of reforms and the return of 
refugees; and there was also an intimation, that if some- 
what satisfactory results were not worked out during the 
period of the armistice, the powers would then undertake 
more " efficacious measures." x 

The French and Italian governments at once signified 
their readiness to support these propositions; but the Eng- 
lish government, while having no plan to propose, stead- 
fastly refused to take any part whatever in presenting the 
Berlin memorandum to the Porte. 2 Within a few days, the 
purport of this document became known in some way at 
Constantinople, and the Porte let it be known in London 
that Turkey would not accept any propositions beyond those 
that had been agreed to by all parties only five months 
earlier (contained in the Andrassy note). The confusion 
at Constantinople, consequent upon the deposition of Sultan 

1 Hertslet, op. cit., vol. iv, p. 2459. 

2 Parliamentary Papers, 1876, vol. lxxxiv, pp. 45, 428, 447. 



il 4 THE MAKING OF THE BALKAN STATES [n 4 

Aziz, May 30, 1876, put an end, it would seem, to what- 
ever confidence the five powers in accord may still have had 
in the Berlin proposals. At any rate, only a few days after 
that event, the three powers that had originated the 
" memorandum " concluded to postpone its presentation to 
the Porte. 1 

There was a disposition on the part of some of the treaty 
powers to defer any further collective action until it should 
be seen what the new government under Murad V would be 
able to accomplish. Affairs with the insurgents moved on, 
however, much as before; and at the beginning of July, 
Servia and Montenegro declared war against Turkey. Fear 
for the safety of their own territory and the sympathy of 
their people for their brothers in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
were the reasons that both princes assigned for this step. 2 
A few days later the emperors of Russia and Austria-Hun- 
gary met and agreed, among other things, according to 
Count Bismarck, that in case Russia should go to war with 
Turkey, Austria-Hungary should acquire Bosnia, as an off- 
set for Austro-Hungarian neutrality. 3 

The Montenegrins attacked the Turkish army in Her- 
zegovina, and were victorious for the most part; but the 
Servian army was not strong enough to cope with the Otto- 
man forces. Consequently, on August 24th, the prince of 
Servia requested the guaranteeing powers to use their in- 
fluence towards the re-establishment of peace between his 
people and the Turks. 4 

1 Parliamentary Papers, 1876, vol. lxxxiv, pp. 460, 479, 571. 

'Hertslet, op. cit., vol. iv, pp. 2471, 2475. 

% Bismarck's Autobiography, op. cit., vol. ii, p. 235; cf. Rose, The 
Development of the European Nations (New York, 1905), vol. ii, pp. 
214, 218. 

4 Parliamentary Papers, 1877, vol. xc, p. 89. 



II5 ] INTERNATIONAL COMPLICATIONS 115 

The tragic death of Aziz, a few days after his deposition, 
and the trying situation at Constantinople during the three 
months that followed, made a mental wreck of Murad, and 
on August 31st he was set aside, and his brother, Abdul 
Hamid, was called to the throne. On the 10th of Septem- 
ber, Sultan Abdul Hamid II issued a decree in which he 
frankly admitted the pressing need of administrative, finan- 
cial and judicial reforms, and he attributed all of Turkey's 
troubles, at the time, to one cause — that the laws had not 
been regularly and constantly observed. 1 He also drew 
the attention of his government to the need of effective 
measures for putting an end to the bloodshed in Bosnia, 
Herzegovina and Servia. 

In keeping with the appeal of Prince Milan, of Servia, for 
the mediation of the powers, Sir Henry Elliot was in- 
structed on September 1st to propose to the Porte at least 
a month's armistice, with the understanding that discussion 
by the treaty powers of the conditions of peace should im- 
mediately follow. Four days later, the Constantinople am- 
bassadors of the other guaranteeing powers communicated 
to the Porte the support of their governments to this pro- 
posal. The Turks, however, thought that an armistice 
would be too favorable to Servia, and were unwilling to 
suspend hostilities before knowing what the terms of peace 
would be. Ambassador Elliot was then instructed to warn 
the Turkish ministers, that if they rejected the proposal for 
an armistice, the British government could do no more to 
avert the ruin that the Porte would thus have brought upon 
the Turkish empire. On its own behalf, France also com- 
municated to the Porte the same kind of warning. 2 All 
combatants also were now to be included in the armistice. 

1 Hertslet, op. cit., vol. iv, p. 2478. 

* Parliamentary Papers , 1877, vol. xc, pp. 91, 108. 



U6 THE MAKING OF THE BALKAN STATES [n6 

On September nth, the prince of Montenegro likewise 
requested the powers to demand a suspension of hostilities. 
The same day the London government suggested, as bases 
for discussion by the European concert, peace with the 
status quo ante in Servia and Montenegro, something like 
local administrative autonomy in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
and some kind of a guarantee against future maladminis- 
tration in Bulgaria. Austria, however, explained that be- 
cause of the mixed population in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
an attempt at anything like local administrative autonomy 
there would be almost sure to break down. 1 

The Porte allowed two weeks to pass without making any 
reply to the proposition of the powers for an armistice. 
Russia and Austria then urged that the powers should sim- 
ply demand a general armistice, for a month or six weeks. 
On September 14th, nevertheless, Turkey was so presump- 
tuous as to present to the powers terms of peace, according 
to which Montenegro was to be left as before, but Servia 
was to be punished by being thrown back under the con- 
ditions that existed there in 1862. 2 At the same time the 
Porte communicated to the powers through the Austrian 
ambassador, that confidential orders had been issued to all 
Turkish military commanders to remain strictly on the de- 
fensive, up to the 25th instant. This period was later 
somewhat prolonged. Turkey finally accepted (October 
1 2th) England's proposed bases for a European conference 
looking towards pacification, but offered at the same time to 
accept an armistice, not for six weeks, but for six months. 3 

It was at this time that the Sultan announced his intention 
to convoke, at Constantinople, a General Assembly, to be 

1 Parliamentary Papers, 1877, vol. xc, pp. 129, 205. 

2 Supra, p. 78. See also Hertslet, op. cit., vol. iv, p. 2482. 
x Parliamentary Papers, 1877, vol. xc, p. 512. 



! r 7] INTERNA TIONAL COM PLICA TIONS 1 1 7 

elected by the people, and a Senate, to be nominated by the 
Porte. Everything would be done, it was promised, to 
bring about a " radical amelioration " and a " good adminis- 
tration," throughout the provinces. Russia and Italy re- 
fused to sanction so long an armistice as six months, and 
steadfastly held for one of a month or six weeks. 1 Neither 
Servia nor Montenegro would listen, either, to a suspension 
of hostilities for six months; and so little by little fighting 
was resumed. The Servians were being hard pressed by 
the Ottoman armies, and on October 31st the Russian am- 
bassador at the Porte, General Ignatierr", gave Turkey only 
forty-eight hours in which to reply to his proposition for an 
unconditional armistice of six weeks or two months. Under 
these circumstances, the Porte abandoned its policy of de- 
lay and counter proposals, and promptly communicated its 
acceptance. General Ignatieff then telegraphed the princes 
of Servia and Montenegro, and they likewise accepted the 
armistice. 2 

For some months there had been unmistakable evidences 
that the Servians were receiving no little aid in men and 
money, from Russian sources. So on October 30th, Lord 
Loftus, the British ambassador at St. Petersburg, was in- 
structed from London to obtain, if possible, definite infor- 
mation from the Tsar's government in regard to this mat- 
ter. 3 Accordingly, on the second of November, the am- 
bassador had an audience with the Tsar Alexander. Lord 
Loftus reported that Alexander deeply deplored the " in- 
veterate suspicion" in England respecting Russia's policy; 
and that the Tsar wished the British government to be as- 
sured that he did not " entertain either the wish or the 
intention " to possess Constantinople. Alexander was re- 

1 Parliamentary Papers, 1877, vol. xc, pp. 480-81, 559. 

* Ibid., pp. 562-3, 565, 573. z Ibid., 1877, vol. xc, p. 554. 



H8 THE MAKING OF THE BALKAN STATES [n8 

ported, likewise, to have referred at the same time to the 
" ineffectual attempts of collective Europe," thus far, to 
bring the war in Turkey to a close, and to have added that 
" he should be obliged to act alone, unless Europe was pre- 
pared to act with firmness and energy." The Tsar ad- 
mitted, wrote Lord Loftus, that in order to quiet the agita- 
tion in Russia in behalf of the Servians, he had permitted 
some of his officers to leave the Russian service and go to 
Servia. 1 

Four days after the Russian ultimatum of October 31st 
brought about the two months' armistice, England proposed 
a conference of the powers to settle the terms of peace, and 
suggested now that the bases for the deliberations in the con- 
ference should be (a) " the independence and the territorial 
integrity of the Ottoman empire;" (b) a declaration that 
none of the guaranteeing powers would seek for exclusive 
influence or advantages for themselves; (c) and the pro- 
posals for pacification that had been suggested by the 
British government back in September. 2 A clue to the fore- 
cast in St. Petersburg of the final outcome of these com- 
plications may be gathered from the Tsar's expressed wish 
that the term " territorial," as here used, should be omitted. 3 
Somewhat earlier, the Russian government had suggested 
that, for the purpose of restoring order, there might be a 
provisional occupation of Bosnia by Austria, and of Bul- 
garia by Russia. And the Russian authorities still believed 
in the " ultimate necessity," as they expressed it, of such 
occupation. 

Being well aware, by this time, of the unfavorable feeling 
among the powers towards the Ottomans, the Sultan's gov- 

1 Parliamentary Papers, 1877, vol. xc, pp. 642, 736. 
2 Ibid., vol. xc, p. 708; cf. supra, p. 116. 
3 Ibid., 1877, v °l- xc > P- 705. 



ug] INTERNATIONAL COMPLICATIONS ng 

ernment appealed to England, with the idea of avoiding 
if possible a European conference. The attitude of Russia 
was so well understood in London, however, that it was 
neither a guess nor a threat when the British government 
met these appeals by assuring the Porte that a settlement, 
either by such a conference or by Russia alone, was in- 
evitable. 1 

The plenipotentiaries of the signatory powers to the treaty 
of Paris (not including Turkey) now proceeded to mature 
their plans for the conference. They held nine preliminary 
meetings in Constantinople (December 11-22, 1876), and 
agreed on a somewhat elaborate plan for administering the 
Sultan's disturbed provinces, and for settling all the ques- 
tions at issue. Then the full conference (including- Ottoman 
representatives), likewise held nine meetings (December 23- 
January 20), during which the pre-arranged scheme un- 
derwent some modifications. For our present purpose, how- 
ever, we shall need to notice only two requirements which 
the guaranteeing powers regarded as the most vital part of 
their plan, and which the Ottoman government would not 
accept. Although several of the plenipotentiaries warned the 
Sultan's government of the extreme dangers connected with 
its refusal, still Turkey would not consent that the proposed 
Governors-General (one for Bosnia and Herzegovina, and 
^one for each of the two proposed Bulgarian vilayets) should 
be nominated by the Porte, with the previous approval of the 
six powers, and that the European Concert should nominate 
two international commissions, to inspect and assist in con- 
nection with the execution of proposed provincial regula- 
tions. 2 The Ottoman plenipotentiaries now referred to the 

1 Parliamentary Papers, 1877, vol. xc, pp. 659, 672, 709. 
% Ibid., 1877, vol. xci, gives the correspondence and the documents 
relating to these developments. 



12 o THE MAKING OF THE BALKAN STATES [ I2 o 

rights unanimously accorded to Turkey in the treaty of 
Paris, and to the first point in the bases for the deliberations 
of the conferences; and then they added, as a final word, 
that the Sublime Porte could not allow foreign interfer- 
ence in connection with the administration of its provinces. 
Thus the conference ended, having totally failed to accom- 
plish its purpose. 1 

Meanwhile, Turkey had been transformed, for the time 
being, into a constitutional monarchy. The Ottoman au- 
thorities had hoped that their new constitution might be ac- 
cepted as a substantial guarantee for reforms, and that the 
powers would be content now to allow Turkey another 
period of probation. 2 But the failure of the conference was 
no sooner known, than the Russian cabinet addressed a cir- 
cular despatch to the other guaranteeing powers inquiring 
for the limits within which these governments were willing 
to act, in meeting the refusal of the Porte to be governed by 
the wishes of Europe. 3 Being disposed to allow the new 
constitutional regime in Turkey sufficient time to deal with 
the situation in the disturbed provinces, the British govern- 
ment delayed some weeks in sending a reply to St. Peters- 
burg. Meanwhile, the Porte settled its difficulties with 
Servia by re-establishing the stattis quo ante in that princi- 
pality and was in a fair way to make peace with Monte- 

1 Parliamentary Papers, 1877, vol. xci, p. 382; Turkish view of the 
outcome of the conference, p. 517. The first point in the bases was, 
"the independence and the territorial integrity of the Ottoman em- 
pire." Cf. supra, p. 118. 

2 The Ottoman constitution of December, 1876, may be seen in Eng- 
lish (not complete) in Hertslet, vol. iv; and in French — complete— in 
State Papers, op. cit., vol. lxvii. 

3 The special representative of England to the Conference, the Marquis 
of Salisbury, said that the principal object of his mission had been " the 
conclusion of a peace between Russia and Turkey." Pari. Papers, 1877, 
vol. xci, pp. 387, 410. 



ui] INTERNATIONAL COMPLICATIONS 121 

negro; and some reform measures were likewise put into 
operation. 1 

Through the initiative of the Russian cabinet, representatives 
of Austria-Hungary, England, France, Germany, Italy and 
Russia signed at London (March 31, 1877) a fatal protocol. 
In keeping with this new agreement, these allies notified the 
Porte that they proposed to have their representatives in 
Turkey watch over the execution of reforms there; and they 
added, moreover, that if their hopes were to be " once more 
disappointed ", they might then seek in concert some further 
means of looking after the interests of peace and of the 
Christians inhabitating the Sultan's dominions. 2 These 
declarations by the representatives of the six powers were 
met with an indignant reply from Constantinople. Appeal- 
ing now to the guarantees in the treaty of Paris (1856), the 
Sultan's government branded the protocol as being " de- 
void of all equity ", and unconditionally refused to be placed 
under any form of surveillance (April 9th). 3 

Representing that the Porte's rejection of the London 
protocol put an end to every means and to all hope of con- 
ciliation, the Tsar promptly arranged with the Roumanians 
for the passage of his troops through their territory (April 
1 6th), and notified the treaty powers that his armies had 
been ordered to invade Turkey. 4 The Russian charge d'af- 
faires was at once ordered by his government to leave Con- 
stantinople, and to cause all Russian consuls in Turkey to 
leave also. The Porte then appealed to the other powers for 
their mediation, under article viii of the treaty of Paris. 
None of the replies, however, held out any hope to the Otto- 

1 Hertslet, op. cit., vol. iv, p. 2553; Parliamentary Papers, 1877, vol. 
xci, pp. 477, 483. 

1 Ibid., vol. xci, p. 421. 3 Ibid., vol. xci, p. 429. 

* Hertslet, op. cit., iv, p. 2576. 



122 THE MAKING OF THE BALKAN STATES [ I2 2 

mans. 1 On the other hand, Russia was assured after a little 
time of the somewhat conditional neutrality of the other 
guaranteeing powers. The British government strongly re- 
monstrated against Russia's action in breaking away from 
the concert of the powers and precipitating hostilities, but 
finally stipulated that England's neutrality would continue 
so long as her interests in the Suez Canal, in Egypt, and in 
the Persian Gulf, were let alone; and while the Russians 
kept out of Constantinople. 2 

Because the Roumanians had permitted the Russian troops 
to pass through their country, Turkey refused to keep up 
diplomatic relations with the government of that princi- 
pality; and in June, Roumania declared her independence, 
and turned her army against the Ottoman forces. 

The Sultan appealed to all " zealous Mussulmans " to 
join in the " Holy War " to protect their country (June 
30th) ; 3 and it was not until well into December, that the 
invaders were able to make headway against the Turkish 
forces. The peace negotiations being carried on between 
Montenegro and the Porte, at the time of the London pro- 
tocol (March), having proved futile, the Montenegrins 
were likewise advancing against those Turks who were in 
their vicinity. In December, Servia found a reason for de- 
claring war, and she too set her army in motion against the 
Ottomans. 4 

How valiantly the Turks fought, especially in the Shipka 
Pass and at Plevna, and how they finally lost, is a familiar 
story. In despair because of her isolation and defeats, Tur- 
key opened communications with the Russians at the be- 
ginning of the next year (1878), and within a month the 

1 Parliamentary Papers, 1877, vol. xci, pp. 101-105. 

* Hertslet, op. cit., vol. iv, p. 2615. 

3 Ibid., vol. iv, p. 2643. * Ibid., vol. iv, p. 2648. 



127,] INTERNATIONAL COMPLICATIONS 123 

preliminaries of peace were signed at Adrianople. 1 It will 
be remembered that the Russian forces did not halt then, but 
that they moved on slowly until they were within sight of 
Constantinople. It was to be expected, no doubt, that Eng- 
land would send troops and a fleet, as she did, to save Con- 
stantinople from the Russians; though it does not seem 
very clear yet that there was much reason for such extreme 
precautionary measures. 2 

Even before the preliminaries were signed at Adrianople, 
England notified the Russian government that she would 
not regard any settlement between Turkey and Russia, that 
should modify European treaties, as having any validity 
until it should be formally accepted by the parties to the 
treaty of Paris. Russia, on the other hand, was only will- 
ing that questions bearing on European interests should be 
submitted to the deliberation of the powers. Only four days 
after the preliminaries had been signed, Austria-Hungary 
invited the powers, signatories of the treaty of Paris, to 
hold a conference at Vienna for the purpose of determining 
what modifications should be made in relation to that treaty, 
and also to the treaty of London (1871). 3 

Notwithstanding this attitude of the other governments, 
however, Russia kept up her negotiations with Turkey, and 
on March third these two powers signed, in the treaty of 
San Stefano, their complete settlement of the whole matter. 
Austria-Hungary then withdrew her proposal for a con- 
ference, and suggested, instead, a congress to be held at 

1 Parliamentary Papers , 1878, vol. lxxxi, p. 704; Menzies, Turkey Ola 
and New, chs. iv, v. 

2 For the substance of various confidential communications between 
London and St. Petersburg in reference to Russia's desire to either oc- 
cupy or possess Constantinople, see Parliamentary Papers (1854), vol. 
xxi, pp. 835-868; (1877), vol. xc, pp. 642, 705, 736. 

z Ibid., 1878, vol. lxxxi, p. 756. 



124 THE MAKI NG OF THE BALKAN STATES [ I2 4 

Berlin. 1 For some time, the British government refused 
to take part in a congress, unless it were understood that 
every part of the treaty of San Stefano would be brought 
up for consideration. Russia was unyielding in her de- 
termination that only such terms in the treaty should be dis- 
cussed as " affected European interests ". Finally, after, 
opposing each other up to the very verge of war, these two 
powers came to a secret agreement, in which Russia con- 
sented to* some important modifications of her treaty with 
the Porte in relation to European Turkey, and England 
withdrew her opposition to a part of the arrangement re- 
specting Asiatic Turkey. 2 

The way being now clear for collective action, it was time 
for the European Concert to perform its part. Accordingly, 
in the twenty sessions of the Berlin congress (June 13- July 
13, 1878), representatives of the seven powers took up the 
Russo-Turkish agreement — the treaty of San Stefano — and 
made it over into the European settlement — the now well- 
known treaty of Berlin. 

At the time of the Crimean War (1853-56), Russia had 
found herself isolated. She was defeated and humili- 
ated. Turkey's allies, it will be remembered, undertook to 
make the outcome of that struggle far more than a military 
victory over the Russian armies. For the European treaty, 
at the close of that war, was intended to release Turkey 

1 The Prime Ministers of the powers would be expected to take part 
in a congress, but not in a conference. 

2 Parliamentary Papers, 1878, vol. lxxxi, pp. 757-771. Because Rus- 
sia was expected to retain Batoum, Ardahan and Kars (in Asiatic Tur- 
key) England entered into a defensive alliance with Turkey in order to 
prevent Russia from making other conquests in that vicinity. The right 
to occupy and administer Cyprus was now granted to England by Tur- 
key, so that the former might be better prepared for carrying on military 
operations against Russia, if necessary, in Asia Minor. Pari. Papers, 
1878, vol. lxxxii, pp. 3-23. 



12 c,] INTERNATIONAL COMPLICATIONS 125 

from Russia's grasp. 1 Moreover, the Ottoman government 
was then for the first time " admitted to participate in the 
advantages of the Public Law and System (Concert) of 
Europe ". Furthermore, the avowed object of the treaty 
of 1856 was to render the peace more enduring by insuring 
the independence and integrity of the Ottoman empire. 2 
Russia had been compelled at that time to promise the great 
powers of Europe that she abandoned every pretension to 
an exclusive protectorate over any of the Sultan's subjects. 3 
The European Concert then assumed the guardianship of 
the civil and religious privileges already accorded by the 
sultans to their Christian provinces. But this new pro- 
tectorate, it will be observed, was expressly on the basis of a 
guaranteed respect for the independence and the territorial 
integrity of Turkey. 

Three of the Sultan's so-called Christian provinces, it 
will be remembered, were then already well advanced on 
their way towards statehood. And near to these, were other 
peoples of like faith and race (in general), who were more 
than anxious to hurry forward their liberation, likewise, 
from local Turkish misrule. Under these conditions, dis- 
content, racial sympathies and national ambitions, made it 
inevitable that the Eastern question would not stay regu- 
lated. Up to the very end of the regime (if we may call it 
such) of the treaty of Paris, the guaranteeing powers found 
it more convenient, to say the least, to induce the sultans to 
confirm successive changes in the Balkan provinces, than 

1 For the text of the treaties under which Russia exercised so much 
control in Turkey, from 1774 to 1856, see Parliamentary Papers, 1854, 
vol. lxxii, pp. 39-77. 

'See the preamble and art. vii, Treaty of Paris (1856). 

3 For the bases of conferences with Russia for re-establishment of 
peace, submitted by England, Austria and France (1854), see Hertslet, 
op. fit., vol. ii, pp. 1216, 1269. 



126 THE MAKING OF THE BALKAN STATES [\ 2 6 

to hold the discontented people there in restraint. And 
Turkey appeared, all this time, to stand so much in fear of 
dangers from within and from without, that she dared not 
undertake to fight these people to a finish. 

There came a time, however, as we have seen, when the 
Porte would not be persuaded by peaceful means to accept 
the collective counsel of the other treaty powers. Even 
though these governments warned Turkey in the most solemn 
manner, she at last defiantly rejected their final proposals. 1 
Russia was ready for just such an exigency. The advance 
of her armies led the Ottoman government to sue for peace, 
and the outcome, as already noted, was the peace treaty be- 
tween Russia and Turkey, signed at San Stefano, and the 
political settlement, worked out a little later, in the Congress 
of Berlin. 2 

Although the conclusions of this congress superseded, 
for the most part, the agreement between Russia and 
Turkey at the close of the war (1878) still the European 
Concert accepted and affirmed the fundamental bases of the 
treaty of San Stefano — the recognition of the independence 
of Servia, Roumania and Montenegro, and the creation of 
an autonomous ^tributary principality of Bulgaria. The 
European settlement, to be sure, required that religious 

*For Turkey's protest against the London Protocol (Apr., 1877), her 
Manifesto in answer to the Russian declaration of war, and her appeal 
to Mussulmans to fight in the " Holy War " against Russia, see Herts- 
let, op. cit., vol. iv. 

2 As might have been expected, the powers sent their leading diplo- 
mats to this congress. Italy sent two, and Austria-Hungary, England, 
France, Germany, Russia and Turkey sent three each. The leaders of 
the congress appear to have been its president and "pacificator," Prince 
Bismarck, Disraeli (Lord Beaconsfield), Gortchakoff (Russian), An- 
drassy (Austrian), and Waddington (French). The minutes of the 
meetings, as well as the treaty, may be found in both English and 
French in Parliamentary Papers, 1878, vol. lxxxiii. 



l 2 y] INTERNATIONAL COMPLICATIONS i 2 y 

equality should be assured in Servia, Roumania and Monte- 
negro, before their independence should be fully recognized. 1 
That condition, however, was soon satisfied, and all three 
took their places in the European family of nations, as in- 
dependent states. Though the Berlin congress permitted 
Montenegro to acquire only about half of the new territory 
that the abortive Russo-Turkish agreement would have 
given to her, still her area was more than doubled, and she 
was now to have an outlet to the sea. 2 After the changes 
by the European congress, Servia still received an increase 
in territory, equal to about one-fourth of her former area. 
Roumanian deputies were even permitted by the Berlin con- 
gress to express their protests there in person against the 
Russian plan to take Bessarabia from the Roumanians, and 
to give to them in return territory which they did not want. 
The powers, however, added a little to what Russia had 
offered, and Roumania was forced to submit. 3 

The Berlin congress made provision for Bosnia and Her- 
zegovina, by simply arranging that these provinces should 
be " occupied and administered " by Austria-Hungary. 4 
Servia had to be threatened by the Dual Monarchy before she 
would abandon her active opposition to that arrangement. 
In 1880 the Servian ministry changed, however, and her 
resentment at what her people even then looked upon as the 
loss of Bosnia and Herzegovina, quieted down. In 1882, 

1 Holland, European Concert in the Eastern Question, pp. 220-241. 

* For maps showing the territorial changes provided for in the treaty 
of San Stefano, and the final settlement in this connection in the Berlin 
treaty, see Hertslet, op. cit., vol. iv. 

3 The views expressed by the Russian plenipotentiaries and by the 
B Roumanian delegates, in the Congress, in reference to that exchange 
W tnay be read in Parliamentary Papers, 1878, vol. lxxxiii, pp. 527, 543. 

4 See Protocol No. 8 of the "Congress of Berlin. Parliamentary 
Papers, 1878, vol. lxxxiii, pp. 504 et seq. 



I2 8 THE MAKING OF THE BALKAN STATES [ I2 8 

with general consent, Prince Milan assumed the title of 
king; and since that time, this little monarchy has gone on 
playing her not always enviable part in the affairs of Europe. 
Roumania took the rank of a kingdom in 1881 and her 
history since has been marked by a gradual internal improve- 
ment. 

, The autonomous principality of Bulgaria, provided for by 
the European powers in the treaty of Berlin, was not much 
like the one that had been arranged for in the Russo-Turkish 
agreement. 1 The greater Bulgaria of the San Stefano 
treaty was divided by the European concert into three parts. 
The southern or Macedonian section was simply given back 
to Turkey, and the remainder was to constitute a Turkish 
province with " administrative autonomy " — Eastern Rou- 
melia — and an " autonomous and tributary principality " — 
Bulgaria. 2 The course of events in relation to these two 
partly liberated districts will be followed up in a separate 
chapter. 

1 McCarthy, History of Our Own Times, vol. ii, ch. xv. 

2 The interesting discussions in four sessions of the Congress, respect- 
ing the formation of the Bulgarian principality, may be found in Parli- 
amentary Papers, vol. lxxxiii, pp. 438-486. 



\ 



CHAPTER IV 

Organization of Bulgaria and Eastern Roumelia and 

the Movements Leading to their Union 

and Independence — 1878- 1909 

The agitation of more than three decades, which culmin- 
ated in the creation of the Bulgarian national church 
(1870), was an important movement towards the unity of 
the Bulgarian-speaking race. It was principally in connec- 
tion with that struggle for ecclesiastical liberation, accom- 
panied as it was by an educational awakening, that the 
Bulgarians in the Balkans gained what little preparation 
they possessed for assuming the momentous responsibilities 
that were so soon to devolve upon them. 

The principal battles of the war of 1877-78 were fought 
on what was considered Bulgarian soil, and the Bulgarian 
peasants helped the invading army in such ways as they 
could. There was not, however, any general rallying of 
Bulgarians to the aid of the armies sent against the Turks, 
though the five thousand and more volunteers who fought 
with the Russians and the Roumanians were not found 
wanting in sustained valor. 

All Bulgarians had abundant reason for rejoicing over 
the concessions in their behalf which Russia obtained from 
Turkey in the treaty of peace (March, 1878). That agree- 
ment provided for a semi-independent Bulgaria with a terri- 
tory considerably larger than that of any of the other 
Balkan states. And most ample provisions were made, like- 
129] 129 



I3 o THE MAKING OF THjb BALKAN STATES [130 

wise, for organizing and inaugurating the government of 
this new and greater Bulgaria, under the guidance and the 
protection of Russian authorities. 1 

But the Russo-Turkish settlement, as we have seen, was 
not accepted by the European concert, and the Berlin con- 
gress decreed modifications that sadly disappointed the 
hopes and the expectations of the Bulgarians. 

At the first sitting of the Congress, Prince Bismarck, as 
its president, suggested that in taking up the " work of San 
Stefano " for " free discussions " it would be well to con- 
sider first the questions of greatest importance — " the de- 
limitation and the organization of Bulgaria." As this pro- 
posal met the approval of all the members, Lord Salisbury 
proposed at the second sitting that the new Bulgaria should 
be restricted to the part of Turkey lying between the Danube 
and the Balkan mountains, and that the territory south of 
the line of the Balkans should remain under the authority of 
the Sultan. He proposed at the same time, however, that 
some precautionary measures should be taken to secure the 
welfare of the populations in the latter territory. Again at 
the suggestion of Prince Bismarck, it was agreed that the 
representatives of Austria-Hungary, England and Russia 
— the powers specially interested in the Bulgarian question 
— should hold private meetings and try to prepare a plan 
that could be taken up in the congress as a basis for a 
settlement. Their report was ready for the fourth sitting; 
and at that time (June 2) it was determined that the prin- 
cipality of Bulgaria should be limited to the part north 
of the Balkans, and that a province should be formed south 

1 Pari. Papers, 1878, vol. lxxxiii, pp. 394 et seq. For the Treaty of San 
Stefano, see Holland, The European Concert in the Eastern Question 
(Oxford, 1885). 



!3l] MOVEMENTS LEADING TO THEIR UNION 131 

of the Balkans under the name of Eastern Roumelia. 1 The 
latter territory had usually been referred to as " South Bul- 
garia," and when Count Schouvaloff spoke in reference to 
this part of the agreement he said : 

. . . the plenipotentiaries of Russia have accepted the division 
of Bulgaria by the line of the Balkans, in spite of the serious 
objections which this division, objectionable for many reasons, 
presents ; the substitution of the name Eastern Roumelia for 
that of South Bulgaria, reserving, at the same time, to them- 
selves on this point, which has been conceded by them with 
regret, full liberty of subsequent discussion at the congress ; the 
retention of the word " Bulgaria " has been considered as a 
watchword or rallying point for dangerous aspirations. . . . 2 

The population of the new " Eastern Roumelia " had been 
deprived, he argued, of a name that rightfully belonged to 
them. And he likewise charged the congress with seeking 
to replace " ethnographical frontiers " by those that were in- 
tended to be " commercial and strategical." 

The questions relating to the Bulgarians which occasioned 
the most discussion were those relating to the liberty that 
Turkey should have for using her troops in the new pro- 
vince of Eastern Roumelia, and to the duration of the 
Russian military occupation of that province and of the 
Bulgarian principality. The extent and plan of collective 
action to be followed in connection with the provisional con- 
trol and the organization of the governments in these two 
provinces were also points on which an agreement was not 
easily reached. That one of the Russian plenipotentiaries, 

^he Greeks and the Servians had strongly protested against the for- 
mation of such a large Bulgarian province as was provided for in the 
Treaty of San Stefano. Cf. Rose, The Development of the European 
Nations (New York, 1905), vol. i, p. 273. 

2 Pari. Papers, 1878, vol. lxxxiii, p. 439. 



132 THE MAKING OF THE BALKAN STATES [132 

Count Schouvaloff, felt called upon to affirm that " Bulgaria 
would not become a Russian annex " is somewhat significant 
of the general trend in all of these discussions. 1 

The Bulgarians were sadly disappointed, if not thor- 
oughly exasperated, by the way in which their interests, 
according to their view, had been sacrificed in the Berlin 
congress. The territory of the new Bulgarian principality 
had there been cut down to but little more than a third of 
what Turkey had ceded to it in the San Stefano treaty. 
And, what was evidently still more grievous to them, the 
populations, mostly Bulgarians, in the part that was now 
seemingly lost to the principality, were to be left under the 
" direct political and military authority of the Sultan." In 
this new province of Eastern Roumelia, to the south of the 
principality, the people were to have a certain amount of 
self-government, it is true, under a Christian governor; 
but the congress had stipulated that the Sultan might keep 
as many Ottoman troops as he wished along the boundary 
between these two provinces. 2 

Although perhaps the Bulgarians did not then realize it, 
still there was for them another side to the work of the 
Berlin congress. Their affairs were thereby released from 
an exclusively Russian or Russo-Turkish control and over- 
sight, and placed under the collective guardianship of the 
great powers of Europe. 3 The best that can be said, per- 

l Parl. Papers, 1878, vol. lxxiii, p. 451. 

2 The treaty of Berlin gave to Bulgaria an area of 24,360 square miles 
with a population of 1,100,000 Bulgarians, 50,000 Greeks, 9,000 Jews, 
400,000 Moslems; and to Eastern Roumelia an area of 13,500 square miles 
with a population of 571,000 Bulgarians, 42,500 Greeks, 175,000 Moslems, 
19,324 Gypsies, 4,177 Jews, 1,300 Armenians (approximately). Cf. 
Pari. Papers, 1880, vol. lxxxii, p. 195; Miiller, Political History of 
Recent Times, p. 566. 

3 See the fifth and sixth Protocols, Pari. Papers (1878), vol. lxxxiii, 
pp. 454-473- 



I33~\ MOVEMENTS LEADING TO THEIR UNION 133 

haps, of the treaty of Berlin is that the signatory powers 
thereby asserted and assumed collective authority and re- 
sponsibility for the entire settlement at the close of the 
Russo-Turkish War. 1 It is significant that before the final 
formulation of that treaty Prince Gortchakoff, following 
the Tsar's instructions, asked the Congress " by what prin- 
ciples and in what manner " it proposed " to insure the 
execution of its high decisions." 2 Finally a Russian pro- 
posal was offered which, being slightly changed by an Aus- 
trian amendment, called for a clause in the final agreement 
stating that the Congress would undertake to " control and 
superintend the execution " of all the stipulations of the 
treaty. Germany was favorable to the adoption of this pro- 
posal ; but it was not accepted by the congress. The pleni- 
potentiaries of England, France, Italy, and Turkey reserved 
their vote, expressing the conviction that the signatures to 
the treaty would furnish a sufficient guarantee for its exe- 
cution. 

But the extent to which the treaty of Berlin, as a whole, 
has stood the test of time does not fall within the scope of 
this chapter. It is desirable here merely to trace in some de- 
tail the process by which, under the protection of that treaty 

1 Up to the present, no one could be more competent, it would seem, 
to pass judgment on the work of the Berlin congress than Dr. George 
Washburn. Having been president of Robert College (American), at 
Constantinople, for more than thirty years, his duties and opportunities 
have enabled him to gain an intimate personal knowledge of what the 
Berlin treaty has meant to all parties concerned. "The Treaty of Ber- 
lin," he writes, " . . . humiliated Russia without helping Turkey, while 
it ignored the rights of the people of the provinces of which it disposed. 
It was a triumph for Lord Beaconsfield, but it was a misfortune for 
England, and has been a source of trouble in Europe ever since.'' 
Washburn, Fifty Years in Constantinople (Boston, 1909), Introduction. 

2 Pari. Papers, 1878, vol. lxxxiii, pp. 624 et seq. The protocols of the 
twenty sittings of the Berlin Congress, together with the Treaty of 
Berlin, may be found in Parliamentary Papers, 1878, vol. lxxxiii. 



!34 THE MAKING OF THE BALKAN STATES [134 

and yet in spite of some of its stipulations, the principality 
of Bulgaria and the province of Eastern Roumelia as con- 
stituted by the Congress of Berlin (1878) have united and 
have come to form the present kingdom of Bulgaria. 

The Berlin congress left ample directions according to 
which representatives of the powers in the European con- 
cert were to attend to the work of organizing Bulgaria and 
Eastern Roumelia. It was stipulated that within a period 
of nine months after the ratification of the treaty, these 
provinces should be duly prepared in respect to their or- 
ganization to enter, within the limits of the treaty, upon 
the administration of their own affairs. During that time, 
Russian troops, not to exceed fifty thousand men, were to 
remain there as an army of occupation. Meanwhile the 
provisional direction of affairs in Bulgaria was entrusted to 
a Russian Commissioner, who was to be assisted by an 
Ottoman Commissioner and the resident consuls of the 
great powers. In case there should be a disagreement be- 
tween this consular commission and either the Russian or 
Turkish Commissioner, the Constantinople representatives of 
the signatories would have the power of deciding the course 
of action. The organization of Eastern Roumelia, how- 
ever, as well as the provisional financial administration of 
that province, was given over to a European Commission, 
that was expected to work in concert with the Porte. It 
was also provided that the boundaries of the two provinces 
should be traced by European commissioners representing 
the signatory powers. 

Up to the very end of the provisional regime in the two 
districts, the Bulgarians of both provinces resorted to 
every means except open warfare to induce the powers to 
place the two sections under one government. In fact, so 
pronounced was the opposition to the separation of Eastern 



135] MOVEMENTS LEADING TO THEIR UNION 135 

Ronmelia from the principality that the work of organizing 
the two provinces was greatly hampered. 1 The London 
government did not hesitate to accuse the Russian authori- 
ties in these provinces of acting in such a way as to 
cause the inhabitants to believe that the separation would 
not be carried out. Great Britain steadfastly held for the 
enforcement of the terms of the treaty, and refrained, in 
general, from any discussion with the Bulgarians respecting 
the possibility of union. 2 

However, as the time drew near when the Russian occu- 
pation of Bulgaria and Eastern Roumelia must come to an 
end, London and St. Petersburg came to an understanding 
respecting the latter province (March-April, 1879 ). 3 In 
accordance with this agreement, the two governments urged 
upon the Porte, in writing, the necessity of maintaining 
inviolate the administrative rights and privileges that were 
to belong to that province under its constitution. Russia 
added the assurance, moreover, that she would not sup- 
port the Bulgarian Roumeliotes in their opposition to the 
institutions which the treaty of Berlin provided for Eastern 
Roumelia, and that all the influence of the Russian govern- 
ment would be brought to bear upon these people in order 
to bring about their submission to the promised regime. 4 

The Bulgarians, however, still continued their unwavering 
opposition to one clause in the Berlin treaty. The apparent 
certainty that Ottoman troops would be strung along the 
boundary separating the two provinces was unbearable to 
the Bulgarian population on both sides. So they kept up 
their appeals to the powers for some arrangement that 

1 Pari. Papers, 1878-79, vol. lxxix, pp. 88, 441, 447; vol lxxx, passim. 

* Ibid., 1878-79, vol. lxxx, pp. 3 et seq.; vol. lxxxi, p. 127. 

8 Ibid., 1878-79, vol. lxxx, Turkey, Nos. 1, 4. 

4 Parliamentary Papers, 1878-79, vol. lxxx, pp. 291-95. 



I3 6 THE MAKING OF THE BALKAN STATES [136 

would hinder the Sultan from exercising his right, under 
the treaty, to place Turkish garrisons along that boundary. 1 
It is not easy to determine how the matter was adjusted, but 
shortly before the time came for the Russian troops to 
leave these provinces (May, 1879) the Russian authorities 
were prepared to assure the Bulgarians that the Porte did 
not " see the immediate necessity of garrisoning the Bal- 
kans." And at the same time it was suggested to them 
that the strategical advantages of maintaining Turkish 
troops along the boundary between the two provinces were, 
seemingly, no longer thought of, and that it remained for 
the Roumeliotes to show by their future conduct that the 
presence of such garrisons was not politically necessary. 2 

Meanwhile, the stipulations of the Berlin congress were 
being carried out in respect to the organization of both pro- 
vinces. The treaty set down as the basis of public law in 
Bulgaria that religious creeds were to have no bearing on 
the civil and political rights of the inhabitants. There was 
to be freedom for the exercise of all forms of worship ; and 
there was to be no interference in relation to the hierarchical 
organization of the various religious communities. The 
treaty also made it inadmissible to select the prince from 
among the members of any of the reigning dynasties of the 
great powers of Europe. 3 

It will be remembered that the treaty of Berlin intrusted 
the provisional administration of Bulgarian affairs to a 
Russian commissioner, although consular delegates repre- 
senting the signatory powers and a Turkish Commissioner 
were expected to exercise some control over the working of 

1 Pari. Papers, 1878-79, vol. Ixxx, p. 299. 

'For the Tsar's proclamation, and the address of his representative, 
see Pari. Papers, 1878-79, vol. lxxxi, p. 1046; cf. infra, p. 144. 

3 Art. iii and Art. v of the Treaty of Berlin. Pari. Papers, 1878, vol. 
lxxxiii, or Hertslet, op. cit., vol. iv. 



137] MOVEMENTS LEADING TO THEIR UNION T.37 

the provisional regime. 1 The Tsar selected Prince Don- 
doukoff to carry on the provisional government in Bul- 
garia ; and it was not long before this Imperial commissioner 
concentrated within himself the supreme civil and military 
authority in both Bulgaria and Eastern Roumelia. 2 He or- 
ganized local militias, and had the recruits from both prov- 
inces drilled practically as a combined force under Russian 
officers. In fact, the whole procedure of the Tsar's agents 
in the two provinces must have had an unmistakable bear- 
ing on the desire and the efforts of the Bulgarian popula- 
tions there for union. From time to time the British gov- 
ernment strongly protested to the St. Petersburg Cabinet 
against the methods employed by the provisional Russian 
authorities. Their entire civil and military system was of 
a nature., it was contended, to render more and more diffi- 
cult and hopeless the task of putting into operation the de- 
cisions of the Berlin congress, which called for the entire 
separation of Eastern Roumelia from Bulgaria. 3 

The upshot of all the correspondence between the two 
cabinets on these matters, was the promise from St. Peters- 
burg (April, 1879) that the influence of the Russian gov- 
ernment would be exerted towards the peaceful organization 
of Eastern Roumelia in accordance with the terms of the 
Berlin treaty. 4 Under the direction of the Russian gov- 

1 The treaty specified that the provisional regime should not extend 
beyond a period of nine months after the ratifications were exchanged. 
During the month of August (1878) all the contracting powers ex- 
changed ratifications at Berlin. 

2 General Stolypin was nominally the Russian governor of the latter 
district. 

5 Pari. Papers, 1878-9, vol. lxxxi, pp. 103, 127, passim. For the atti- 
tude of the European commission, engaged in drafting the Eastern 
Roumelian Constitution, see ibid., p. 183. 

*Cf. supra, p. 135; also Pari. Papers, vol. lxxx, Turkey, Nos. 1,4; 
also Annual Register, 1879, p. 179. 



1^8 THE MAKING OF THE BALKAN STATES [138 

ernor-general of Bulgaria, Dondoukoff, a national assembly 
was convened (February 26, 1879) at tne old Bulgarian 
capital, Tirnovo. 1 In opening the assembly Prince Don- 
doukoff presented for its consideration the draft of a con- 
stitution for the prospective principality. But with the Bul- 
garian representatives other matters claimed first attention. 
Sofia was determined upon as being the most suitable place 
for the new capital. Then, after about three weeks of 
speech-making, a vote was finally taken expressing the 
thanks of the Bulgarians to the Russian Emperor. 'It is 
somewhat significant, also, that this expression of gratitude 
to the Tsar was accompanied with a declaration of fears 
for the future in case Turkish troops were to be stationed 
along the boundary between the principality and Eastern 
Roumelia. 2 At this juncture, however, a mild reprimand 
from Prince Dondoukoff (conveyed through a messenger) 
brought his " skeleton constitution," as he called it, up for 
consideration (April 2). 3 A committee of fifteen then 
spent about two weeks in revising the Russian project; and 
the assembly completed the work in about three weeks more, 
A number of important modifications were made in the 
original draft. A clause stating that the relations of the 
prince to the Porte should be those of a vassal, was re- 
jected. Articles providing for a Council of State, and pro- 
hibiting any change in the constitution within five years, 
were likewise cut out. Articles were also added prohibiting 
slavery, and the giving of titles of rank in the principality. 
In closing the assembly, Prince Dondoukoff intimated that 

1 Beaman, M. Stambuloff, London, 1895, ch. i. 

^Appleton's Annual Cyclopedia (New York, 1879). 

3 The imperial commissioner had appointed a substitute to preside 
during the discussion of the constitution. The former exarch was 
elected the regular president of the Assembly. 



139] MOVEMENTS LEADING TO THEIR UNION 139 

the work accomplished by the deputies signified the posses- 
sion of qualities that had not been known hitherto among 
Bulgarians. 

Having now a constitution for Bulgaria, the next day 
(April 29th) a new assembly proceeded to elect a prince. 
Three candidates were named, and the deputies unanimously 
elected the one best known to them — Prince Alexander 
of Battenberg. 1 

The constitution declared the principality of Bulgaria a 
hereditary and constitutional monarchy with a national rep- 
resentation. The prince was to be the chief representative 
of the state, and to bear the simple title of " Highness." He 
was to have his permanent residence within the principality, 
and both he and his heir-apparent were to be exempt from 
all taxes, state dues and fines. A sum equal to about $120,- 
000 was to be granted yearly by the Assembly to the prince 
and his court. It is interesting to note in this connection 
that the constitution declared that " neither the prince nor 
his relatives " could derive personal profit from any of the 
state property. 

In the prince was vested the right of appointment to all 
government employments ; and each appointee was to swear 
fidelity to the prince, as well as to the constitution. The exe- 
cutive authority, " under the high superintendence and di- 
rection of the prince," was vested in the six Ministers of 
State and their council. No official document signed by 
the prince was to be valid without the signature of one or 
more of his ministers. These ministers, to be appointed or 

1 The Assembly that revised the Russian draft of the constitution con- 
sisted of 286 members. The majority were elected by the inhabitants, 
and the remainder were deputies ex officio and appointees of the govern- 
ment. The Assembly that elected Prince Alexander consisted of 250 
members, 22 of whom were Mohammedans. Cf. Miiller, Political His- 
tory of Recent Times, trans, by Peters (New York, 1882), p. 556. 



I4 o THE MAKING OF THE BALKAN STATES [140 

discharged by the prince, were declared to be responsible 
" conjointly " to him and to the representative Assembly. 

Representation in the government was confined to one 
House — the National Assembly, or Sobranje. Its members, 
one for every ten thousand of the population of either sex, 
were to be elected for three years, by universal manhood 
suffrage ; and the constitution made it the duty of each mem- 
ber to represent the entire nation. It was definitely stated, 
also, that each member was to be entirely free to act in that 
capacity in accordance with " his own conscience and con- 
viction." 

Provision was likewise made for the election and con- 
vocation of a Grand Sobranje. This assembly was to be 
chosen like the other, except that it would contain double the 
number of the ordinary one. It was to be the only com- 
petent body to elect three regents when necessary, to select 
a new prince, or to settle questions involving a change in the 
constitution or in the territorial boundaries of the prin- 
cipality. 

Bulgaria has been called the most democratic country in 
the world. It had neither an aristocracy nor a plutocracy; 
and it was made a part of the fundamental law that titles of 
nobility or rank, and likewise orders and decorations, could 
not be constituted in the principalit}'. It is noteworthy, 
also, that while education had not yet become general out- 
side the larger towns and villages, the constitution specified 
that primary education should be gratuitous and compulsory 
for all subjects. The constitution provided, moreover, for 
the freedom of the press, and the right of public assembly; 
and it proclaimed the inviolability of the rights of person 
and property. While the " Orthodox Eastern Confession " 
was mentioned as being the state religion, still full religious 
liberty was to be accorded to all. 1 

*For the full text of the constitution, see Pari. Papers (1878-79), 
vol. lxxx, Turkey, No. 8. 



141] MOVEMENTS LEADING TO THEIR UNION 141 

One of the most important features of the new constitu- 
tion seems to have been the nice balance that was worked 
out in it between the representative assembly and the exe- 
cutive branch of the government. It has even been sug- 
gested that this relationship was due to the forethought of 
the Tsar's agents; their plan being, perhaps, to leave a 
way open whereby Russia could control the situation by 
maintaining a paramount influence over either the prince, 
the cabinet, or the people. 1 This system of checks and 
balances surely rendered it very difficult to make any head- 
way in the government without the mutual agreement of 
these three governmental forces. 

From the outset, the fortunes of Bulgaria and Eastern 
Roumelia were so closely interwoven that it will be well to 
watch, in going along, the progress of affairs in both pro- 
vinces. The international commission, called for in the 
treaty of Berlin to work out a plan for organizing Eastern 
Roumelia, continued its sittings from September, 1878, to 
the end of April of the following year. This commission 
was also charged with the duty of provisionally administer- 
ing the financial affairs of that district. 

The eleven commissioners representing the signatory 
powers of the treaty did nearly all of their work at Philip- 
popolis, where they could readily familiarize themselves with 
every phase of the situation. 2 The lengthy " Organic 
Statute " which they succeeded in elaborating was promptly 
and unhesitatingly accepted by all parties concerned. 3 This 

1 Miller, The Balkans (New York, 1896), p. 216. 

8 Of the sixty-four sittings of the commission, while the statute was 
being drafted, only the last four were held in Constantinople. For a 
full account of these meetings, see Pari. Papers, 1878-79, vol. lxxxi. 

s The text of the 495 Articles, and as much more in "Annexes," may 
be seen in Pari. Papers, 1878-79, vol. lxxx, Turkey, No. 6. 



I4 2 THE MAKING OF THE BALKAN STATES [T42 

document bears evidence of having been most carefully 
worked out in every detail. And it is not too much to add in 
this connection, that it proved to be peculiarly adapted, as we 
shall see, to suit the shifting relations of the people whose 
affairs were intended to be administered according to its 
provisions. 

The treaty of Berlin had specified, as we have seen, that 
Eastern Roumelia should enjoy administrative autonomy, 
while remaining under the " direct political and military au- 
thority of the sultan." It fixed the term of the governor- 
general (belonging to the Christian faith) at five years. 1 It 
provided, likewise, that Eastern Roumelia should have a 
native police and a local militia. The chief officers of these 
two bodies were to be nominated by the sultan, but he was 
enjoined to pay due heed in his appointments to the religion 
of the people in the different localities. The organic statute 
empowered the sultan to select the Minister of the Interior 
from a list of three candidates (Christians) to be presented 
by the governor-general. The many other nominative 
offices were to be filled by appointees of the governor-gen- 
eral, subject to the approval of the sultan. It was provided, 
however, that the local appointments should be valid in 
case the Imperial decision were delayed for a month. 

The statute provided as well for the usual departments of 
state, and for a Provincial Assembly. It contained ample 
provisions for safe-guarding within the province such 
liberties as are common under constitutional government. 
Primary and secondary schools were left, for the most 
part, to the direction and maintenance of the various re- 
ligious organizations. In case a community should be too 
poor to maintain schools the government was directed to sup- 

1 The governor-general to be nominated by the Sultan with the assent 
of the treaty powers. 



143] MOVEMENTS LEADING TO THEIR UNION 143 

ply certain grants from the national treasury; but schools 
receiving such aid were to be wholly under the control of 
the government. In fact the Director of Public Instruc- 
tion was charged with the general oversight of all schools, 
public and private. Instruction to all children between the 
ages of seven and thirteen, inclusive, was made obligatory. 
Five years after the promulgation of the constitution, young 
men becoming twenty-one were not to be permitted to vote 
if unable to read and write Turkish, Bulgarian, or Greek. 

The manufacture of gunpowder in Eastern Roumelia was 
strictly prohibited. The supply for the provincial maga- 
zines was to come from other Turkish provinces, and could 
not be imported without special authorization by the pro- 
vincial assembly. The attention given by the framers of 
the organic statute to minor details is noticeable in the speci- 
fication that such authorization should be given gratuitously. 1 
A study of this extremely long and detailed constitution, 
worked out for the new and autonomous province in ac- 
cordance with the treaty of Berlin, causes one to feel that 
scarcely any question could arise, connected with the com- 
plicated affairs in that province, that would not be covered 
by some provision in that document. 

At the end of their prospective constitution, the European 
commissioners added a " disposition finale " intended to 
limit the activity of the provincial government in the matter 
of law-making. According to this final provision changes 
in the constitution, excepting in relation to two chapters 
bearing on the militia and the gendarmerie, could not be 
made without the consent of the seven governments con- 
cerned in the formulation of the statute. 

1 There was a strong impression in London and Vienna that the com- 
mission entered too much into detail respecting the internal administra- 
tion of the province. Pari. Papers (1878-79), vol. lxxxi, p. 573. 



1 44 THE MAKING OF THE BALKAN STATES [144 

While the organic statute was nearing completion, a dele- 
gation representing some of the Bulgarian leaders in East- 
ern Roumelia and Bulgaria was visiting the capitals of the 
signatories of the Berlin treaty. By this time many of the 
principal agitators for the immediate union of these two 
provinces had abandoned the hope of bringing about that 
result. The avowed purpose now was to obtain a sufficient 
modification of the treaty to allow Eastern Roumelia a 
European governor, and to prevent the placing of strictly 
Turkish garrisons along the boundary between the' two 
provinces. In fact, there appears to have been all along an 
unwavering determination among the Bulgarians, especially 
those in Eastern Roumelia, never to submit to the exercise 
of the sultan's right respecting the Balkan garrisons. 1 

It was at this juncture that the Tsar may be said to have 
come to the rescue. He now sent a special messenger, Gen- 
eral Obrutcheff, to the Sultan and to the Bulgarians. 2 Gen- 
eral ObrutchefFs mission to Constantinople was successful 
to the extent that the Sultan pledged himself " provision- 
ally/' not to exercise his treaty right of garrisoning the 
roadways between Eastern Roumelia and Bulgaria. 3 

Having received this most comforting promise from the 
Turkish government, the Tsar's envoy hurried on in order 
to deliver his messages to the Bulgarians. In various cen- 
ters throughout Eastern Roumelia he read to the people his 
master's " Proclamation to the Bulgarians." He told his 
hearers, likewise, of his audience with the Sultan, and as- 

1 Pari. Papers (1878-79), vol. lxxxi, pp. 734 et sea. 

2 Ibid., p. 995; also vol. lxxx, p. 299. 

3 It is said that the Sultan's pledge was obtained as an offset to the 
Tsar's pledge for the maintenance of order in Eastern Roumelia, and 
for the remission of about four million dollars of Turkey's indebtedness 
to Russia. Miiller, Political History of Recent Times, p. 557. Cf. 
supra, p. 136. 



I45 ] MOVEMENTS LEADING TO THEIR UNION 145 

sured them that they had nothing to fear from Turkish 
troops. He pointed out to them, moreover, that with the 
exception of their governor-general — one of their own race 
— no Turkish official would be seen in their country. These 
assurances, taken in connection with the Tsar's expressed 
disapproval of any disorderly opposition to the organization 
being worked out for them, did much to clear the way for a 
fair trial in Eastern Roumelia under the statute about to be 
presented by the International Commission. 1 

The " Organic Statute " was completed and signed by the 
commissioners on April 26, 1879, at Constantinople. The 
Sultan's nomination (April 14th) of Alexander Vogorides 
(Aleko Pasha) as governor-general of Eastern Roumelia 
for five years, had already been accepted by the governments 
in the European Concert. 2 It will be seen that the first 
governor's name clearly indicates that he had a Greek an- 
cestry; but frequent reference is found to him as being of 
Bulgarian blood. 3 He recognized the ecclesiastical author- 
ity of the Bulgarian Exarch, and thus he is commonly called 
a Bulgarian Christian. Aleko Pasha spoke both Bulgarian 
and Greek, and he had formerly been Turkish ambassador, 
at Vienna. 4 

The disappointment of the Bulgarians in Eastern Rou- 
melia over this separation from Bulgaria, and the racial and 
religious prejudices, all too apparent throughout the pro- 
vince, rendered the situation there anything but promising. 5 
Russia's army of occupation was expected to withdraw as 

1 Pari. Papers, 1878-79, vol. lxxxi, pp. 1044 et seq. Cf. supra, p. 136. 
2 Ibid., pp. 877, 944. 

3 Washburn, Fifty Years in Constantinople, p. 148. Pari. Papers, 
1878-79, vol. lxxxi, p. 1059, passim. 
i /oid., p. 1013. 
5 Pari. Papers, 1878, vol. lxxxii, Turkey, No. 49. 



146 THE MAKING OF THE BALKAN STATES [x 4 6 

soon as the new government should be organized. Under 
these circumstances, it became evident to the powers that it 
would not be advisable to leave the responsibility of in- 
augurating the new regime solely to the authorities provided 
for in the constitution. Austria and Great Britain were 
quite determined that the Russian occupation should not be 
prolonged. Finally, in accordance with the Sultan's pro- 
position, the international commission, just finishing the 
draft of the constitution, was continued for another year. 
The commissioners were then instructed by their govern- 
ments to proceed to the capital of the new province (Philip- 
popolis), and to act there in conjunction with their asso- 
ciates as an advisory council to the governor-general. It 
was well understood, at the same time, that the administra- 
tive head of the provincial government was to pay due heed 
to the advice of this international body. 1 The Sultan issued 
firmans (May 18th), with rather unusual promptness, con- 
firming the appointment of Aleko Pasha, and sanctioning 
the constitution. 2 As the governor was about to leave for 
Philippopolis, it appears that the Sultan ordered him to wear 
the Turkish fez, at his installation. Owing to the feeling in 
the province, however, it seems that after crossing the fron- 
tier he discarded the fez for the Bulgarian cap. 

On Aleko Pasha's arrival (May 27) at Philippopolis, he 
was greeted by a band playing the Bulgarian hymn, which 
was also sung by boys from the Bulgarian school. Two 
days later, when the ceremony connected with the reading of 
the Sultan's firman took place, the governor felt obliged to 
defer to the popular desire and did not display the Turkish 
flag. 3 

l Parl. Papers, 1878-9, vol. lxxxi, pp. 1020 et seq. 

2 For the texts of the imperial firmans, see ibid., vol. lxxx, p. 423. 

z Parl. Papers, 1878-79, vol. lxxxi, pp. 1061 et seq. The governor's 
acquiescence was in keeping with the advice of the European com- 
mission. 



!47] MOJ'EMEXTS LEADING TO THEIR UNION 147 

A German, Mr. M. A. Schmidt, had already rendered 
valuable service in caring for the financial affairs of the 
province under the direction of the international commis- 
sion. Taking note of the sentiment favoring his retention, 
the governor appointed him Director of Finance. Most of 
the other appointive offices were filled with Bulgarians. 

With the Russian troops rapidly departing, leaving a local 
militia already quite well organized, drilled and equipped, 
by the Russians, and with the presence of the European com- 
mission in the capital. Eastern Roumelia was now started 
on her brief period of autonomy. 1 

While this preparatory work had been going on in rela- 
tion to Eastern Roumelia, the provisional government in 
Bulgaria was putting matters in order there for the inaugur- 
ation of the new regime. The man selected to be the first 
prince of this new tributary state was but twenty-two years of 
age, and, at the time of his election (April 29, 1879), he was 
serving as an officer in the Prussian garde du corps at Pots- 
dam. He was a son of Alexander of Hesse, by a Morgan- 
atic marriage which that prince contracted with a Polish 
lady, who was made Princess Battenberg. Through mar- 
riages contracted by other members of the Hessian and Bat- 
tenberg families, he was connected with the British royal 
family. He was also a nephew of the Russian empress. 2 
His education and military training had been obtained at 
Berlin ; and as he had accompanied the invading army that 
fought its way towards Constantinople in 1877-78, he was 
not without some very practical knowledge of warfare. 

The parties to the treaty of Berlin readily assented to the 
election of Prince Alexander of Battenberg; and he visited 
the principal European courts before going to Bulgaria. 

1 Pari. Papers, 1878-79, vol. lxxxi, p. 882. 

2 Annual Register, 1879, p. 180; Miiller, op. cit., p. 557. 



148 THE MAKING OF THE BALKAN STATES [i 4 g 

He went first to Russia to pay his respects to his Imperial 
uncle, Tsar Alexander II. It was there that he received 
from a Bulgarian deputation the official notification of his 
election to the princely dignity in the new state. Finally he 
journeyed from Rome to Constantinople, where he received 
his investiture (July 5th) from the Sultan. He then went 
on to Bulgaria, and was received there with no lack of en- 
thusiasm. On July 9th, at the old capital — Turnovo — , he 
took the oath of fidelity to the constitution ; and a few days 
later he entered the new capital — Sofia — and proceeded to 
set in motion the governmental machinery of the new 
principality. 1 

Prince Dondoukoff* departed at once, and within a month 
the Russian army of occupation had left the country. A 
very liberal supply of Russian officers remained behind, 
however, in care of the native militia. 

Within a week after entering his capital Prince Alexander 
selected his first cabinet. He made choice of five conserva- 
tive Bulgarians, and one Russian — the Minister of War — 
General BarantzofT. The elections for the Sobranje came 
on in the fall, and when the Assembly convened (November 
8th) it was found to contain a large majority of Liberals. 2 

For some little time the national parties were, for the 
most part, passing through formative stages. It is not 
easy, therefore, to characterize them with any considerable 

*See ch. vii of the Constitution; also Appletori s Annual Cyclopedia, 
New Series, vol. iv. 

2 The one-chambered legislative assembly. 

Annual Register, 1879, p. 159; Washburn, op. cit., p. 152. Dr. 
Washburn speaks from personal knowledge when he says: "... there 
were no leaders who had had any experience in government, and the 
National Assembly chosen by the people was hopelessly ignorant and 
unmanageable." But he sympathetically adds, "I suppose nothing 
better could have been expected of a people suddenly emancipated from 
Turkish rule." 



149] MOVEMENTS LEADING TO THEIR UNION 149 

definiteness. It may be said, however, that, generally speak- 
ing, the Conservatives were willing to follow the lead of 
Russian advisers, while the Liberals held that the Bulgarians 
could and should exercise their share of authority and re- 
sponsibility in the affairs of the principality. Being a favor- 
ite nephew of Tsar Alexander II, Prince Alexander very 
naturally worked for some time quite in harmony with 
Russia's agents, and thus in accord with the Conservatives. 

But there was at the same time another line of cleavage, 
which caused more or less overlapping in respect to these two 
national parties. A vigorous agitation was being kept up 
among the Bulgarians in the principality, as well as in 
Eastern Roumelia, for the early union of the two territories. 
Some of the Liberals favored a temporizing policy on the 
part of the Bulgarian government towards the object of this 
agitation ; and in this attitude they were in full accord with 
the Conservatives. But there were other would-be leaders 
among the Liberals who were supremely interested in press- 
ing upon the Government the expediency of taking imme- 
diate steps looking towards the consummation of the union. 1 
It was not long before a keen rivalry sprang up between the 
leaders of these two Liberal factions, Zankoff and Caraveloff, 
and that added somewhat, also, to the party complications. 2 

The prince found that he could not make any headway 
with the Sobranje and he dissolved the assembly (Decem- 
ber 5th). The second elections were held in the spring of 
1880, and resulted in greatly increasing the Liberal ma- 
jority. Prince Alexander determined now to try a Liberal 
Ministry, and he picked Zankoff to form a Cabinet. 3 

1 Cf. Beaman, op. cit., p. 42. 
'Minchin, The Balkan Peninsula, ch. xiv. 

'Zankoff called himself a Constitutional Liberal. His chief anxiety- 
was to see the principality organized and administered in strict accord- 



150 THE MAKING OF THE BALKAN STATES [150 

These gains for the Liberals greatly strengthened the 
unionist movement. The chief agitators held a mass meet- 
ing (May 29) at Slivno, in Bulgaria, and the prince sent 
two delegates, in order that he might have definite infor- 
mation regarding the situation. As the head of the new 
Liberal Ministry in England, Mr. Gladstone had let it be 
known that the sympathy of the British government for the 
Christian nationalities of the Balkans was dependent on the 
good use that they should make of the liberties that Europe 
had already secured for them. This declaration, coupled 
with the efforts, particularly of English and Austrian offi- 
cials in the two provinces, had a most favorable influence in 
dissuading Bulgarians, both north and south of the Balkans, 
from taking any decisive steps at this juncture to bring 
about the union. Prince Alexander's delegates returned 
from the Slivno conference to report that the time had 
not arrived yet for a general unionist movement; and 
for the next two or three years the question seems to have 
been kept more in the background. 1 

The internal conditions in Bulgaria and Eastern Roumelia 
were still anything but promising. Brigandage had sprung 
up anew, and there were many instances of racial and re- 
ligious strife in which neither the Bulgarians, the Greeks, 
nor the Moslems seem to have been blameless. There were 
difficult problems, likewise, to be solved in connection with 
the financial needs of the two impoverished provinces. 2 

Throughout the year 1880, the premier, Zankoff, failed 
to get along well with the Russian War Minister (now 

ance with the constitution. Pari. Papers, 1880, vol. lxxxi, p. 438; 
Minchin, op. cit., p. 234. 

l Parl. Papers, 1880, vol. lxxxi, pp. 445 et seq.; Beaman, op. cit. y 
ch. ii. 

2 Pari. Papers, 1880, Turkey, No. 19; 1881, Turkey, No. 4; Appleton's 
Cyclopedia, 1879, " Bulgaria," loc. cit.; ibid., 1880, p. 74. 



I5 l] MOVEMENTS LEADING TO THEIR UNION 151 

General Ernroth) at Sofia; and in December the prince 
gave the premiership to Caraveloff. 1 Under these Liberal 
cabinets a considerable number of important legislative bills 
were passed. Provisions were made for a better system of 
national education and for ecclesiastical reforms intended to 
place a limit on hierarchical domination, and the rights and 
duties of village magistrates were better defined. But when 
the Liberals set on foot a movement to reduce the number 
and the rank of Russian officials in Bulgaria and manifested 
strong socialistic tendencies, the prince was ready to break 
with the Liberals and to resort to rather high-handed 
measures. 2 

In March, 1881, Tsar Alexander II, the uncle and patron 
of Prince Alexander of Bulgaria, was assassinated. Prince 
Alexander attended the funeral of his Imperial uncle, and 
then visited the courts of Berlin and Vienna. After an ab- 
sence of about six weeks, he returned, and shortly after- 
wards (May 10th) dismissed the ministry and appointed 
the Russian War Minister, General Ernroth, premier. He an- 
nounced at the same time his determination to surrender his 
crown unless a Grand Sobranje should decide in accordance 
with his views. Then he submitted three proposals which 
were to be acted upon by the Grand Assembly. He asked 
to be invested for seven years with " extraordinary powers " 
enabling him to create new institutions, and empowering 
him to summon a Grand Sobranje within the seven years, so 
that the constitution might be revised on the basis of such 
institutions as he had created. Also, the ordinary As- 
sembly, then in session, was to be suspended. 

1 Caraveloff was at this time a moderate Liberal, or Nationalist. He 
was in general more interested in looking after internal affairs, and 
bringing about the union of Eastern Roumelia with the principality, 
than in opposing Russian interference. 

s Annual Register, 1881; Appletori s Cyclopedia, 1881, "Bulgaria,'* 
loc. cit. 



I5 2 THE MAKING OF THE BALKAN STATES [152 

Prince Alexander and his Russian helpers arranged for 
most careful oversight of the elections, and a Grand As- 
sembly was convened that accepted the prince's proposals 
without delay or opposition. 1 Whether or not the prince 
effected this coup d'etat as a result of advice proffered to 
him at St. Petersburg, Berlin and Vienna, it is certain that 
the Russians were in full accord with the movement. 2 

It appears that the prince feared he had weakened his 
prestige in Bulgaria, for he asked Russia to send him two 
ministers. The Tsar replied by sending General Soboleff, 
who became Minister of the Interior, General Kaulbars, who 
was made Minister of War, and General Tioharoff, who be- 
came Minister of Justice. 3 

Bulgaria was now practically, so far as the government 
was concerned, a Russian province. The Russians in the 
Ministry claimed to receive their orders from the Tsar ; and 
they soon made it plain to the prince that, though he might 
continue to reign, he would not be permitted to rule. 4 But 
Prince Alexander was not the man to be forced into sub- 
mission to subordinate officials. Hence there was for a 
little time something like a three-cornered fight. The Bul- 
garian leaders were bitter towards the prince for having set 
aside the constitution, and the exploitation of their coun- 
try by Russian commercial speculators tended to increase 
their opposition to Russian domination. 

With the accession of Alexander III to the Russian 
throne (1881), a new element had been introduced into 
the situation in Bulgaria. Up to the time of his death, 

l Cf. Annual Register, 1881; Beaman, op. tit., p. 46. 
J C/. Muller, op. tit., p. 557; Minchin, op. tit., p. 234. 
3 Koch, Furst Alexander von Bulgaria (Darmstadt, 1887), p. 104. 
* Beaman, op. tit., p. 48; Leonoff, Documents Secrets (Berlin, 1893), 
passim. Minchin, op. tit., p. 238. 



153] MOVEMENTS LEADING TO THEIR UNION 153 

Alexander II manifested a fatherly interest in the success 
of his favorite nephew's reign. But the son (Alexander 
III) is said to have cherished an enmity towards his cousin, 
Prince Alexander. This dislike, it seems, was due to some 
unpleasantness that came up between them during their 
youth. 1 The young Tsar's animosity is thought to have at 
least encouraged the Russian officials in the principality in 
manifesting unfriendliness and arrogance towards the prince, 
as soon as he presumed to slight their counsel. 2 

Throughout the year 1882, the Bulgarians were greatly 
agitated over the loss of many of their liberties through 
the suspension of the constitution. In fact, the country was 
so near the verge of revolution that martial law was de- 
clared. Meanwhile, the prince was taking a more and more 
decided stand against the dictation of his Russian officials. 
Even the threats of dethronement failed to hold him longer 
in check, and from this time until his abdication the breach 
between him and the Tsar widened more and more. 3 

Finding that Prince Alexander was slipping his halter, the 
Russian ministers undertook to ingratiate themselves with 
the Liberals.* The St. Petersburg government, or rather 
the Tsar, had now determined that the union of Eastern 
Roumelia with Bulgaria should not be brought about until 
Prince Alexander could be forced to abdicate. The lead- 
ers of the popular party in Bulgaria were told that the prince 
was the principal obstacle in the way of union. The Bul- 
garians, however, were just now most intent on the re- 
establishment of constitutional government. Consequently, 

1 Washburn, op. cit., pp. 161, 183; Koch, op. cit., p. 81; Bismarck's 
Autobiography, Eng. trans., vol. ii, p. 117. 

2 Dicey, The Peasant State (London, 1894), p. 23. 
3 Beaman, op. cit., p. 49; Appletori 's Annual Cyclopedia, 1882. 

4 The Contemporary Review for 1886 contains an article dealing quite 
fully with this period. 



I54 THE MAKING OF THE BALKAN STATES [154 

Russia's next move was to call upon the prince to give up his 
autocratic power and restore the constitution, on pain of 
losing his throne. 1 

Meanwhile, the prince had been leaning more and more 
on the counsel of the moderate Liberal leaders. He had 
hesitated about trying again to govern with a radical minis- 
try and assembly, but when there was no alternative except 
the humiliation of submitting to the dictation of Russian 
agents, he determined to follow his own plans in restoring 
the constitution. He found the leaders of all the Bulgarian 
parties ready to join with him, and arrangements for the 
restoration of constitutional government were quickly ma- 
tured. The " small assembly " petitioned the prince to re- 
store the constitution of 1879, and he at once issued a pro- 
clamation to that effect (September, 1883). 

The Russian ministers had not been consulted in refer- 
ence to this step. They were taken unawares, and in their 
surprise and anger, they resigned. Zankoff (Liberal) was 
asked now to form a ministry. 2 The elections for the So- 
branje, however, resulted in a sweeping victory for the par- 
tisans of his rival, Caraveloff, and Zankoff resigned. Zan- 
koff had earlier expressed himself as wanting neither 
" Russia's honey nor Russia's sting." 3 From this time, 
however, he became an out-and-out Russophil, and we shall 
see a little later what an important and shameful part he 
played in helping to bring about the abdication of Prince 
Alexander. The Caraveloff ministry and the prince, in spite 

1 Leonoff , op. cit., passim; cf. Rose, op. cit., p. 310. 

^Appleton's Annual Cyclopedia, 1883. One of England's represent- 
atives at Philippopolis has expressed the opinion that "up to this time 
(1883) the prince seemed to listen to every one and to find in every one 
a broken reed; but since 1883 the prince has relied upon himself alone, 
and has hardly ever made a mistake." Minchin, op. cit., p. 297. 

3 Koch, op. cit., p. 45. 



155] MOVEMENTS LEADING TO THEIR UNION 155 

of stormy times in the government, managed to maintain a 
firm grasp on the situation until the unionist outbreak in 
September, 1885. 

In Eastern Roumelia Aleko Pasha's term of office expired 
in 1884, and his deputy, M. Christovitch, was appointed by 
the Sultan with the unanimous consent of the great powers. 
The new governor-general, officially called Gavril Pasha, 
was a Bulgarian, had been educated in Paris and had a 
Greek wife. He was understood to be opposed to the rev- 
olutionary tendencies in Eastern Roumelia, and conse- 
quently, for the time being, he was sure of Russian support. 1 
He proceeded to dismiss many of the Liberal officials who 
were known to be zealous in the cause of the union. This 
line of action merely increased the agitation, and led at the 
same time to greater secrecy in the formation of a unionist 
plot. In the spring of 1885 a secret movement was regu- 
larly organized in the southern province with the object 
of overthrowing the government of Gavril Pasha and ef- 
fecting a union with Bulgaria. September 26th was the 
day fixed upon for the uprising, but the government under- 
took to arrest some of the agitators, and this hastened the 
outbreak. It appears that Prince Alexander was informed 
about September 9th of the secret plans of the revolution- 
ary committee. He claimed to have strongly disapproved 
of the undertaking, and to have told the representative of 
the committee that Russia would not countenance the move- 
ment. And, moreover, he urged that he had given positive 
assurances to the Emperor of Austria-Hungary that tran- 
quillity would be maintained for the present. 2 He seems 
to have thought that after these representations on his part 
the plot would not be carried out. At the same time, his 

1 Annual Register ; 1884, 1885. 

2 Pari. Papers, 1886, vol. lxxv, pp. 39, 133 {Turkey, No. 1). 



!^6 THE MAKING OF THE BALKAN STATES [156 

premier, Caraveloff, was looked upon by some of the people 
in Philippopolis as the principal organizer of the movement. 

The prince was at his summer home (at Varna) near the 
coast of the Black Sea, when, on the morning of September 
18th, he was apprised of the fact that the " foreign govern- 
ment of Roumelia " had been overthrown, and that a pro- 
visional government had proclaimed the union of that pro- 
vince with Bulgaria, under his sceptre. On the afternoon 
of the same day, a resolution was adopted at a meeting in 
Sofia calling upon Prince Alexander to sanction the union. 
On the same day, also, the militia of both provinces de- 
clared for the union under Prince Alexander. 

The prince and Caraveloff left Varna the same evening, 
arriving at Tirnovo the next day. From there — the old 
capital of Bulgaria — the prince issued, on the 20th, a mani- 
festo proclaiming the union, and assuming, " by the grace 
of God and the national will," the title of " Prince of North- 
ern and Southern Bulgaria." The next day, he was en- 
thusiastically received at Philippopolis. 1 He telegraphed 
immediately to Constantinople announcing what had been 
done, and affirming that there was no hostile intention to- 
wards the Ottoman government, whose suzerainty he re- 
cognized. He likewise requested the Sultan and the Porte 
to sanction the union, adding that the people were deter- 
mined to defend with their lives the new state of affairs. 

The Tsar at once expressed his entire disapproval (Sep- 
tember 21) of what had been done and forbade the Russian 
officers in the armies of Northern and Southern Bulgaria to 
take any part whatever in the movement. A little later, 
all these officers were called home. All the great powers 
were taken by surprise, and there was a general expression 
of opinion that the mode in which the union had been ef- 

1 Pari. Papers, 1886, vol. lxxv, p. 43 {Turkey, No. 1). 



157] MOVEMENTS LEADING TO THEIR UNION 157 

fected should be strongly condemned. On the 24th, Russia 
proposed that an informal conference of the Constantinople 
ambassadors be held in order to reach some common ground 
in relation to the situation. The prince had already declared 
himself responsible for the tranquillity of the two districts 
now united; but the Bulgarian and Turkish armies were 
soon facing each other along the frontier. The situation 
was rendered still more critical, also, by the threatening at- 
titude of Greece and Servia, in opposition to the enlarge- 
ment of Bulgaria. 

Shortly before the prince had arrived in Philippopolis on 
the 21st, the President of the provisional government, Dr. 
Stransky, took great care to point out to British representa- 
tives that " the revolution was directed against Russian 
tutelage." And he added the assurance, that " united Bul- 
garia " could stand alone. 1 It became evident in London 
that these united provinces meant to be self-governing, and 
hence, within a week after the union was proclaimed, the 
British ambassador at Constantinople was instructed to take 
part there in an informal conference of the ambassadors, 
and to advise that the Sultan should abstain from military 
intervention and that Prince Alexander of Bulgaria should 
be governor-general for life of Eastern Roumelia. 2 

After deliberating for more than two weeks, the Con- 
stantinople ambassadors agreed on a " Declaration," to be 
presented to the Porte and to Bulgaria. The note, in sub- 
stance, merely disapproved what had transpired in Eastern 
Roumelia, and suggested that the Bulgarians should cease 
military preparations and take care not to spread the agita- 

1 Pari. Papers, 1886, vol. lxxv, p. 51 {Turkey, No. 1). 

2 Pari. Papers, 1886, vol. lxxv, p. 29 {Turkey, No. 1); Edwards, Sir 
William White (London, 1902), ch. xviii. 



!^8 THE MAKING OF THE BALKAN STATES [158 

tion. 1 In reply to this note, the Porte expressed the wish 
that the powers would request Prince Alexander to restore 
without delay the status quo. 

At the joint suggestion of the courts of St. Petersburg 
and Vienna, the Porte requested the powers to instruct their 
ambassadors at Constantinople to form a conference, in 
which Turkey should take part, for settling the troubles in 
Southern Bulgaria, on the basis of the treaty of Berlin. 
The first meeting of the conference was held on November 
4th. England's ambassador was instructed to move for a 
consideration of the means of meeting the wishes of the 
population, before discussing a return to the status quo. 
He was to refer to his government for further instructions 
on any proposal looking towards a return to the former situ- 
ation in relation to the two provinces. The seventh and 
last sitting of the conference, until the final one of the fol- 
lowing April, was held on November 25th. All of the 
powers except England were practically agreed at the 
seventh sitting, that Turkey might go on and re-establish 
a separate government in Eastern Roumelia, in accordance 
with the organic statute. 2 

Meanwhile, Servia had broken away from all restraint 
and declared war on Bulgaria (November 14th). 3 Servia 
had evidently expected that the threatening attitude of the 
Turkish forces gathered along the Roumelian frontier would 
result in holding a large part of the Bulgarian force in that 
quarter. Such was not the case, however. Prince Alex- 
ander put himself at the head of an army representing united 
Bulgaria, and in less than two weeks his forces had driven 

1 Pari. Papers, 1886, vol. lxxv, p. 141 {Turkey, No. 1). 
'The protocols of the conference may be found in Pari. Papers, 1886, 
Turkey, No. 1. 

8 For the Servian and Bulgarian declarations, see Hertslet, op. cil., 
vol. iv. 



159] MOVEMENTS LEADING TO THEIR UNION 159 

the Servian army under King Milan out of Bulgaria and 
ten miles over the frontier towards the Servian capital. 
Austria-Hungary checked the further advance of the Bul- 
garian army, and a military commission, representing the 
seven treaty powers, aided Bulgaria and Servia in fixing the 
terms of an armistice (Nov. 28-Dec. 21), and in concluding 
a treaty of peace (March 3, 1886). 1 

As soon as the ambassadors at Constantinople ceased to 
meet in conference, without having reached any full agree- 
ment, the Porte dispatched two delegates to Eastern Rou- 
melia in order to prepare the minds of the people there for 
the re-establishment of a separate government in that pro- 
vince. The delegates carried with them a proclamation 
from the Sultan which pointed out that a few " evil-dis- 
posed persons " had " disturbed the order and tranquility of 
the country," and promised entire amnesty and all good 
things for the province, under a governor-general to be ap- 
pointed. 2 These Turkish commissioners were told at Philip- 
popolis that the only qualified representatives of Southern 
Bulgaria, were the prince and the government at Sofia. 
After a stay of four days, therefore, they left without hav- 
ing even been allowed to circulate the Sultan's proclama- 
tion. 3 

Before the end of December (1885) Turkey began to 
urge again the desirability of the powers uniting on some 
line of action. Lord Salisbury took occasion at this time 
to suggest to the Turkish ambassador in London that " a 
Bulgaria, friendly to the Porte, and jealous of foreign in- 
fluence, would be a far surer bulwark against possible ag- 

1 Pari. Papers, 1886, vol. lxxv, passim. 

J The proclamation may be found in Pari. Papers, 1886, vol. lxxv, 
p. 422. 

*Ibid., p. 21 {Turkey, No. 2). 



l6o THE MAKING OF THE BALKAN STATES [160 

gression than two Bulgarias, severed in administration, but 
united in considering the Porte as the only obstacle to their 
national development." The English Foreign Secretary 
suggested, moreover, that it was coming more and more to 
be the wish of the powers that the Porte should find some 
solution of the Bulgarian question by direct communica- 
tion with Prince Alexander. 1 The month had not closed 
before Russia admitted that the union had been effected 
and could not be undone, and that it only needed to be 
" regularized." Then, almost simultaneously, the Sultan 
expressed his readiness to negotiate with Prince Alexander 
directly and to sanction some form of union. 2 

By the end of January, an agreement was reached be- 
tween the Porte and the Bulgarian foreign minister. The 
settlement was delayed, however, for two months longer, 
mainly because Prince Alexander was unwilling to accept an 
appointment as governor-general of Eastern Roumelia un- 
der Article XVII of the treaty of Berlin, which required 
re-appointment by the sultan every five years, with the as- 
sent of the powers. The conference of the Constantinople 
ambassadors was called together at last, April 5th, and the 
settlement was signed, regardless of the prince's objections. 
Fortunately, Prince Alexander's name was not in the ar- 
rangement. The governor-generalship of Eastern Rou- 
melia was entrusted to the prince of Bulgaria, in accord- 
ance with the above-mentioned article of the treaty of 
Berlin. The British government, nevertheless, reserved the 
right of proposing at the end of the first five years the re- 
nomination of Prince Alexander. Two other important 
points in this settlement, were the separation of the Mussul- 
man villages of Kirdjali and the Rhodope district from 

1 Pari. Papers, 1886, vol. lxxv, p. 424. 
2 I6id., 1886, vol. lxxv, p. 22 {Turkey, No. 2). 



I 6i] MOVEMENTS LEADING TO THEIR UNION t6i 

Eastern Roumelia, and the relinquishment by the Porte, in 
return, of the right to provide for the defense of the land 
and sea frontiers of Eastern Roumelia. 1 

The union as thus defined was only the minimum of 
what the Bulgarians had intended to secure. As the head 
of the Eastern Roumelian government, the prince was looked 
upon by some of his people as merely a Turkish function- 
ary. One party now began to clamor for a more complete 
union, another for an attempt to regain the friendship of 
Russia, and still another for determined resistance to any 
form of Russian aggression. From April 5th to August 
2 1 st, party spirit in both provinces was at high tide. The 
powers had sanctioned a merely personal union between 
Eastern Roumelia and Bulgaria. Nevertheless, the prince 
set about the work of making the union political and ad- 
ministrative as well. As a beginning in that direction, the 
southern province was ordered to elect deputies to the Bul- 
garian national assembly. 

Party antagonism caused some serious disturbances in 
the June election. On his tour through the southern prov- 
ince, the prince had proclaimed that only Bulgarian would 
be recognized as an official language there. That attitude 
towards the languages of the minorities in Eastern Rou- 
melia still further alienated the Greeks and the Turks and 
caused many of them to refrain from voting. In general, 
however, the election may be regarded as having been a 
struggle between the rival adherents of the prince and the 
Tsar. The Russian government complained most bitterly 
to the Porte that the prince had grossly misused his author- 

1 Pari. Papers, 1886, vol. lxxv, Turkey, No. 2; Hertslet, op. ctt., 
vol. iv. It will be remembered that the right given to Turkey by the 
Treaty of Berlin (art. xv) to garrison the frontiers of this province had 
been, for some months, one of the chief obstacles in the way of a peace- 
ful organization of Eastern Roumelia and Bulgaria. Cf. supra, p. 135. 



!62 THE MAKING OF THE BALKAN STATES [ifa 

ity, by putting every obstacle in the way of an expression 
of public opinion at the polls. The fact seems to be, how- 
ever, that neither the government nor the opposition was 
in any sense blameless in connection with the serious dis- 
turbances during the elections. 

.When the Sobranje convened, on June 14th, it was found 
that the majority were prepared to support the prince and 
his ministry. In opening the Assembly, the prince seems 
to have been most unfortunate, from some points of view, 
both in what he said and in what he omitted to say. He 
declared to the deputies from both sides of the Balkans, 
representing, as he said, the " Bulgarian nation," that the 
union of the two Bulgarias was already accomplished. As 
a proof that the union was complete, he pointed out that 
the " general national Bulgarian assembly " would hence- 
forth care for the interests of the united country. But 
beyond all this, the prince failed to make the accustomed 
reference to Russia, as the " liberator " of the Bulgarians. 
So, taken as a whole, the speech was disappointing, not to 
say annoying, to all except the most radical Bulgarians 
in the " united country." 

But Prince Alexander's struggles with Bulgarian af- 
fairs were now nearly ended. In the early hours of August 
2 1 st, a small band of Bulgarian conspirators gained entrance 
to the palace, forced him to sign an illegible paper, spirited 
him out of the country, and conveyed him through Rou- 
mania and Russia, to Lemburg (Austria). In the actual 
execution of the plot, the leader appears to have been the 
director of the military school, Major Grueff. His prin- 
cipal associates were likewise connected with the army, and 
several of them had personal grievances against the prince. 1 

1 For a detailed account of the plot and its execution, see Quarterly 
Review (London, 1886); see also Minchin, op. cit., ch. xv. In his 



j 63] MOVEMENTS LEADING TO THEIR UNION 163 

Now was the opportunity for the Russophil Zankoff, and 
his followers. In the early dawn, Zankoff led the way in 
denouncing the prince as " a German foreigner, who had 
tried to estrange Russia." 1 The Zankoffists at once tele- 
graphed everywhere, — " Prince Battenberg dethroned . . . 
Make army take oath to the provisional government." In 
order to give the proceedings the appearance of a national 
movement, they forged the names of several of the national- 
ist leaders. By evening it became clear to the leaders in 
this first provisional government that the men whose names 
had been made use of without their consent, could not be 
counted upon as even friends of the new regime. Then a 
government was formed exclusively of Zankoff's followers; 
and a proclamation was issued to the effect that " Prince 
Alexander of Battenberg had abdicated forever the throne 
of Bulgaria, owing to his firm conviction that a continua- 
tion of his reign would only bring about the ruin of the 
Bulgarian people." This proclamation closed with the sig- 
nificant assurance to the Bulgarian people that the Tsar, 
" the Protector of Bulgaria," would not cease to afford his 
powerful aid and protection to their country. 2 The local 
head of the Bulgarian Church was the president of this 
second ministry, and Zankoff was Minister of the Interior, 
with Major Grueff commander-in-chief of the army. 3 

This proclamation was issued on Saturday. The next 

biography of Stambouloff, the author claims that " it is not proved that 
official Russia had any cognizance of the plot, though . . . the con- 
spirators were sure of having the most complete approval from St. 
Petersburg if they succeeded." Beaman, op. cit., p. 88. 

1 Pari. Papers, 1887, vol. xci, p. 124 {Turkey, No. 1). 

2 Beaman, op. cit., p. 92. 

'There were six in the ministry. An English writer names Zankoff 
and the president of this government, Metropolitan Clement, as the 
civil leaders in the plot to abduct the prince. Minchin, op. cit., p. 254. 



!64 THE MAKING OF THE BALKAN STATES [164 

Monday, Stambuloff, who was at Tirnovo, issued a counter- 
proclamation. 1 In the name of Prince Alexander, and of 
the National Assembly, of which he had been president, he 
declared the members of the provisional government to be 
outlaws, and that anyone who should obey their orders 
would be punished by military law. At the same time he 
appointed Colonel Mutkuroff, then in command of the troops 
at Philippopolis, to be commander-in-chief of all the Bul- 
garian forces. The English consul at Philippopolis, Cap- 
tain H. Jones, had already appealed to Mutkuroff not to 
take the oath of allegiance to the revolutionary govern- 
ment. 2 Mutkuroff soon determined not to recognize the 
government of the traitors to the prince, and when Stam- 
buloff 's proclamation reached him, on Monday (23rd), he 
was preparing to march on Sofia. 

Stambuloff's proclamation and the movement of Mut- 
kurofFs army towards Sofia, caused the members of the re- 
volutionary government to lose all hope, and they resigned 
and disappeared (24th). Prince Alexander's late premier, 
Caraveloff, now formed a government at Sofia; but a re- 
gency of three, with Stambuloff as the leading member, 
was constituted three days later, to last until the prince 
could be found and brought back. 3 

On reaching Lemburg (P. M. 27th), Prince Alexander 
learned that a government loyal to him had been established 
in Bulgaria. He found a dispatch from Stambuloff await- 
ing his arrival, stating that " the whole of Bulgaria was 

x At this time Stambuloff was practicing law. He was a staunch 
nationalist and had been active in agitation for the national cause since 
1876. See Beaman, op. cit., Stambuloff. 

2 Pari. Papers, 1887, vol. xci, p. 155 {Turkey, No. 1); Minchin, op. 
cit., ch. xvi. 

3 Pari. Papers, 1887, vol. xci, p. 143; Beaman, op. cit., p. 96. 



^5] movements leading to THEIR UNION 165 

longing for his return." 1 Realizing now that the ordeal he 
had undergone was the work of a band of conspirators, and 
feeling that he had the sympathy of western Europe, the 
prince left the next day for Sofia. His entire journey back, 
by way of Bucharest, has been described as a " triumphal 
progress." 

On the northern boundary of Bulgaria, at Rustchuk, the 
prince was enthusiastically greeted (30th) by an official 
Bulgarian deputation, in the presence of local foreign repre- 
sentatives. And it was before proceeding further that 
Prince Alexander committed what some of his faithful 
friends and ardent admirers have styled his fatal blunder. 2 
We have seen how he had started out three years earlier 
to dispense with the counsel of Russia's agents. From that 
time the breach betw r een the prince and the Tsar had con- 
stantly widened. 3 But now, on his way back to take up 
again at this critical juncture the reins of government in 
Bulgaria, he seemed willing to stake his all, as the ruler of 
that country, on an appeal to the magnanimity of his Im- 
perial cousin, Alexander III. 4 In his now well-known tele- 
gram to the Tsar, he said, among other things : 

" My first act on assuming my legitimate authority is 
to announce to your Imperial Majesty my firm intention to 
spare no sacrifice in order to aid your Imperial Majesty's 
magnanimous intention to terminate the present grave crisis 
through which Bulgaria is passing. ... I shall be happy 
to be able to give your Imperial Majesty decisive proof of 
my unalterable devotion to your august person. The prin- 

1 Beaman, op. cit., p. 96. 

5 Quarterly Review, op. cit., 1886; Beaman, op. cit., pp. 98, 101; Min- 
chin, op. cit., pp. 280 et seq. 

* Koch, Furst Alexander von Bulgairen , passim. 
*The Saturday Review (London, 1887), vol. lxiv, p. 93. 



j66 THE MAKING OF THE BALKAN STATES [166 

ciple of monarchy has compelled me to re-establish a legal 
government in Bulgaria and Roumelia. Russia gave me 
my crown : I am ready to return it into the hands of her 
sovereign." 

Three days later, on reaching Philippopolis, the prince re- 
ceived from the Tsar the following reply : 

" Have received your Highness' telegram. Cannot ap- 
prove your return to Bulgaria, foreseeing disastrous conse- 
quences to country already so severely tried ... I shall re- 
frain from all interference with the sad state to which Bul- 
garia has been brought as long as you remain there. Your 
Highness will judge what is your proper course. I reserve 
my decision as to my future action, which will be in con- 
formity with the obligations imposed on me by the vener- 
ated memory of my father, the interests of Russia, and the 
peace of the East." 1 

The same day that this telegram was received by the 
prince (September 2) the London government suggested to 
the German and Austrian governments that the treaty pow- 
ers consult together with a view of giving them support to 
Prince Alexander. Neither Berlin nor Vienna gave any 
encouragement, however, towards such a project, and the 
idea seems to have been abandoned. 2 

Prince Alexander passed on the next day (September 3) 

. ■■ . - ■ ,. . 

*It has been said that the Russian consul at Rustchuk induced the 
prince to send the telegram to the Tsar. The Bulgarian officials knew 
nothing of this message until the Tsar's reply was received at Philip- 
popolis. "Then the prince confessed his thoughtless action, and ad- 
mitted to the full the enormity of his fault." Beaman, Stambuloff, p. 
101. The consul had just informed the prince that a Russian general 
was already on the way to look after the administration of Bulgaria, in 
the Tsar's name. Minchin, op. cit., pp. 282 et seq.; Pari. Papers, 1887, 
vol. xci, p. 136. 

2 Ibid., pp. 127 et seq. 



^7] MOVEMENTS LEADING TO THEIR UNION 167 

to his capital, and the hearty greetings of the populace 
voiced the confidence and approval of his people. With 
the Tsar's telegram before him, however, and with the 
feeling that a large number of the army officers had been im- 
plicated in the plot against him, he at once expressed his 
determination to appoint a regency and leave Bulgaria. 1 
All the arguments that some of the members of his govern- 
ment could bring to bear failed to persuade him to alter his 
purpose. A meeting of political leaders was then held at 
which the decision was reached to accept the formal abdica- 
tion of the prince, providing the great powers would give 
some guarantee that Russia would not occupy Bulgaria, 
and that further foreign interference in the internal affairs- 
should not be permitted. 2 

On the 7th, the foreign representatives were called to the 
palace to take leave of the prince. In his parting address 
to the diplomatic corps, he said he had returned to Bulgaria 
in order that " he might be able to leave it by the light of 
day instead of being dragged like a malefactor through the 
streets at the dead of night." The Constantinople settle- 
ment appointing him a Turkish functionary in Eastern Rou- 
melia had been fatal to him, he contended. He had made 
every effort to save himself from that misfortune; but " it 
was not possible," he added, " for one man alone to stand 
against Europe." 3 Then followed Prince Alexander's last 
official announcement to the " Bulgarian nation " — his pro- 
clamation — giving notice of the formation of a regency and 
of his abdication. The first few lines are very significant : 

" We, Alexander, etc., — Being convinced of the painful 
truth that our departure from Bulgaria will facilitate the 

1 Pari. Papers, 1877, Turkey, No. 1, pp. 134^ seg. 

2 Ibid., Turkey, No. 1, pp. 148-160. 

3 Ibid., Turkey, No. 1, p. 149; cf. supra, p. 160. 



l6g THE MAKING OF THE BALKAN STATES [168 

restoration of good relations between Bulgaria and her liber- 
ator Russia, and having received an assurance from the 
government of His Imperial Majesty the Russian Emperor 
that the rights, freedom and independence of our State 
shall remain intact, and that no one shall meddle in its 
internal affairs : 

" Do hereby announce to our beloved people that we re- 
nounce the Bulgarian throne." x 

Prince Alexander is said to have borne himself with 
manly dignity throughout these trying hours. At four 
o'clock of the same day, he rode out of the city, with Stam- 
bulofT, through the crowded streets. His carriage was 
repeatedly stopped by the efforts of the long line of people 
to kiss his hand. At last he called back, " Long live Bul- 
garia," and passed on with a number of carriages following 
to the Austrian frontier. 2 

The regents named by the prince before his abdication 
were S. Stambuloff, P. Caraveloff, and Colonel Mutkuroff. 
The regency announced without delay the intention of call- 
ing for the election of a Grand Sobranje to choose a prince. 3 
The Chamber met on September 13th and approved the 
measures taken for convoking the larger assembly. October 

1 Leonoff, Documents Secrets, pp. 98 et seq.; Pari. Papers, 1887, vol. 
xci, Turkey, No. 1, pp. 166, 169. 

2 Pari. Papers, 1887, vol. xci, Turkey, No. 1, p. 173. In the Hun- 
garian Chamber of Deputies it was asked how it came about that the 
hostility of Russia alone could have compelled a popular prince to abdi- 
cate, and that the empire was enabled to interfere in the internal affairs 
of the principality. The questioner also wished to know how the sup- 
port given by German diplomacy to Russian interest had effected the 
close friendly relations between Austria- Hungary and Germany. Pari. 
Papers, 1887, Turkey, No. 1, pp. 1S3, 190. 

8 The Grande Sobranje, or National Assembly, it will be remembered, 
was made up of double the number of deputies in the ordinary sobranje. 
Cf. supra, p. 140. 



169] MOVEMENTS LEADING TO THEIR UNION 169 

i oth was appointed as the day for holding the elections. 
On the 25th (September), General Kaulbars arrived in 
Sofia as the Russian diplomatic agent, with instructions to 
" assist " the Bulgarians in relation to their affairs. 1 The 
same day he demanded the postponement of the elections for 
the Grand Assembly, together with the immediate raising 
of the state of siege and the release of all persons impli- 
cated in the late conspiracy. 2 The ministers replied (Octo- 
ber 1 st) that the latter demands were accepted, but that the 
elections announced were in strict accordance with the re- 
quirements of the Bulgarian constitution, and could not 
therefore be postponed. 

Despite the opposition of General Kaulbars, the elections 
were held, and passed off without very serious disturb- 
ances. Of the 450 deputies, only about one-sixth were 
Zankoffists. The Grand Sobranje opened on October 31st 
and in spite of protests from Constantinople deputies from 
Eastern Roumelia formed a part of the assembly. A 
brother of the Empress of Russia, Prince Waldemar of Den- 
mark, was elected Prince of Bulgaria by acclamation (No- 
vember 10). Two days later the reply came that Prince 
Waldemar would not accept the honor without the approval 
of the Tsar, and must therefore decline. 3 The Sobranje 
now appointed a deputation of three to visit various Euro- 
pean courts in search of a prince, and then adjourned. Gen- 
eral Kaulbars failed to persuade what he termed the de facto 

x Tht brother of the General Kaulbars who was so officious as the 
Russian War Minister in Bulgaria, 1881-1883. 

2 Pari. Papers, 1887, Turkey, No. 1, pp. 183, 193. As an explanation 
of General Kaulbars' mission, the St. Petersburg government urged 
"special duty and moral obligation incumbent on Russia as having 
called Bulgaria into existence." 

3 Beaman, Stambuloff, op. cit., p. 115. 



I j THE MAKING OF THE BALKAN STATES [170 

government to listen to his " advice," so he left, together 
with all the Russian consuls in Northern and Southern 
Bulgaria (November 19). 1 

Early in December Russia proposed to the Porte Prince 
Mingrelia, a Russian subject, as a candidate for prince. A 
little later, however, Bulgaria notified the Porte that she 
would not accept Russia's candidate, as all of the Bul- 
garians were opposed to him. It was not true that all the 
Bulgarians were opposed to him, for Zankoff and his fol- 
lowers were anxious for his election. 2 

By the middle of December Prince Ferdinand of Saxe- 
Coburg was understood to be a candidate, and the emperor 
of Austria-Hungary was reported as having given his as- 
sent. 3 Prince Bismarck thought Prince Ferdinand's can- 
didature out of the question for the reason that the Tsar 
would not be likely to give his consent. 

During the following months, one plot succeeded another 
in Bulgaria; and several projects looking toward foreign 
occupation were considered. Finally, another Grand So- 
branje was elected. The opening session was held at Tir- 
novo, on July 4th (1887), and on the 7th Prince Ferdinand 
of Saxe-Coburg was elected prince of Bulgaria. The 
prince replied on the 8th that he would go to Bulgaria and 
devote his life to that nation as soon as the approval of the 
Porte and the powers should be given. 4 

1 For the reasons assigned by the St. Petersburg government, see 
Pari. Papers, 1887, Turkey, No. 2, p. 3. 

8 Pari. Papers, 1888, vol. cix, Turkey, No. 1, p. 16. 

3 Ibid., p. 3. Prince Ferdinand, born 1861, was serving at this time 
in the Hungarian army. His father was Prince Augustus of Saxe- 
Coburg (an Austrian) and his mother was a daughter of Louis Philippe 
(King of France, 1830-48). 

*For an account of some of the plots against the regency, see Beaman, 
Statnbuloff, pp. 118 et seq. 



iy 1 ] MOVEMENTS LEADING TO THEIR UNION 171 

Russia alone among the powers held that the elections for 
the Grand Sobranje had been illegal, and that she could not 
therefore even consider the question of recognizing any per- 
son as prince of Bulgaria who might be elected by that body. 
Russia now proposed to the Porte that General Ernroth 
be appointed sole regent of the two Bulgarians. 1 The Porte 
procrastinated in relation to this proposition. Meanwhile, 
Prince Ferdinand of Coburg determined to accept the reiter- 
ated call of the Bulgarians, and to become their prince. In 
making his decision known to Europe, he pointed out that 
he had waited for the replies of the great powers to the 
Porte, and ascertaining that none of the treaty powers had 
expressed any hostility to him personally, he had resolved to 
" take in hand the destinies " of the Bulgarian people. He 
was resolved, he said, " to work for the consolidation of 
order and peace " in his new country, and he expressed an 
" unwavering hope that His Majesty the Sultan would con- 
tribute to that end by hastening to confirm his election." 2 

Prince Ferdinand entered Bulgaria August nth, and on 
the 14th he took the constitutional oath before the Grand 
Sobranje, at Tirnovo. In his proclamation to the Bulgarian 
nation, he made no reference to any foreign power, and 
closed with — " Long live free and independent Bulgaria." 
On the 23rd, when the prince arrived in Sofia, none of the 
foreign diplomatic agents were present at his reception. All 
of the signatory powers to the treaty of Berlin had already 
instructed their representatives in Bulgaria to avoid any offi- 
cial recognition whatever of the newly installed prince. 
Russia had refused to recognize the legality of his election 
on the ground that existing conditions in Bulgaria ren- 

1 General Ernroth (Russian) was formerly minister of war at Sofia 
(1882). 
8 Pari. Papers, 1888, vol. cix, Turkey, No. 1, p. 126. 



!j2 THE MAKING OF THE BALKAN STATES [172 

dered impossible any trustworthy expression there of the 
popular will. Now all the other powers refused to recog- 
nize him in his new capacity, because he had gone to Bul- 
garia without the approval of the Sultan and the assent of 
the treaty powers. This relationship between Prince Fer- 
dinand's " de facto " government and the great powers was 
destined to continue, as we shall see, for nearly ten years. 

After some days of effort a ministry was formed (Sep- 
tember 1 ) in which Stambuloff became President and , Min- 
ister of the Interior, and Mutkuroff the Minister of War. 
Elections for the Sobranje were held on October 9th and re- 
sulted in a sweeping victory for the government party 
(National). 

Russia complained bitterly of the " terrorism " of the new 
government, and put forth renewed efforts to secure the 
appointment of General Ernroth as regent or governor of 
Bulgaria. The Porte requested Germany to take the initia- 
tive in bringing this proposal to the attention of the powers. 
Germany, however^ referred the matter back to the Porte. 
Stambuloff and his followers let it be known that Bulgaria 
would not allow General Ernroth to cross her frontier un- 
less he were able to fight his way into the country. Russia 
counted on European unanimity to bring the Bulgarian gov- 
ernment under submission; but England and Austria, in 
particular, favored a " let alone " policy, and so nothing was 
done. Before the end of the year, Russia's Foreign Min- 
ister, M. de Giers, was ready to say in reference to the Bul- 
garians : " They may do anything and everything they 
please, from cutting each other's throats to declaring them- 
selves an empire. We shall not move a finger to prevent 
them. We wash our hands of the whole concern." * 

l ¥or the attitude of the powers in relation to the Bulgarian question, 
see Pari. Papers, 1888, Turkey, No. 1. A writer who has an intimate 



1/3] MOVEMENTS LEADING TO THEIR UNION 173 

Back in 1881, Turkey had ceded to her foreign bond- 
holders the income from the Eastern Roumelian tribute. 
This tribute to Turkey had been fixed in the organic statute 
(1879) at about one million dollars per year, representing 
three-tenths of the estimated provincial revenues. Any tri- 
bute that might be received from the principality of Bul- 
garia was also ceded at that time to these bondholders. 
The treaty of Berlin left the amount of the annual tribute 
due from Bulgaria to be fixed by the treaty powers within 
one year after the beginning of the new organization in the 
principality. But the powers never " fixed " the amount to 
be paid by Bulgaria. The new government under Prince 
Ferdinand now made early arrangements (November 3, 
1887) for paying the arrears due on account of the Eastern 
Roumelian tribute. The government declared, however, 
that three-tenths of the income of the province amounted 
now to only something more than a half a million dollars 
per year, and Turkey agreed to the reduction. 1 

Six months after Prince Ferdinand went to Bulgaria, 
Russia made one more abortive effort to force him out of 
the principality. This plan, emanating from St. Peters- 
burg, was to have the treaty powers join in a collective note 
to the Porte declaring the present situation in Bulgaria il- 
legal. The Porte would then be expected to notify the Bul- 
garian government that Prince Ferdinand's presence as the 
head of the government of the principality was held to be 
illegal and contrary to the treaty of Berlin. Russia's agents 
at least pretended to believe that Prince Ferdinand would 

knowledge of every phase of this part of Bulgaria's history has expressed 
the opinion that " there is nothing more pathetic in the history of Eu- 
rope and nothing more diabolical in the history of Russia than the story 
of the events in Bulgaria which followed the Philippopolis revolution " 
(1885). Washburn, op. tit., p. 183. 
1 See Hertslet, op. tit., vol. iv, passim. 



iy^_ THE MAKING OF THE BALKAN STATES [174 

leave when he found that all the great powers were op- 
posed to his remaining. England, Austria and Italy re- 
fused to countenance the St. Petersburg proposal, but Ger- 
many and France joined with Russia, with the result that 
the Porte sent the desired notification to Sofia (March 5, 
1888). The communication was sent to M. Stambuloff, 
and merely stated that Prince Ferdinand (of Coburg) had 
been informed when he first arrived in Bulgaria that his elec- 
tion had not received the assent of the powers nor the 
sanction of the Porte, and was therefore illegal. The note 
pointed out also that the Porte still held Prince Ferdinand's 
position in Bulgaria to be contrary to the treaty of Berlin. 
As soon as this declaration was dispatched from Constanti- 
nople, Russia's Foreign Minister (de Giers) said that the 
policy of his country now was "to return to her passive atti- 
tude and await events." After the lapse of nearly a month, 
the Sofia government decided not to take any official notice 
whatever of the above communication. It is evident that 
the Porte forwarded the declaration to the Bulgarian gov- 
ernment at the instigation of the St. Petersburg authorities, 
and hence there was no need of England's warning against 
" any further imprudent action " at Constantinople. This 
episode proved to be the last attempt from without, of any 
considerable magnitude, to thwart the will of the majority 
in Bulgaria. 1 

For nearly seven years (1887- 1894) Stambuloff re- 
mained at the head of Prince Ferdinand's government. 
He was ever a staunch nationalist, and during his premier- 
ship everything was done to establish friendly relations with 
Turkey rather than with Russia. There were always those 

1 For the correspondence in connection with this final diplomatic at- 
tempt of Russia to bring the Bulgarians under subjection, see Pari. 
Papers, 1889, vol. lxxxvii, Turkey, No. 3. 



175] MOVEMENTS LEADING TO THEIR UNION 175 

who stood out against the dictatorial and even despotic 
methods, perhaps too often employed by the patriotic Stam- 
buloff. The prince finally joined with the opponents of his 
Russophobe premier, and Stambuloff was forced to re- 
sign (1894). 1 

There was already a growing desire in Bulgaria for rec- 
onciliation with Russia. The death of Alexander III 
(1894), the arch enemy of the late Prince Alexander and of 
those who followed him in the Bulgarian government, may 
be said to have cleared the way in a large measure for a 
restoration of friendly relations between these two kindred 
peoples. 2 

In 1894 there was great rejoicing throughout Bulgaria 
over the birth of a son to the royal family. The prince 
and his consort were Catholics, however, and according to 
the Bulgarian constitution the heir to the throne must pro- 
fess the Orthodox Eastern faith. Two years later Prince 
Ferdinand announced to the National Assembly that he had 
resolved " to lay on the altar of the Fatherland the great- 
est and heaviest of sacrifices," and to have the rite of holy 
confirmation administered to the heir-apparent, Prince Boris, 
according to the usages of the (Bulgarian) National Or- 
thodox Church. In reply to a request from Prince Ferdinand 
to the Emperor Nicholas II for the presence of a Russian 
representative at the ceremony, the Tsar, " inspired with 
sentiments of magnanimity and sincere good will for the 
Bulgarian people," delegated a member of the Imperial staff 
to attend in his name. All the powers now signified their 

1 Beaman, Stambuloff, ch. x. Stambuloff was most cruelly assassinated 
in Sofia the following year. He has often been referred to as the " Bis- 
marck of Bulgaria." 

* Prince Alexander died in 1893, and an imposing ceremony took 
place in Sofia when his body was taken there for interment. 



iy(y THE MAKING OF THE BALKAN STATES [176 

recognition of Prince Ferdinand as the lawful ruler of Bul- 
garia, and within a few months he was most cordially re- 
ceived at Constantinople by the Sultan, and at St. Peters- 
burg by the royal family. 1 

Throughout the remaining dozen years, in the political 
life of the principality, the Macedonian question continued 
seriously to disturb the relations of Bulgaria and her peo- 
ple with the outside world. Roughly speaking, Macedonia 
lies between Servia and Bulgaria on the north, and Greece 
and the Aegean sea on the south. The population near to 
Bulgaria and Servia is undoubtedly made up mostly of 
Bulgarians and Servians, while in the extreme south the 
Greeks are clearly in the majority. For the most part, 
however, the nationality of the people in central Macedonia 
appears to be hopelessly mixed, so far as race characteristics 
are concerned. 2 

The treaty of Berlin provided that there should be a sort 
of European supervision over the introduction of new laws 
which Turkey promised to settle upon for her remaining 
European provinces. 3 During the eighties, many of the 
Slavs in Macedonia became weary of waiting for the new 
organization in that territory and migrated in considerable 
numbers, especially to the new principality of Bulgaria. 
Under the influence, perhaps, of some of these emigrants, 
the idea of a revolutionary movement in Macedonia aiming 
at autonomy for that province began to gain adherents 
rapidly after about 1897. Bulgarians, Servians and Greeks 
appear to have joined together for a time in helping to 
work up the revolutionary propaganda. There was such an 

1 Annual Register, 1896; Miller, The Balkans, op. cit., ch. vii. 

2 Odysseus, Turkey in Europe (London, 1900), ch. viii; Upward, 
The East End of Europe (London, 1908), passim. 

3 Article xxiii. See Hertslet, op. cit., vol. iv. 



177] MOVEMENTS LEADING TO THEIR UNION ijj 

active sympathy in Bulgaria with this movement that by 
1 90 1 Sofia had become the headquarters of the revolutionary 
Macedonian Committee. 

In 1897 Russia and Austria-Hungary had entered into a 
compact with a view of maintaining the status quo in East- 
ern Europe, and in 1901, under the pressure of these two 
countries, the Bulgarian government arrested some mem- 
bers of the Macedonian committee and undertook to keep 
the troops and civil officials from taking any part in the 
agitation. About this time, also, the Bulgarians and the 
Greeks began to fall apart in connection with the movement 
in Macedonia. So when the armed uprising came in 1902- 
1903 the Turkish forces had little trouble in suppressing 
the revolts. 1 

Not long after the Turkish troops were set in motion to 
put an end to the revolutionary movement for autonomy in 
Macedonia, Russia and Austria-Hungary determined to 
send each a civil agent to Macedonia, accompanied by a 
foreign officer to have general charge of the police force 
there. This action by the two powers put an end, in the 
main, to the movement for an autonomous Macedonia. 
From that time (1903) down to the change of government 
in Turkey, (1908) a most cruel religious and racial war was 
carried on in the heart of Macedonia. Armed bands of 
Bulgarians and of Greeks have vied with each other in a 
resort to ruthless and murderous methods in carrying for- 
ward their respective propagandas. As allegiance to the 
Bulgarian Exarchate or to the Greek Patriarchate signifies 
in general either Bulgarian or Greek nationality, this prose- 
lyting had a political or national end in view. 2 We are here 

1 Annual Register, 1897, 1901. 

'The two sides in relation to this most destructive warfare may be 
found in Upward, op. cit., and in The Near East (anonymous) (New 
York, 1907). See also Villari, The Balkan Question (London, 1905). 



lyS THE MAKING OF THE BALKAN STATES [iyg 

'concerned mainly with the fact, however, that Bulgaria 
■was greatly disturbed by reason of this agitation and war- 
fare in Macedonia, and that the principality was thereby 
brought several times to the verge of war with Turkey. 

The renewal of the appointment of Prince Ferdinand to 
the governor-generalship of Eastern Roumelia was gradually 
discontinued, and that province had come to be quite gener- 
ally regarded as merely the southern part of Bulgaria. 1 By 
a process of historic growth, the status of the Bulgarian gov- 
ernment had now passed far beyond the bounds fixed for the 
principality in the treaty of Berlin. At the courts of the 
European powers there were Bulgarian diplomatic agents 
representing their country, with scarcely ever an intima- 
tion from any quarter that they represented a vassal state. 
In 1899 Turkey sanctioned the sending of Bulgarian dele- 
gates to the first Hague Conference. These delegates were 
required, nevertheless, to have seats at that time back of 
those occupied by the Sultan's representatives, and to sign 
official documents after the signatures of Turkey's delegates. 
When the second conference was held in 1907, however, 
Bulgaria again sent her own delegates, and they now took 
equal rank so far as seats and signatures were concerned, 
with those from Constantinople. 2 

As a matter of fact, at the close of thirty years after the 
settlement in the Berlin congress (1878), the Bulgarian 
principality had come to exercise so many of the functions 
of an independent state that any act on the part of Turkey 
signifying her intention to assert her suzerainty over Bul- 
garia was a source of alarm and irritation to the Bulgarian 
government. The Porte found various ways, however, of 
keeping up the appearance of claiming the territory of the 

x New International Year Book (New York, 1908), "Bulgaria," 
loc. cit. 

2 Hull, The Two Hague Conferences (Boston, 1908), pp. 11, 14; Fort- 
nightly Review (London, 1908), vol. xc, p. 866. 



179] MOVEMENTS LEADING TO THEIR UNION 179 

principality as a part of the Ottoman empire. During the 
latter part of Abdul Hamid's reign, anybody who wished to 
travel about from place to place in the empire was required 
to have a permit (teskereh), properly signed by the Turkish 
authorities. In the various towns the police kept a close 
watch and no one was free to go or come without a properly 
endorsed teskereh. In this matter, the Turkish authorities 
were unwilling to make any exception whatever in the case 
of persons going to or coming from Bulgaria. This, of 
course, was but one of the many ways in which the Turkish 
government kept alive the claim to Bulgaria as an integral 
part of the Ottoman domains. 

In working their way towards actual independence the 
Bulgarians and their rulers may be said to have been, on the 
whole, moderately though constantly aggressive. While 
they have shown, at times, a willingness to wait for ad- 
vancement on the way towards statehood, they have all 
along invariably manifested an unwavering determination 
never to relinquish any acquisition in that direction. For 
some years past, the jealous watchfulness in the two capitals 
for any signs of a change of attitude towards the existing 
relations between the governments has frequently given rise 
to disquieting apprehensions. Irrespective of the European 
regulations (notably of 1878 and 1886), there had grown 
up such a strained relationship between the two countries 
that the tension, not to mention the ever present danger of 
direful eventualities, had come to be a standing menace to 
both parties. Except for the outgrown and almost obso- 
lete formula embodied in the treaty of Berlin — a European 
document already shattered in several particulars — there 
was little reason why Bulgaria should not openly and reso- 
lutely take her place among the sovereign nations of the 
world. 1 That a sufficient cause existed for a recognition on 

1 The Nineteenth Century (New York, 1908), vol. lxiv, pp. 705 et seq % 



180 THE MAKING OF THE BALKAN STATES [180 

the one side, or a declaration on the other, of the independ- 
ence of Bulgaria, has not been appreciably questioned. 
Considering all the circumstances, it was too much to ex- 
pect, no doubt, that the Porte would take the initiative in 
such a measure. It was but natural then that Bulgarian 
authorities should watch for some seemingly justifiable oc- 
casion for taking the final step. 1 

In the late summer and fall of 1908, a combination of 
events was readily turned to account at Sofia and made to 
furnish the desired occasion for putting an end to the 
theoretical vassalage of the Bulgarian principality. 2 The 
Young Turk Revolution came on in July, and the restora- 
tion of constitutional government in Turkey caused some 
doubt among the Bulgarians as to the effect of this move- 
ment upon the acquired status of their country. Then early 
in September the Sultan's Foreign Minister, Tewfik Pasha, 
created a stir by omitting to invite the Bulgarian representa- 
tive at the Porte, M. Gueshoff, to a dinner in honor of the 
Constantinople diplomats. This omission being quite un- 
usual, a protest followed, and the Porte explained that only 
representatives of sovereign states had been invited. Al- 
though the Turkish authorities proffered other amends for 
the neglect, M. Gueshoff was not invited, and his govern- 
ment recalled him from the Turkish capital. Some days 
following this incident a strike was declared on the Eastern 
Roumelian section of the Oriental Railway, and the Bul- 
garian government sent troops and employees to look after 
the operation of the line. Three days later (September 21) 
the strike was terminated, but Bulgaria continued her mili- 
tary occupation. When the southern province became 
practically united with the principality of Bulgaria in 1886 

1 Spectator (London, 1908), vol. 101, passim. 

2 Annual Register, 1908, "Bulgaria," loc. cit. 



l8i] MOVEMENTS LEADING TO THEIR UNION igi 

no new arrangement was made affecting Turkey's owner- 
ship of the railway in Eastern Roumelia; consequently, by 
the terms of the treaty of Berlin, Bulgaria possessed no 
proprietary rights in that part of the line. 

Subjects of Germany and Austria-Hungary being among 
the principal shareholders in the company that had been 
operating the line under a lease from Turkey, these two 
countries, together with Turkey, made strong protests 
against the continued Bulgarian occupation of the road. 
Bulgaria contended that her interests rendered it necessary 
that she should control that section of the railway, and sug- 
gested the possibility of some arrangement with the com- 
pany. 1 This question, however, was soon merged with 
others of even more serious moment. 

Two days after the termination of the strike, Prince Fer- 
dinand was received at Budapest by Emperor Francis 
Joseph, and the prince is said to have been apprised at this 
time of the Austro-Hungarian plans for the annexation in 
the near future (December 2) of Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
There seems to be some reason for believing that this in- 
formation hastened the action of Prince Ferdinand. 2 How- 
ever that may be, he surprised Europe somewhat by issuing 
a declaration from Tirnovo, October 5th, proclaiming the 
independence of Bulgaria. 

In the rather brief declaration read by Prince Ferdinand 
at the old capital, he pointed out that " practically independ- 
ent, the nation was impeded by certain illusions and formal 
limitations which resulted in a coldness of relations between 
Bulgaria and Turkey. " Turkey and Bulgaria," he con- 
tinued, " free and entirely independent of each other, may 
exist under conditions that will allow them to strengthen 

1 Contemporary Review (London, 1908), vol. xciv, pp. 513 et seg. 
1 The Fortnightly Review (London, 1909), vol. xci, pp. 224 et seq. 



jg 2 THE MAKING OF THE BALKAN STATES [182 

their friendly relations and to devote themselves to peace- 
able internal development." In this declaration he fore- 
stalled any question relating to the territory of Eastern 
Roumelia (Southern Bulgaria) by proclaiming " Bulgaria, 
united since September, 1885, as an independent kingdom." * 

Prince Ferdinand and his government were criticised, es- 
pecially by England, for having proclaimed the independence 
of 'Bulgaria at a time when its realization might seriously 
discredit the Young Turk Party that was making such 
worthy efforts to regenerate the disordered Ottoman empire. 
There does not seem, however, to have been any expression 
in Europe of an intention to try to undo what the prince 
had done. 2 

Two days after Prince Ferdinand's proclamation was is- 
sued, Austria-Hungary formally announced the annexation 
to that empire of Bosnia and Herzegovina. These two 
Turkish provinces, as is well known, were placed by the 
Berlin congress under the administrative control of the 
Dual Monarchy. The complete absorption now of the two 
provinces into the Austro-Hungarian empire was held at 
Vienna to be necessary in order to put into operation there 
certain much-needed and radical reforms. Emperor Francis 
Joseph's government was unwilling that the validity of this 
action should be questioned in a European conference, so 
any joint action by the treaty powers bearing on the whole 
situation was delayed. 3 

The Turkish authorities took rather a calm view of the 

1 For the text of the proclamation, see The International Year Book 
(New York, 1908), "Bulgaria," loc. cit. 

2 Spectator, op. cit., vol. 101, passim. 

3 Early in 1909 Turkey accepted about eleven million dollars, ostensibly 
for property she possessed in the two provinces, and allowed Austria- 
Hungary to keep Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Outlook (New York, 
1909), vol. xci, passim. 



183] MOVEMENTS LEADING TO THEIR UNION 183 

Bulgarian declaration. A general recognition of the in- 
dependence of the principality appears to have been, almost 
from the first, a foregone conclusion. Because of the East- 
ern Roumelian annual tribute due to Turkey, and the Porte's 
ownership of the railroad through that province, however, 
there was a necessity for a settlement between the prin- 
cipality and Turkey on the basis of compensation from 
Bulgaria. Happily, the government at Sofia was ready to 
discuss the question of compensation to Turkey. Before 
the end of the month, England, France and Russia joined. 
(October 27) in a communication, which was approved by- 
Italy and Germany, advising Bulgaria to undertake direct 
negotiations with the Porte. The Sofia government 
promptly acted on this advice, and sent a representative, M.. 
Dimitroff, to Constantinople. 1 Within another month, the 
negotiations at the Turkish capital had resulted in an agree- 
ment on the principles that were to form the basis of a 
settlement. 

The chief difficulty proved now to be the difference of 
opinion between the two parties respecting the amount of 
total indemnity due to Turkey. After several weeks, Bul- 
garia offered to pay about $16,400,000; but in the fore part 
of February, 1909, the Turkish government declined to ac- 
cept that amount, and demanded a lump sum of $24,000,000. 
Bulgaria complained, as she had done before, of Turkey's 
uncompromising attitude, and refused to pay any more 
than she had already offered. The efforts of the treaty 
powers to bring about some compromise utterly failed, for 
a time, and both Turkey and Bulgaria renewed their war- 
like demonstrations. After about a fortnight, however, the 
Russian government hit upon a plan for relieving the ten- 
sion, and made a definite financial proposition to both 
governments. 

l The New International Year Book, 1908, " Bulgaria," loc. cit~ 



^4 THE MAKING OF THE BALKAN STATES [184 

Turkey was bound by treaty to pay an annual war in- 
demnity to Russia (on account of Russo-Turkish War, 
1 877- 1 878) of about $1,600,000 without interest. 1 Russia 
now proposed to relieve Turkey of the obligation to make 
these yearly payments until the total sum remitted should 
amount to $24,000,000 — Turkey's claim against Bulgaria. 
Then, as an offset to this, Russia proposed to accept from 
Bulgaria in annual installments, with interest, a sum aggre- 
gating $16,400,000 — the amount of Bulgaria's offer to 
Turkey. 2 Turkey accepted Russia's proposal, and an agree- 
ment to that effect was signed by the Constantinople and 
St. Petersburg governments, on March 16th. Bulgaria 
likewise agreed to the proposition and signed protocols ac- 
cordingly on April 19th, with Russia and Turkey. 3 

The signing of these international documents settled all 
the claims at issue between the parties. King Ferdinand 
was the recipient of personal congratulations from European 
rulers ; and within a few days the governments of the great 
powers formally recognized Bulgaria as an independent 
kingdom, 4 

This new kingdom has, in general, a fertile soil and a 
favorable climate ; and, with rare exceptions, abundant crops 
are harvested. During their thirty years of semi-independ- 
ent political life, these people, who are now legally recog- 
nized as being their own masters, have won the reputation 
of being industrious, generally progressive and zealous in 
the pursuit of knowledge. By their persistent and patriotic 

1 Hertslet, Map of Europe by Treaty, vol. iv. 

2 The amounts stated here in American money are not strictly exact. 
For the terms of settlement, see Outlook, vol. xci, p. 375. 

3 The signing of the protocol with the Porte implied the recognition 
by Turkey of Bulgarian independence. Saturday Review (April, 1909'), 
vol. cvii. 

* Review of Reviews (New York, 1909), vol. xxxix, passim. 



!85] MOVEMENTS LEADING TO THEIR UNION 185 

efforts throughout these years and with the help of theii 
two foreign rulers, they have won their independence with- 
out much sacrifice in warfare. They begin their history 
as an independent people with the good-will of the great 
powers, and without carrying over any serious impediment 
to mar the tranquillity or impede the progress of the Bul- 
garian kingdom. 1 

l The Nineteenth Century (1908), vol. lxiv, pp. 705-723; The New 
International Encyclopedia, vol. iii, "Bulgaria." For a fuller con- 
sideration of the characteristics of the Bulgarians and of their country, 
see Dicey, The Peasant State, London, 1894. 



CHAPTER V 
Summary — Present Situation in the Balkan States 

The phenomenal success of the Young Turk party in 
overthrowing the autocracy and establishing constitutional 
government in Turkey satisfied in a measure, for the 
time being, the aspirations of the people in Macedonia. The 
promise of an equality of races and religions throughout the 
empire, in local as well as national affairs, leaves the people 
of that heretofore disordered province slight excuse at the 
present for further insurrection. Turkey in Europe then, 
as a whole, is for once both nominally and in reality an in- 
tegral part of the Ottoman Empire. 1 

We have seen above (ch. i) that Montenegro and the 
provinces of Moldavia and Wallachia were never more than 
loosely united to Turkey. During a period of about three 
hundred years previous to 1774, there were spasmodic ef- 
forts in these three provinces, as in Servia, to lessen their 
submission to Ottoman authorities. The beginning, how- 
ever, of a continuous and progressive movement towards 
self-government in one or more of the Sultan's Balkan pro- 
vinces was inaugurated in 1774, by the terms of the treaty 
of Kainardji between Russia and Turkey. The Russian 
army had been victorious over the Turkish forces; and in 
restoring Moldavia and Wallachia to Turkey Catherine II 
exacted from the Sultan favorable stipulations for the gov- 

1 Annual Register (1908), pp. 312 et seq. For the constitution of the 
Ottoman empire, see British and Foreign State Papers, vol. lxvii. 
186 [186 



187] SUMMARY 187 

ernment of these provinces. Moreover, she exacted from 
the Sultan and his government the solemn promise that 
Russia might henceforth watch over the rights of a part of 
Turkey's Christian subjects. 1 

The consummation of Bulgarian independence (April, 
1909) stands at the other end, as it were, of the series of 
events which may be said to have grown out of the situa- 
tion created by the treaty of Kainardji. Thus it will be 
seen that for nearly a century and a half an almost incessant 
struggle had been kept up by one or more of the Sultan's 
Balkan provinces to secure added privileges and rights in 
the direction of self-government. It would indeed be diffi- 
cult to estimate, even approximately, the weight of foreign 
influence in connection with these struggles. The people 
in these provinces are certainly entitled to their full share 
of credit or of blame for what has transpired in the course 
of this prolonged contest. It would not be safe, perhaps, 
to conclude that the outcome — the independence of the four 
Balkan states — would not have been brought about without 
foreign interference; nevertheless it is true that foreign in- 
tervention has repeatedly rendered these aggressive groups 
of people secure from any retrogression in connection with 
their advancement towards statehood. 

Another result of foreign intervention has been to divide 
this extended and almost continuous agitation and unrest in 
some parts of the Balkan country, into three quite distinct 
periods. From the treaty of Kainardji to the treaty of 
Paris (1774-1856) Russia maintained her sole guardian- 
ship over the rights and interests of the groups that were 
then contending for a greater and greater degree of local 

^his referred to the Orthodox Eastern Christians, and included the 
Greeks, as well as Catherine II 's co-religionists in the Balkan country, 
who are likewise of a kindred race with the Russians. Cf. supra, ch. i, 
p. 13. 



!88 THE MAKING OF THE BALKAN STATES [188 

self-government. The policy of the European powers as 
set forth in the treaty of 1856 was to create a radically dif- 
ferent situation. Russia was accordingly forced to sur- 
render whatever exclusive rights she had acquired to inter- 
fere in the affairs of Turkey; and such privileges and im- 
munities as Wallachia, Moldavia and Servia already pos- 
sessed were placed under the " guarantee " of the seven 
signatory powers. The Sublime Porte was now formally 
admitted into the "concert"; and, what might well have 
seemed still more formidable to the aspiring Balkan peoples, 
the rulers of Great Britain, Austria, Prussia, France, Sar- 
dinia and Russia, engaged, " each on his part, to respect the 
independence and the territorial integrity of the Ottoman 
empire," and guaranteed in common the strict observance 
of this engagement. Then, two weeks later, Great Britain, 
Austria and France guaranteed " jointly and severally the 
independence and integrity " of Turkey, and promised to 
consider any infraction of the treaty of Paris (1856) as a 
casus belli. 1 

Doubtless the struggles in Europe occasioned by the uni- 
fication of Italy and of Germany had a derogatory influence 
on the effectiveness of the treaty of Paris (1856) in relation 
to political affairs in Turkey. At any rate, it required 
but two decades to wear out the high-sounding " engage- 
ments " in this treaty respecting the independence and ter- 
ritorial integrity of the Ottoman empire. Insurrection 
spread throughout the Balkans (1875-1876); the Sultan 
refused to grant certain concessions which were advised 
collectively by the other powers in the European concert; 
Russia's army, aided by the Roumanians, forced its way 

1 Copies of the various documents covering this period may be seen 
in Hertslet, Map of Europe by Treaty, vol. ii. 



189] SUMMARY 189 

against the stubborn resistence of the Turkish forces and 
encamped within sight of the Sultan's capital. 1 

In the final settlement after this war, the Sultan was 
forced to grant independence to Roumania, Servia and 
Montenegro, comprising considerably more territory than 
Turkey actually kept for herself in Europe. She was com- 
pelled, likewise, to assent to the formation of two new 
semi-independent provinces — Bulgaria and Eastern Rou- 
melia. Then, also, the way was opened for the loss to 
Austria-Hungary of Bosnia and Herzegovina. This 
second period of struggle in the Balkan country (1856- 
1878) had been carried on under the supervision of the 
European concert, and in the face of the avowed policy of 
the great powers to protect Turkey in the matter of her 
sovereignty and of her territorial possessions. But the 
lapse of twenty-two years found the contracting parties 
holding another European congress, this time at the capital 
of the German empire, where the agreement was somewhat 
readily reached virtually to strip Turkey of fully two-thirds 
of her European territory. 

The Berlin settlement placed Bulgarian and Eastern Rou- 
melian affairs under the supervision of the European Con- 
cert. But this time the treaty contained no intimation of 
an intention on the part of any of the signatory powers to 
guard either the sovereignty or the territorial integrity of 
the Ottoman empire. It took only thirty years, as we have 
seen, to wear out the stipulations of this treaty, respecting 
Turkey's remaining Balkan provinces. The development 

1 Russia's loss in this war was reported as being 321,000 men. A 
Russian church-monument, a few miles from Constantinople, marks the 
place where something more than 10,000 Russians were buried who died 
of sickness in Turkey during the war. Cf. Miiller, Political History of 
Recent Times, trans, by Peters (New York, 1882). 



ig THE MAKING OF THE BALKAN STATES [190 

of Eastern Roumelia and Bulgaria into an independent king- 
dom, and the complete absorption of Bosnia and Herze- 
govina by Austria-Hungary, during this third and last 
period of the long struggle in the Balkan country, put an 
end to at least one phase of the troublesome Eastern 
Question. 

Under the wise and rather conservative leadership of 
King Charles I, Roumania has steadily progressed, prac- 
tically along all lines. 1 In general it has been the national 
policy to care for internal improvements, and to protect the 
independence of the country by keeping clear of foreign en- 
tanglements. The capital — Bucharest — is now much like 
the better European cities of similar size, about three hun- 
dred thousand population. The country covers an area of 
nearly fifty-one thousand square miles. The population 
now is something more than six and a half million, as 
against practically five million when Roumania became in- 
dependent, thirty years ago. Neither King Charles nor his 
invalid consort has any liking for show or pomp. Queen 
Elizabeth, whose pen-name, as is well known, is Carmen 
Silva, is held in high repute as a writer of poems and dramas. 

Montenegro has the distinction of being one of the small- 
est of independent nations. Although the provisions of 
the treaty of Berlin more than doubled the size of the prin- 
cipality, still the area is only a little more than three and 
a half thousand square miles — about one-thirteenth the size 
of New York State. The added territory, however, sup- 
plied the little group of mountaineers with a good stretch 
of excellent pasture land, together with a harbor and thirty 
miles of seaboard. The present ruler, Nicholas I, has been 
at the head of the government for fifty years. Through the 

Prince Charles (Karl) of Hohenzollern, elected prince of Roumania 
in 1866, has borne the title of king since 1881. 



I 9 l] SUMMARY igi 

marriages of his daughters, his dynasty has become con- 
nected with the royal families of Russia and Italy. The 
efforts of King Victor Emanuel's consort in helping to re- 
lieve the sufferings of the Messina earthquake victims has 
now made the name of the former Montenegrin princess, 
Queen Helena, a household word in many parts of the world. 

During the past few years much has been done in Monte- 
negro to improve the public highways. In 1908 the first 
line of railway, only eleven miles long, was opened. The 
chief source of livelihood for a great number of the people 
is in the rearing of all kinds of live stock. Elementary in- 
struction is free and compulsory, but not much has been 
done by the Montenegrins to provide facilities for second- 
ary and higher education. 

Of the four Balkan constitutional monarchies that have 
been carved out of Ottoman territory, largely under the 
supervision of the great powers, the case of Servia seems 
to be the most unsettled and unpromising. For nearly a 
hundred years now, more or less frequent disturbances 
there have resulted from rivalry and intrigues in connection 
with the two native dynasties (Karageorgevich and Obreno- 
vich). 1 The revolting incidents connected with the most 
recent and the most horrifying tragedy in the little kingdom 
— the murder of King Alexander (Obrenovich) and Queen 
Draga, 1903 — lost for the Servian nation, in a large meas- 
ure, the sympathy and support of Europe. The present 
king, Peter Karageorgevich, was called to the throne at that 
time. During his reign, however, there have been so many 
changes in the ministry that the country can not be said to 
have had anything like a stable government. Nevertheless, 
the economic conditions throughout the country have grown 

1 Miller, The Balkans, pp. 309-351; Mijatovitch, A Royal Tragedy 
(London, 1906). 



ig 2 THE MAKING OF THE BALKAN STATES [192 

more and more promising. The people in the main lead a 
pastoral and an agricultural life. Practically every family 
outside the larger cities owns and cultivates a piece of 
ground ; and the country has not a great number who are 
unemployed, or who suffer from extreme poverty. 1 

Being a small kingdom that comprises only a minor por- 
tion of the Serbs, the Servians have strained every nerve 
during the past three decades to obtain concessions from 
some quarter that would enlarge their borders and unite 
with them other groups of the Serb race. 2 This national 
ambition had led them to hope that they might obtain at 
least a part of the provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
and thus make their territory contiguous with that of their 
kinsfolk in Montenegro. Then, also, one of the three 
villayets that make up what is now commonly called Mace- 
donia contains, for the most part, a Serb population. 3 The 
people of the present kingdom of Servia have greatly de- 
sired also that that part of Macedonia — the villayet of 
Kossova — should form a part of what they have dared to 
hope for and have earnestly striven to realize — a Greater 
Servia. 

For some years past Servia's foreign policy has fre- 
quently revealed her Pan-Serbian aspirations. At no time, 
however, had she felt forced to take an open and determined 
stand in this connection, until by annexing Bosnia and 

1 Am. Review of Reviews (1909), vol. xxix, p. 741. Only eight or ten 
of the Servian cities have a population above ten thousand. 

2 The Servian kingdom has a population of nearly three millions and 
covers an area of nearly nineteen thousand square miles. There are 
said to be altogether about ten million Serbs, scattered through Slavonia, 
Bosnia, Herzegovina, Montenegro, Servia, Dalmatia, Kossovo and 
some parts of Hungary. Cf. The Forum, vol. xli, p. 104. 

'Odysseus, Turkey in Europe, p. 373; The Near East (New York, 
1907), P. 147. 



193] SUMMARY I9 3, 

Herzegovina, Austria-Hungary virtually eliminated every 
possibility of Servian expansion in that direction. Servia's 
appeal to the European powers for " compensation," and 
her preparations for an appeal to arms against her mam- 
moth neighbor to the north, are well known. But when 
there was none to help, what could the little kingdom do 
except to submit ? 1 Meanwhile, with the passing of their 
cherished hopes for a union with some part of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, and thus with Montenegro, the Servians are 
rather forced by the turn of events to abandon all hope of 
bringing the Serb district in Macedonia into their kingdom. 
If it were merely somewhat vague national aspirations 
inspired by race sentiment among the Serbs that had been 
doomed to failure by recent events, the case would scarcely 
merit any mention here. A glance, however, at Servia's 
geographical situation is likely to convince an unbiased ob- 
server that there were, after all, something more than senti- 
mental grounds for the determined opposition of the Serv- 
ians to the recent settlement in the Balkans. Doubtless 
there are good grounds for the argument that the tempera- 
ment and the rather obstinate restlessness of the Servians 
only serve to aggravate the dangers of their position. But 
the fact remains, nevertheless, that these people are now 
hemmed in, as it were, by a geographical combination that 
threatens to become at any moment a serious menace to> 
their national existence. 2 The complete triumph, in one- 
sense, of Austro-Hungarian diplomacy in relation to the 

1 A discussion of the Servian and the Austro-Hungarian views may- 
be found in Nineteenth Century (1908), vol. lxiv, pp. 705 et seq.; and 
Fortnightly Review (1909), vol. xci, pp. 1, 1040; The Am. Review of 
Reviews (1909), vol. xxxix, pp. 411, 537. 

2 This small kingdom has no passage to the sea and is surrounded by 
vastly stronger states to which, in view of past relations, the Servians 
may not naturally look for support. Blackwood 's Magazine (New 
York, 1909), p. 579- 



I94 THE MAKING OF THE BALKAN STATES [ IO , 4 

taking over of Bosnia and Herzegovina has not only 
blasted the hopes of the Servians for a union with other 
-groups of Serbs, but has left them in fear for the future 
welfare and even the safety of their own kingdom. 

In view of the present outlook in Servia, it is no doubt 
quite natural that her people should revive the idea of a 
federation of the Balkan states. 1 So far as is generally 
Iknown, however, the representations intended to urge the 
expediency and even the necessity of such a movement have 
not met, lately, with any particular response. 

If the people in the Balkan peninsula could at once ac- 
cept the attempt now being made to establish constitutional 
government in Turkey as furnishing a final solution of the 
Macedonian question, then the present outlook for a Balkan 
■confederation might seem more favorable. But there are 
indications already (Feb., 1910) that some of the states bor- 
dering on Macedonia are inclined to interfere with the ad- 
ministration of affairs there under the new Turkish regime. 2 
It is well known at the same time that for several years past 
strife has been engendered between some of these states 
by the overlapping of their claims to the loyalty of parts 
of the mixed Macedonian population. In view of all this, 
unless there should be some real danger from without, a 
federation of these states seems for the time being quite im- 
probable. It may be said then that the present situation in 
relation to Macedonia, as well as to Servia. presents the 
problems that now appear most likely to disturb the tran- 
quillity of one or more of the Balkan states. 3 

1 Fortnightly Review (1909). vol. xci, pp. 1040 et seq.; Outlook (Xew 
York, IQ09), vol. xcii, pp. 353 et seq. 

-London Times, Feb. 3, 1910. 

"In addition to references already cited, see The Nation (New York, 
1909). vol. lxxxviii, Balkans (index); Fortnightly Review (1509), vol. 
xci, p. 609. 



BIBLIOGRAPHY J 



I. OFFICIAL CORRESPONDENCE, TREATIES AND OTHER 
DOCUMENTS. 

British and Foreign State Papers. London, 1814- 

Castlereagh, R. S. Viscount. Correspondence, Despatches and other- 
Papers of Viscount Castlereagh, second Marquess of Londonderry, 
Ed. by his brother C. W. Vane, Marquess of Londonderry, Vol.- 
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Clercq, A. de and J. de. Recueil de traites de la France, Vol. II. Paris 
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Documents Secrets de la Politique rmse en Orient — 1881-90 — d'apres le 
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Gentz, F. von. Depeches inedites du chevalier de Gents aux Hospodars 
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Hertslet, Sir E. Map of Europe by Treaty. 4 Vols. London, 1875-91. 

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Martens, G. F. de and C. de, and others. Recueil de traites d'alliance, 
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Parliamentary (Sessional) Papers. London 1801- . For documents 
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1 It will be understood that this bibliography is necessarily incom- 
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195] 195 



196 BIBLIOGRAPHY [ I9 6 

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2 Vols. Paris, 1891. 
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Duggan, S. P. H. The Eastern Question — A Study in Diplotnacy. 

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Edwards, H. S. Sir William White: His Life and Correspondence. 

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Filitti, J. G. Les Principautes roumaines sous Voccupation russe. 

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Holland, T. E. The Treaty Relations of Russia and Turkey. London, 

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Huhn, A. von. Der Kampf der Bulgaren. Leipzig, 1886. 
Jirecek, C J. Das Fiirstenthum Bulgarien. Prague, 1891. 



197] BIBLIOGRAPHY 197 

Joyneville, C. Life and Times of Alexander I. Emperor of All the 

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Kanitz, F. Donau — Bulgarien und der Balkan. 3 Vols. Leipzig, 1882. 
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Midhat, Ali Haydar. Life of Midhat Pasha. Chaps. II and III. 

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Mijatovich, C. A Royal Tragedy. London, 1906. 

Servia and the Servians. London, 1908. 

Miller, W. The Balkans. London, 1899. 

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don, 1886. 
Near East, The. Anon. New York, 1907. 
Noyes, J. O. Roumania: The Border Land of the Christian and the 

Turk. New York, 1858. 
Odysseus (Eliot, Sir C.) Turkey in Europe. London, 1900. 
Pourcher, C. Essai d'etude du droit d' intervention en Turkie, applique 

au probleme Balkanique. Paris, 1904. 
Rachitch, V. Le Royaume de Serbie. Paris, 1901. 
Ranke, L. von. History of Servia. Eng. transl. by A. Kerr. London, 

1847. 
Rochkovich, S. La Mission du peuple Serbe dans la question d'Orient. 

Considerations sur le passe et sur I'avenir des pays balkanique. 

Paris, 1886. 
Samuelson, J. Roumania Past and Present. London, 1882. 
Selected Writings of Vincent Strangford. London, 1869. 
Stapleton, A. G. The Political Life of George Canning, 1822-27, 2nd 

Ed. 3 Vols. London, 183 1. 
St. Clair, G. B. and Brophy, C. A. Twelve Years' Study of the Eastern 

Question in Bulgaria. London, 1877. 
The Cambridge Modern History. Ed. by A. W. Ward and others, 

Vols. X-XI. London, 1907-9. Chapters on affairs in Turkey. 
The People of the Balkans — by a Consul's Daughter and Wife. Ed. by 

S. L. Pool. London, 1878. 



198 BIBLIOGRAPHY [jg$ 

Thouvenel, L. Trots Annies de la Question d' Orient, 1856-9. Paris, 

189/. 

Washburn, G. Fifty Years in Constantinople. Boston, 1909. 

Wilkinson, W. An Account of The Principalities of Wallachia and 

Moldavia. London, 1820. 

Worms, Baron H. de. England's Policy in the East. London, 1877. 

Vakschitch, G. L'Europe et la resurrection de la Serbie, 1804-1834. 

Paris, 1907. 

III. SPECIAL ARTICLES AND EDITORIALS. 

"Alexander I of Bulgaria." C. Williams. Contemporary Review, 

Vol. L. 1886. 
" Alexander, Prince, of Battenberg." Anon. Saturday Review, Vol. 

LXIV. London, 1887. 
" Austria and the Berlin Treaty." R. Blennerhassett. Fortnightly 

Review, Vol. XC. 1908. 
" Balkans, Bluff in the." Anon. Blackwood's Magazine, Vol. CLXXXV. 

New York, 1909. 
" Balkan Crisis and the Macedonian Question, The." N. D. Harris. 

Forum, Vol. XLI. 1909. 
" Balkans, The Future of." M. R. Ivanovich. Fortnightly Review, 

Vol. XCI. 1909. 
" Balkan Settlement, The." Outlook, Vol. XCI. New York, 1908. 
"Bulgaria and the Treaty of Berlin." S. Tonjoroff. North Am. Rev., 

Vol. CLXXXVIII. 1908. 
" Bulgaria, Church in." G. M. Mackenzie and A. P. Irby. Good Words. 

London, 1865. 
" Bulgaria, The New." An Eastern Statesman. Contemporary Review, 

Vol. XXXV. 1878. 
"Bulgarian Plot, The." Art. Quarterly Review (London), Vol. 

CLXIII. 1886. 
" Bulgarians, On the." J. Beddoe. Journal of the Anthropological 

Institute of Great Britain and Ireland, Vol. VIII. London, 1879. 
" Michael Obrenovich, Prince of Servia." H. Sandwith. Fortnightly 

Review, Vol. XIII. 1870. 
" Montenegro." Anon. Edinburgh Review. Vol. OX. 1859. 
" Montenegro." W. E. Gladstone. Nineteenth Century, Vol. I. 1877. 
" Montenegro and Her Prince." D. Burchier. Fortnightly Review, 

Vol. LXX. 1898. 
" Near East, The Crisis in the." E. Reich. Nineteenth Century, Vol. 

LXIV. 1908. 
" Near Eastern Crisis, The." E. J. Dillon. Contemporary Review, VoL 

CXIV. 1908. 



I99 ] BIBLIOGRAPHY ! 99 

" Near East, The Problem of the." Calchas. Fortnightly Review, 
Vol. XC. 1908. 

" Near Eastern Crisis, Real History of the." Vidi. Fortnightly Review, 
Vol. XCI. 1909. 

" Servia." Nation, Vol. VII. 1868. 

M Servia and the Balkans." Outlook, Vol. XCII. New York, 1908. 

" Servia, Economic Development of." Am. Review of Reviews, Vol. 
XXXIX. 1909. 

" Servia, Exodus of Mussulmans from." Anon. Macmillan's Maga- 
zine, Vol. VIII. Cambridge, Eng., 1863. 

" Situation in the East. The." E. Laveleye. Contemporary Review. 
Vol. L. 1886. 

" Slavonic Problems. Bulgaria, etc." The Spectator, Vol. CI. Lon- 
don, 1908. 

M Slavs, The Spread of the." Journal of the Anthropological Institute 
of Gr. B. and Ireland, Vol. VIII. London, 1879. 

" Turkey." Lord Stratford de Radcliffe. Nineteenth Century, Vol. I. 
187/. 

" Turkey in Europe." W. M. Sloane. Political Sc. Quarterly, Vol. 
XXIII. New York, 1908. 



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VOLUME XII, 1899-1900. 586 pp. Price, $3.50. 

1. History and Functions of Central Labor Unions. 

By William Maxwell Burke, Ph.D. Price, $1.00. 

2. Colonial Immigration Laws. By Edward Emberson Proper, A.M. Price, 75 cents. 

3. History of Military Pension Legislation in the United States. 

By William Henry Glasson, Ph.D. Price, $1.00. 

4. History of the Theory of Sovereignty since Rousseau. 

By Charles E. Merriam, Jr., Ph.D. Price, $1.50. 

VOLUME XIII, 1901. 570 pp. Price, $3.50. 

1. The Legal Property Relations of Married Parties. 

By Isidor Loeb, Ph.D. Price, $1.30. 

2. Political Nativism in New York State. By Louis Dow Scisco, Ph.D. Price, $2.00. 

3. The Reconstruction of Georgia. By Edwin C. Woolley, Ph.D. Price, $1.00. 

VOLUME XIV, 1901-1902. 576 pp. Price, $3.50. 

1. Loyalism in New York during the American Revolution. 

By Alexander Clarence Flick, Ph.D. Price, $2.00. 

2. The Economic Theory of Risk and Insurance. 

By Allan H. Willett, Ph.D. Price, $1.50. 

3. The Eastern Question : A Study in Diplomacy. 

By Stephen P. H. Duggan, Ph.D. Price, $1.00. 

VOLUME XV, 1902. 427 pp. Price, $300. 

Crime in Its Relations to Social Progress. By Arthur Cleveland Hall, Ph.D. 

VOLUME XVI, 1902-1903. 547 pp. Price, $3.00. 

1. The Past and Present of Commerce in Japan. 

By Yetaro Kinosita, Ph.D. Price, gi.50. 

2. The Employment of Women in the Clothing Trade. 

By Mabel Hurd Willet, Ph.D. Price, $1.50. 

3. The Centralization of Administration in Ohio. 

By Samuel P. Orth, Ph.D. Price, $1.50. 

VOLUME XVII, 1903. 635 pp. Price, $3.50. 

1. * Centralizing Tendencies in the Administration of Indiana. 

By William A. Rawles, Ph.D. Price, $2.50. 

2. Principles of Justice in Taxation. By Stephen F, Weston, Ph.D. Price, $2.00. 

VOLUME XVIII, 1903. 753 pp. Price, $4 00. 

1. The Administration of Iowa. By Harold Martin Bowman, Ph.D. Price, $150. 

2. Turgot and the Six Edicts. By Robert P. Shepherd, Ph.D. Price, $1.50. 

3. Hanover and Prussia 1795-1803. By Guy Stanton Ford, Ph.D. Price, $2.00. 

VOLUME XIX, 1903-1905. 588 pp. Price, $3.50. 

1. Josiah Tucker, Economist. By Walter Ernest Clark, Ph.D. Price, $i 50, 

2. History and Criticism of the Labor Theory of Value in English Political 

Economy. By Albert C. Whitaker, Ph.D. Price, £1.50. 

3. Trade Unions and the Law in New York. 

By George Gorham Groat, Ph.D. Price, $1.00. 

VOLUME XX, 1904. 514 pp. Price, $3.00. 

1. The Office of the Justice of the Peace in England. 

By Charles Austin Beard, Ph.D. Price, $1.50. 

2. A History of Military Government in Newly Acquired Territory of the 

United States. By David Y. Thomas, Ph. D. Price, $2.00. 

VOLUME XXI, 1904. 746 pp. Price, $4.00. 

1. *Treaties, their Making and Enforcement. 

By Samuel B. Crandall, Ph.D. Price, #1.50. 

2. The Sociology of a New York City Block. 

By Thomas Jesse Jones, Ph.D. Price, $1.00. 

3. Pre-Malthusian Doctrines of Population. 

By Charles E. Stangeland, Ph.D. Price, $2.50. 



VOLUME XXII, 1905. 520 pp. Price, $3.00. 

The Historical Development of the Poor Law of Connecticut. 

By Edward W. Capbn, Ph.D. 

VOLUME XXIII, 1905. 594 pp. Price, $3.50. 

1. The Economics of Land Tenure in Georgia. «.««_,- 

By Enoch Marvin Banks, Ph.D. Price, $1.00. 

2. Mistake in Contract. A Study in Comparative Jurisprudence. 

By Edwin C. McKeag, Ph.D. Price, $1.00. 

3. Combination in the Mining: Industry. By Henry R. Mussby, Ph.D. Price, £1.00. 

4. The English Craft Guilds and the Government. «.•*«_, 

By Stella Kramer, Ph.D. Price, ji.oo. 

VOLUME XXIV, 1905. 521 pp. Price, $3.00. 

1. The Place of Magic in the Intellectual History of Europe. 

By Lynn Thorndike, Ph.D. Price, 75 cents. 

2. The Ecclesiastical Edicts of the Theodosian Code. 

By William K. Boyd, Ph.D. Price, 75 cents. 

3. *The International Position of Japan as a Great Power. 

By Seiji G. Hishida, Ph.D. Price, $2.00. 

VOLUME XXV, 1906-07. 600 pp. Price, $4.00. 

1. • Municipal Control of Public Utilities. By Oscar Lewis Pond, Ph.D. Price, $1.00. 

2. The Budget in the American Commonwealths. 

By Eugene E. Agger, Ph.D. Price, $1.50. 

3. The Finances of Cleveland. By Charles C. Williamson, Ph.D. Price, $2.00. 

VOLUME XXVI, 1907. 559 pp. Price, $3.50. 

1. Trade and Currency in Early Oregon. By James H. Gilbert, Ph.D. Price, $1.00. 

2. Luther's Table Talk. By Preserved Smith, Ph.D. Price, gi.oo. 

3. The Tobacco Industry in the United States. 

By Meyer Jacobstbin, Ph.D. Price, $1.50. 

4. Social Democracy and Population. By Alvan A. Tenney, Ph.D. Price, 75 cents. 

VOLUME XXVII, 1907. 578 pp. Price, $3.50. 

1. The Economic Policy of Robert Walpole. By Norris A. Brisco, Ph.D. Price, $1.50. 

2. The United States Steel Corporation. By AbrahamBerglund, Ph.D. Price, $1.50. 

3. The Taxation of Corporations in Massachusetts. 

By Harry G. Friedman, Ph.D. Price, $1.50. 

VOLUME XXVIII, 1907. 564 pp. Price, $3.50. 

1. DeWitt Clinton and the Origin of the Spoils System in New York. 

By Howard Lee McBain, Ph.D. Price, £1.50. 

5. The Development of the Legislature of Colonial Virginia. 

By Elmer I. Miller, Ph.D. Price, $1.50. 

S. The Distribution of Owner ship. By Joseph Harding Underwood, Ph.D. Price, $z. 50. 

VOLUME XXIX, 1908. 703 pp. Price, $4.00. 

1. Early New England Towns. By Anne Bush MacLbar, Ph.D. Price, $1.50. 

S. New Hampshire as a Royal Province. By William H. Fry, Ph.D. Price, I3.00. 

VOLUME XXX, 1908. 712 pp. Price, $4.00. 

The Province of New Jersey, 1664—1738. By Edwin P. Tanner, Ph.D. 

VOLUME XXXI, 1908. 575 pp. Price, $3.50. 

1. Private Freight Cars and American Railroads. 

By L. D. H. Weld, Ph.D. Price, $1.50. 
8. Ohio before 1S50. By Robert E. Chaddock, Ph.D. Price, $1.50. 

3. Consanguineous Marriages in the American Population. 

By George B. Louis Arner, Ph.D. Price, 75c. 

4. Adolphe Quetelet as Statistician. By Frank H. Hankins, Ph.D. Price, I1.25. 

VOLUME XXXII, 1908. 705 pp. Price, $4.00. 

The Enforcement of the Statutes of Laborers. By Bertha Haven Putnam, Ph.D. 

VOLUME XXXIII, 1908-1909. 635 pp. Price, $4.00. 

1. Factory Legislation in Maine. By E. Stagg Whitin, A.B. Price, $1.00. 

2. *Psychological Interpretations of Society. 

By Michael M. Davis, Jr., Ph.D. Price, $2.00. 

3. *An Introduction to the Sources relating to the Germanic Invasions. 

By Carlton Huntley Hayes, Ph.D. Price, $1.50. 



i 



VOLUME XXXIV, 1909. 628 pp. Price, $4.00. 

1. [89] Transportation and Industrial Development In the Middle West. 

By William F. Ghphart, Ph.D Price, $2.00. 

8. [90] Social Reform and the Reformation. 

By Jacob Salwyn Schapiro, Ph.D. Price, $1.25. 

3. [91] Responsibility for Crime. By Philip A. Parsons, Ph.D. Price, $1.50. 

VOLUME XXXV, 1909. 568 pp. Price, $4.00. 

1. [93] The Conflict over the Judicial Powers in the United States to 1870. 

By Charles Grove Haines, Ph.D. Price, $1.50 

8. [93] A Study of the Population of Manhattan ville. 

By Howard Brown Woolston, Ph.D. Price, $1 25. 

3. [94] * Divorce: A Study in Social Causation. 

By James P. Lichtbnbbrgbr, Ph.D. Price, $1.50. 

VOLUME XXXVI, 1910. 542 pp. Price, $3.50. 

1. [95] * Reconstruction in Texas. By Charles William Ramsdell, Ph.D. Price, $-a. 50. 

rom Colony to Commonwealth. 

By Charles Ramsdell Lingley, Ph.D. Price, £1.50. 

VOLUME XXXVII, 1910. 606 pp. Price, $4.00. 



8. [96] The Transition in Virginia from Colony to Commonwealth. 

R/ 



1. [97] Standards of Reasonableness in Local Freight Discriminations. 

By John Maurice Clark, Ph.D. Price, $1.25. 

8. [98] Legal Development in Colonial Massachusetts. 

By Charles J. Hilkey, Ph.D. Price, $1.25. 

3. [99] * Social and Mental Traits of the Negro. 

By Howard W. Odum, Ph.D. :Price, |2.oo. 

VOLUME XXXVIII, 1910. 463 pp. Price, $3.00. 

1. [1001 The Public Domain and Democracy. 

By Robert Tudor Hill, Ph.D. Price, $2.00. 

8. [101] Organismic Theories of the State. 

By Francis W. Coker, Ph.D. Price, $1.50. 

VOLUME XXXIX, 1910. 

1. [108] The Making of the Balkan States. 

By William Smith Murray, Ph.D. Price, $1.50. 



The price for each volume is for the set of monographs in paper. Each volume {except Vol. II), as well 
as the separate monographs marked*, can be supplied in cloth-bound copies, for 50c. additional. 
All prices are net. 



The set of thirty-eight volumes, covering monographs l-ioi, is offered, bound, for $J30: except that 
Volume II can be supplied only in part, and in paper covers, no. l of that volume being out of print. 
Volumes I, HI and IV can now be supplied only in connection with complete sets. 



For further information, apply to 

Prof. EDWIN R. A. SELIGMAN, Columbia University, 

or to Messrs. LONGMANS, GREEN & CO., New York. 
London: P. S. KING & SON, Orchard House, Westminster. 






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